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appropriate ma:1agement tool. This ' .... as sUDport.ed by the :<.yan and 
OestreJ..ch -::- e port in 1991. To e x plore the current status of fear ln 
the military workplace, th:'..s st:.u:iy imres tigates a particular 
superlor-subordinate relationship at company level in the Army 
env i ronme n t at Fort Ord , Callfernia. A sequence of in - depth 
J..:lterviews with a C::lmpany Commander and his Executive Officer 
p r ovide the da t a base. A fear model is developed to assist i n 
catego::izing a nd analyzing the articulated fears. ':'he array ::If 
fears recorded dl:ri:1g t.he interviews enabled us to address t.he 
fo l lowing issues : (1) the extent t.O which fear is applied as a 
management tOOl, (2) whether the 'lse of ~ear in a l eadership 
context. is viewed apprcpriate by t..he office::::-s, and (3) the possible 
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When the master governs, the people 
are hardly aware that he exists. 
Next best is a leader who is loved. 
Next, one who is feared. 
The worst is one who is despised. 
(TAO TE CHING NR 17) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fear is a fundaIT.":1ta~ cOIT.por_ent of eu::: humae exist"n::G. 
daily l:'ves are filled wi tl: e:::cur~ences we often :.lGr.c:.e as 
[e0r:'u~. P,"ople are afraid to lO~<Je :he:'r jebs, st"J.dents il.~2 
afrodd te [ai~ in a test, SO:Tle ::.ndividuals are .afroid cf 
or. s::::hool compeu::lds. ':'he variety ~f f2ars i::; enOrDo'.lS, 
di:fe:::-e:tt lndividuals eXDerien::::e d:'..f:erent fea::s, a:lc fears 
can have p08it:'ve ar.d :1egative aspects. 
The phen~meno:1 of :nen's fea:::- seem to be as old as IT.anki:ld 
and started p:::oba::J':"y as early as :.iesc::i.t;e::i in L"le B:'...ble's book 
"Genesis t. l\tt.er Adam a:1c Eve failed :'0 comply with ":_:"1e ::'ord' S 
erde:: tu stay away frem the tree of :'he knowledge ef ':fuud and 
evil, they :'ns::antly :::-ealized that they were naked a:1d they 
[el:. ashamed about. it .. 'fiber. tr.e Lord · ... alked around and called 
:.hem, they hid f::am h:'s prese:lce. Adam sa:'d tu the Lar-::i: 
heard the Beund of t:"lee in t:"le gar-den and 1 was af::d.i::i, 
because I was :laked; a:ld I hid myself. tr :Ref. 21 :Genesis 
3: 10: . 
Fear- can have a tr-emendous impact or. our ~:.ves. The 
spectrum embraces negative as well as pcsitive ext.remes. 
may sti:nula:.e us and activate powertul energy resources, it. 
may he U"_e driving force for great achievemer.t_s or t.he majo:::-
impediment t:.o accor.Lplish our tasks, 0::- it may paralyze and 
even rUl-n us. Psychologists have fOrr:lulated various fear 
theories and embarked on experinlental r e sea:::-ch. Reasons fer 
tear were ::-esearched, individual responses to :ea::-t'..l l 
situations analyzed, and methods to overcome t e ar were 
developed. 
: n the 1950s Dr. Edward Deming published his guide':' i nes 
for ·'Total Quality l'o'.a:1agement" , including h i s wel l k!1own list 
ot 14 points to be used in the ;Jlementation of his 
ph i ~osop:1.y of a new management style. Point number eight 
elaborates the :::-equirement "Drive fea:::-" tron the 
workplace. My interest was stimul ated by this particu l ar 
fundamental peint. T:1.e idea of an ent:.irely fearless workplace 
is exciting. But is it real l y achievable to the extent 
described by Deming? Ryan and Oestreich reported in 1991 that. 
managers stil l want to use fear as a management too l rather 
than eliminate it. from the workplace. 
'::'his contrast between the requirements of Deming and the 
findings by Ryan and Oestreich are the basis for this study. 
My intentions are (ll to explore the fears present in a 
particular workplace, (2) to determine the impact ot tear on 
the performance of workers in that particular workplace, (3) 
to inquire managements opinion about the appropriateness of 
fear as a management tool, and (4) to answer the question, 
whether fear can be eliminated entire l y from a workplace. 
II. BACKGROUND FOR THIS STlJDY 
Edward Deming asserts a set of 14 po ~nts which ~ n his vi.ew 
necessary for creating excellence in organlza::i:.ms tha::. 
can generate qua l ity. Peint e i ght of h i s 14 po i nts dec-:lares: 
"Dr i ve (Jut fear" He described a variety of aspects whe:::"2 r.e 
found evidence ~.hat fear · ... as prevaili:lg i:1 the ' ... or '-qJlace and 
suggested ways to eli:nil'.ate it.. Since then, many organizations 
have started to imple:nent De:ning's theory of Tota l Qua l ity 
Leadership {TQL) including the pain::. about drivi:1g out fear. 
On the other hand, most management today seem t::J \.;se [ear 
to so:ne extent. Examples range f rom ignoring subord i nates. to 
cut t h em off :.r.e in[orrr.atien f l ow, to being aggressive, to 
using physical threat . In a recent book by Kathleen D. Ryan 
and Daniel K. Oes treich "Driving Fear out of the Workp l ace" 
the authors state ::hat today's managers oEte!1 view fear as a 
des i red e l ement. within t. heir orga:1izations. fhese macagers 
didn't want to eliminate it but asked for appropriate methods 
to oont1::'ol and manipulate fear. The~r argument was t hat 
controlled fear can be used to achieve higher goals of 
[lroduc::ivi::y [Ref. 15:p. xv]. 
Ryan and Oestreich demonstrate that a strong inverse 
relationship exists iJetween fear and productivity. Their 
investigation is limited t::J "the fear of s[lcaking up in the 
workplace". Nevertheless, for this particu l ar type of fear the 
res).;. l ts seem to demonstra'::e that productivity can be iacreased 
significantly by reducing the fear. They also found evidence 
that levels of productivity were :"ower in cases where fear was 
?revalent in the workplace. 
The contrast betwe en the findings of Ryan and Oestreich 
and the opinions of some manage::::-s stimul ated my i nteres t . The 
question arose about t he role of fear in the practice of 
today's military l eadership. I was inte::::-es t ed in finding out 
t o what ex t en t the rel ationship between fear and p::::-oductivity 
was realized 1.n the military context . Furthermore, I wanted to 
exp l ore to what degree Demiag's TQL ph i losophy had been 
adopted and p::::-obably implemented by the armed forces. I was 
par t icu l a rly interested in finding out (1) to what extenl, if 
at all, Deming's TQL phi l osophy had been disseminated down LO 
the company leve :" , (2) to what extent, if at all, the actual 
pract i ce of l eadership in this particular company ref l ected 
TQL theories, and (3) the opinions of officers about Deming ' s 
requirement to drive out fear in the workplace. 
Another point of interest was that Ryan and 8estre ich 
l imited their research to one specific f ear ; '-he fear of 
speaking llP in the workplace. My impression is that more than 
just one type of fear is present i n the workplace, and those 
fears have not received very much attention. My intentioI"'_ is 
to map the variety of fears which can be found in the 
workplace, i n order to t:nde!'stand the i r presence and thelr 
effects. 
Xore detai l ,,"Q knowledge about fears and thelr 
interdep,,"ndencies wi l l be he l pful to better understand and 
evaluate employee's behavior ar.d reactions . It may also 
provide he l pf"l guidance fcr leadersh i p .l l'lp!"ovements. Ryan's 
and OeBtreich's research is str i cc:.y i n line with Cem.lng's 
peint. number eight. They expl ored thoroughl y the various 
aspects of the fear ef speaking up and provide we t hcds f or 
leadership improverr,e :1ts to elimi nate chis specific fear . My 
approach is broader. To pursue Demir.g' s geal to eliminate fear 
in the wo!:.""kplace, it seems vital for me to identify whatever 
fea!:.""s are actt:al l y pr,,"sent. In a secend step, corrective 
actions can be developed to eliminate those fears. Th is study 
will attempt: to accomplish t he first. step: to ident.ify the 
fe<J.rs in one particular situat.ion. 
I found , that the different se:::vices of the US Armed 
Forces have l aunched efforts to implement TQL~techniqu,,"s in 
the recent past. The degrees of acceptance , dissemi:1at.ion, 
implementation, and enforcement vary bet.ween units. The :irst 
studies are underway· to assess the actual sitt.:ation and 
d':'scover ways for imprevements and corrections. 
My study will be conducted in a stock-taking manner 
focus ing on a very part icular situation. The study is intended 
to cover intensively the relat.ionship of two officers il~ a 
superior~ subordinate Different fears wil l be 
discussed and recorded . The study is i ntended to l ay a 
groundwork for- probable future research. Even though I wl.l l 
primari l y pursue my intention to answer- the resear-ch 
questions, I a l so presurr,e that my discoveries wil l stirr.ulate 
a var-iety of new questions . The resear-ch wi ll focus on t:"1e 
identificat.:.or, and differentiation of (1) the i ndividual 
fears, reported by the two cfficers , (2) fears, which <lr-e 
based upon cr related to their particular relationshi.p, and 
(3) fears, which are related to their- c i vi l ian and military 
environment . 
The study will add to the body of knowl edge abo'...lt the 
aspects of fear within the superior-subcrdinate relationship . 
Furthennore, the comp l exity of fear i:1 the workplace wi l l be 
described and an attempt will be made to ana l yze it. The 
i r. tention is to i:1crea·se the understanding of this complexity 
and infann the reader about the variety of identified fears. 
The reader may also gain va l uable information abou t how 
various fears influence the atmosphere of a workplace as we l l 
as the behav i or and, u l timately, the productivity of the 
employee. 
III. STATEMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
:::J~ming seated in his point m.:.rrloer 8 of :"1i8 1 4 poincs: 
"D-::-ive Oelt fear ' . This appears co be a very rigorous stat.ement 
and his reques::: se8ms t.o be, to eliminate fea r e:1t.l!:ely from 
:::he work place. The findings Of Ryan dr.~l Oestreich show that. 
managers don't want fear to be e l iminated . Their inte:1tion is 
to u se fear as an appropriate manag~me:1t tool. In t.he light of 
t hese contradictions I wanted to explore in dep:::"1 the e l ('ment 
of [ear in a narticular case to find out, to wha t extent (ear 
:'s prevalent in a workplace and to what. extent it is 
purposeful l y applied as a management ::001. 
Speci:ically, my study is directed t o research the 
fol lowing questions: 
1 Po the two off i cers feel any fears and if so what are 
.tll.e.y2 
I will expl ore the various manifestations of [ear 
currer-tly present in eac~l individual. Furt.hermore, 1 wil l 
examine, t.o what extent. fear may inf l uence or shape their 
relat.lonship. 
:::8 it possible to eliminate fear enr.ire l y "-rom tt:e 
mili~ary work p 1ace? 
This question will cry to evaluate Deming's requi rement , 
that. fear has to be eliminated complete l y, to arrive at a:1 
effective TQM work environment. I wi l l ca::-efu~ly attempt: 
to explore whet he:::.- his requirement may be overstated or 
whether ::.:: is app;opriate aCId applicable in the absolute 
'Hay he stated it. 
:3 . Do the interviewed officers bplieve that fear is an 
,3.;:mropriate manacement too l? 
I wil l solicit L'1eir opinions and try to find out. 
what extent they may have already followed or applied 
management techniques which result in a fear ~ree work 
env:'ronment. Do they agree, t hat fear can and should be 
eliminated from the military work place? A special 
interest is generated by the additional question, 'Hhether 
the military environment has a major inf:'uence on t.he 
officers attitude'towards fear. 
IV . CONCEPTUAL BAS IS POR FEAR AND MANAGEMENT 
A lite:ca:::ure search was condc.c::.ec based on ::i.if fe rent 
coffibinat:io!1s of terms re l a t e::i to c:he fields of Iraoage:l'.ent: 
(e. g . o rga:1iza t: ion, organizationa l behavior, organi z at.iona':' 
psychology) a!1d ~ (e . g. threat, intimida:::ion , uncerta i nty). 
J ournals covering the field of psycho logy we:ce examined 
seperate ::' y. Aft.e r I narrowed down the vast var i e ty of 
ava i lable pui:Jl~catiO!:s reviewed briefly about 100 
publ i cat i ons, b e fore se l ect.ing ahou::. 50 cooks <:Ind artic l es f o r 
deta iled review . 
Ny readings focused on the areas of psycho l ogy and 
organ~zat ional behavior. I f our.d many references to fear dnd 
l eadership, but I cou l dn' t find any work wh i ch described my 
spec~fic topic. Many articles present the research f i ndings in 
the f i elds of f ear and leadership with regard to qua l ity 
issue s , l eadership theories , or organizational behavior i n 
general. My particul ar intention is to explore t he various 
manifestations of fear j n the 1 eadership prQ~ess. 
To find an expl anat i on or d e f ini tion for t he ':erm fea r is 
a n in':eresting experience, since the topic is vast and there 
are many , many definitions of f e a r. ~, i::: i s impossib l e t.o 
find an appropriate vers ion sui tabl e for all purposes. Fear 
definitions usual l y serve a very spec ific purpose and are n o::. 
applicable outside that particular field of interest. Second, 
the var ious sciences Ilike bio :" ogy, psychology, and ethology) 
pursue different approached to e xp l ain the various phenomena 
associated with fear. ~, the observa t io:1s and conclusions 
differ from e ac h other ami are, which 
r elatively young scie:1tific discipline, sor:tetimes very 
controversial. 
I wil l give a brie f introduction into some of t he 
discoveries. The focus of rr,y s tudy wi l l remain on a ~
~rs:Je~tive and thus, I wil l be more interested in any kind of 
relationship between fear , I1'.a:1ageria:" duties and t. he work 
place . 
A. ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FEAR 
I wil l present a brief description of the development of 
the various fear t heories and the background of the studies 
t hat have led to these theories . 
A diffi c ulty is that most of the experiments have been 
done with animals. The findings of animal experiments are 
transferable to human behavior only to a l imited extent . 
Animals are widely lead by their instinct while human reaction 
is a combination of instinct and behavior based a nd related to 
intelligence. 
The Encyclopedic ,?j ct j qnary Of Psycho I ogy [Ref 9: p. 232 ] 
provides t he following definition of fear ; " A mot i vational 
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state a::-oused by specif i c e x ternal stimuli and p::-omoting 
avoidance, de.fensive and escape behavior ." 
Fearfu l behav i.or thus de tracts from the original task and 
diverts energy into prutective behavior . The individua l fee l s 
threatened and focuses no"" pr i rr.arily on acticl:S 1 ike def e nse, 
protec-:tion, 8r counterattack . In al l cases, the ene::-gy is no 
l onger ava i labl e for the original missi8n wh i ch wi ll s u ffe r. 
This i s i n line with Demi ng's ':'deas. I n an organizational 
conte xt, aspects l i ke p::-oduct i vity, product qua l ity , safety, 
and long t erm t hinking will get l ess attention and go down. 
What in gene::-al stimul ates fear? Various classificati8rl 
systems for fear st i rr.u li have been developed during the short 
h i sto ry of experimental psycho l cgy. D:l. tferent scienti f ic 
approaches yielded different explanatior:: mode l s . 
The psychol ogist J.B.Watson :Ref . l :p . 5j fO'.lnd in his 
studies in the early 1 920s evidence to formulate his fea::-
theory. Ee stated that Ir ••• the innate stimul i for fear (i.e. 
those which are capable of causing fear without special 
learning that t h ey are da:l.gerous or nox':ous) ca:l. be l imited to 
loud no i se, sudden loss of support, and pain . n . His 
observations led him t o the conclusion that "all othe r stimuli 
which ca:l. be seen to produce fear are t he:l. supposed to acquire 
this powe r as the resul t of a fonn of lea::-ning known as 
classical condition': ng, ... . He prese:l.ted a short list of 
three unconditioned fear stimuli (~, s udden loss of 
~, and ~) and attrib..lted all other stimuli to 
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conditioning . Fur-thennor-e, the behavior-:'..st Watson limited h i s 
studies to aniwa l s and g e nerali zed his find i ngs f o r all 
spec ~es . 
Gr-ay [Ref. l :p. 21 - 23] revis e d Watson's li st and offers 
five gener-al princ i p l es for fear- st i muli: i r.tens i ty, nove l ty. 
spec ~ a l evolutionary danger, stimuli arisi n g dur i ng socia l 
interaction, and conditio:led fear stimuli. Intens i ty i!1cludes 
a l l distal (stir:1uli ' .... ith which the receptor ~ s :lot in direct 
physical contact ) and proximal (the bo~iy cf the r e ceptor- i..s i n 
direct contact with L"le sour-ce of stimulati::m) inte nse stimu li 
(e . g. noise, light, e l ectrical shock, etc). rhe fear of 
nove l ty is closely related to the fear of stra:lgers or, i!1 
mo:::-e general tenns, to the novelty of a situation . In the same 
context Gray discussed, that suddenness in genera l seer:1S to be 
a notable element to determine the effectiveness of a fea:::-
stimul i. The rapid and unanticipated chan ge of a s ituaticn 
creates a diffe:::-ent and in many cases n ove l c o nditicn . The 
unaware mind may respond wi th fear to trois sudden change, 
especially when it doesn't fit familiar and we l l - known 
schemes. In the same context Gray discussed the phenomen on cf 
lack o f stimuli. When the individual has been accustomed to a 
certain pattern of actions and responses, the absence cf an 
expected action or response is similar to a novel c i rcumstance 
and ca!1 create fear. 
Maturation is one phenomenon related to fear. Not a l l 
fears are present at all times. Observations, described by 
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Gray [Ref l;p. 8-12), led to the conclusion, t:"1at some types 
of fear are i nnate and others got developed over time . 
?urthermore, the strength of a partic",la::::- fear can cha:lge over 
t i me . It may increase as well as decrease. For eXilmple. the 
[ear of snakes may be, d e v e l o ped by c h ildren, but not before 
the age of four. 
The studies were limited to children up to the age of 71 
month. No data were presented for adults. The observations 
showed, tr.at for one group of t e ars (e.g. noise, strallge 
objects, pain, falling, l oss of support, specif i c objects ar.d 
sit1.!ations ) the level of fea::::- was decreasing over time. For 
ano t her gro up (e.g. ridicule, rODbers, dreams, death, dark, 
anima l s, threat or danger, traffic, drowni:1g. fire, imagina:cy 
c~eature s) the fear level was increasing over time. I n both 
cases t he individual gained more knowledge about the 
pa~::_icular stimulus. The fear matured and the person showed 
different r e actions with increasing age. Inte~esting is, that 
fears seem to mature in both directions; they may go up 0':'-
dewn. 
Even though the expl anation for this phenomenon appea::,s to 
be stil: weak, it seems that those fears increase which are 
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:-elated to a learnir.g process. They do not seeIl'. to be ir,nate, 
they seem to be subject to the individual's developmer.t, the 
exposition of a pe~son to it's environment, the person is 
rais8d in, and their education, to name a fe w facto::-s. For 
e xample, the implications of interpersona l relationships in a 
f a c tory have to he l ea~ned, they are not irmate. Problems, 
re lated to those re l at i onships, and the possible fears, wh i ch 
may ::-esults from them, a~e thus subject t o a l earEing or 
development process. The fea::-s which see!":" to be i nr,ace 
decrease with the development of knowledge. eople, as they 
mature, seem to unders tand t he phenomenon "::let=~r and may find 
logical e xp lanations which he l p them to cope with the 
previously unknown or unfamiliar situation or obj ect. 
For my study I want to expand this theory beyond the 
origina l time frame of 0-71 month carefu l ly. I assume, that. 
the theory of maturation will be valid also during the li fe of 
an adult. Individuals get exposed to novel situatio:ls a ll the 
t i me during their life. Especially in the work environ:nent, 
frequent changes confront employees with new challenges. Peter 
Vaill , in his book Managing as a Performing Art offers a 
metaphor, which dem.onstrates the situation in modern 
organizations. He cal ls it ttpermanent white water". The story 
tell s us that managers often believe in paddling thei r canoes 
in st.ill, calm organizational wat e rs, and in assumillg they are 
able to go whereve r they want. They handle temporary 
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disruptions and a:::-e led by t.he hope, t he canoe wi 11 reach calm 
wat e rs soon. Bu t the truth is somewhat differ-ent: 
,"hese frequ e nt: changes, t he permanent uncertai n t i es, ar.d the 
numero'cls conEronLatiol":!s wi t: h novel conditions in our j obs may 
result in the development of fears if we he l l.-eve i n t he 
reality of ca l m organ-=--za t ional waters. People are se l dom 
prepared to cope with condj tions of "permanent white water" 
S;Jfficien'::ly. Most of the ',;o rkers have been t rainee to handle 
standard situatio:1s and are morc ot" l ess confused, when 
unanticipated changes occur. A thought of Peter Vail l may 
ill-Jstrate this point: 
How much c~ange, uncertainty, and n.:rbulence can the 
!'lodern manager handle? Everyone t hese days o; eems to be 
talking about the need to handl e substantial amounts of 
change, uncertainty , and turbulence, nut seldom do 'Ne find 
people talking about t!1e possibility t hat 'Ne l1'.ay be 
approacr.ing some kind of a red line of the psyche, s o~e 
state ..... here it is all just too mucro to cope ','lith [Ref 8 :p. 
11 . 
The unpreparedness and t.he possible feeling of ir.sufficient 
capabilities to respond effectively may lead to the 
development of fears, especially the f ear of failure. If a 
person has already encoentered novel situations, where he or 
she failed, the knowledge may be developed that novel 
sit:.lations are related to failure. This, in turn, may l ead to 
the deve l opment of fear of new and uncertain situations. The 
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fears about situations we encount e!' in our jobs are not 
innate. They a!'e developed over t i me wh~le we are exposed to 
the sti:nulu s. So:ne people wi l l g e t accustomed to the cha l l er.ge 
of char.ges. ot!'Jers will respond by d e veloping an increased 
fear. In oath cases we can say, the f ear has matured. 
One dist:inction between two fear-motivated behavio::-s may 
be helpfl:l to improve our ur.derstanding of human behavior. 
r.ve!'ybody tries to avoid negat:ive st i muli whenever p c ssibl e . 
Two differe nt types of react i ons, available t o us, have been 
i dentif i ed: "passive avoidance" and "active avoidar.ce" [Re f. 
l:p. 138 ] . Passive avoidance is re l ated to a sitl:ation, .... ·here 
the desire d be:'1av i or brings the indiv i dual in contact .... ·ith a 
negat i ve s t imu li. 
The typ i cal situation is, that a worker detects a 
deficiency and reports it to t:he supervisor wit:h the request 
for clarification and/or change of the current state . The 
supervisor is unreceptive for t!1is unfavorable report. I f the 
worker insists in demanding a change, the supervisor may rate 
his subordinate badly or treat him or her negatively. The 
worker will terminate' his complaints to avoid that negative 
treatment (punishment) in the future. The message fran the top 
is clearly: Don't do this, or else ... ! In the active avoidance 
situation, the individual is in permanent contact with the 
negative stimulus, until he shows the behavior, the superior 
wants him to show. The individual learns one particular 
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behavio~, whi ch enables hi:n to avoid punish."I1.enc; any uther 
behClvior will be punished. 
In :ny opinion, active avoidance is a rare occc;rrence in 
the crganizationa l world. It would mean, that the entire 
setting fo:- a new person wm:lc. be negative from t.he beginning . 
This adverse envi~onment would be changed griidt.:ally, when che 
new person diS91ayed a behavior, which is in congruence wit h 
the organ 1. zational culture. In genera l , organizational 
environrr.ents are not ent irely ne3acive fro:n che beginning . Tf 
the new person shows behavi or wh i c.h is in contrast. t.o the 
existing no:::ms, an educational process will be initiated . 
Nec;ative r e.l n:orce:nents may be used if c.c::nventionCl l 
educa t iona l pract.ices do not yield the desi~ed outcome. If the 
ne-", person responds '::: 0 those n e gac ive reinforc::ements , t his can 
be explained by passive avoidance . 
B. THE NOTION OF FEAR IN THE TOM ENVIRONMENT 
In his book about Dening' s theories, Rafael Aguayo devoted 
a chapter to Deming's point :-:lumber eight "Drive out fear, 
that everyone may work effective l y for the company" [Ref . 3:p . 
183 -198 J. He stated that bad managemer. t practices Clre 
continuing to reinforce the idea that fear can be employed as 
a u seful and acceptable rreanagement tool. (this iB the point 
rr.ade by Ryan and Oestreich, Ref Lp. xv). He goes on to 
describe that managers often seem to confuse fear with 
pressure. Individuals rreay induce pressure in c:her'lselves to 
achieve higher goals or to satisfy themse lves, their supe~iors 
or even peers. But .'-n no case would these people experie:1ce 
any ::ype of fear. The intrinsic desire to exce l is t he driving 
force behind the speci~ic effort in L'1ose instances and not 
any extrinsic pressure, which could induce fear. The 
difference in those cases clearly is between the voluntarily 
5el f imposed, sel fmo t i va ti:1g versus ::.he external press\;.~e. 
Individuals 10'1',0 operate under fearful conditions wil l 
invest enO!:IT.ous eaergies to overcome the fear or to eliminate 
the so\;.rce of fear. This behavior has two negative effects on 
a company. ~, valuable resources will be used !:or defense 
purposes by individua l workers. The employees wi l l be very 
careful in choosing their actions and wi l l also devo te much 
t ime and energy to check, whether actions will be safe for 
them. The "zero defect" mentality cons idered 
counterproducti ve to a company's performance, because it 
diverts employee energy away from the actual objectives (e .g. 
improve company's prof it, improve qual ity). Second, the 
employee may manipu l at'e his performance figures in an attempt 
to make them look favorable. In this case, management would b e 
deceived and would probably operate for a long time with the 
manipulated figures. 
Aguayo's final statement summarizes thi s point: "Fear, 
even if it were to produce greater effort, will not produce 
greater results" [Ref. 3:p. 184]. According ::'0 this idea, the 
at tempt to use fear as a leadership tool would inevitably end 
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in a loose-loose gam!2 fo::::- all participating part:ies. The 
emp loyee mig:'1t loose trust to his sClperiors, confidence in his 
own C'.hilities, or the loyalty t.o the ::ompany . He also looses 
e[fecciveness, because he is splitting his energy between 
produccioIl efforts and his individual safety sys;;:em. The 
manager will loose cl early on the production side . Eff i ciency 
and quality will drop, division perfonnance .1n al l areas may 
be affected negatively by t:-te behavior of the Err.ployees, whier. 
is GOW governed by ~ear rather t r.an company oriented 
effectivefiess. Tr.e mcinager will nut be able to fu::"fil 1 his 
gOd 1 s i n the long run. The cr.mpany as a who l e will ~uf f er 
most, cspeci Ol.l ly in the l ong and very 1 0r:.g r UG. The mission 
Carl on ly be accomplished partially or no:. at a l l . Custumers 
may leave th e crganiza::: ion as wel l as suppl iers, robbing the 
company off it's vital basis . Int:ernal problems wi ll be 
reflected by ind:'cators l i ke high turn over :::"ates, 
dissat:'sfaction of the employees, and/o:::" increas i ng n·..J.IDber of 
gr: evances or complaints. 
My study is geared to d:'scover different types ot fear in 
the speci fic military environment under investigation. From 
Deming's theory I learned, that a variety of fears exist in 
the corporate world. Aguayo concentrates on two types of fear 
i n his book [Ref 3:p. 1.85-1.86]. till.L he describes, how the 
situati::m of mismanagement is apt to stimulate the fear in the 
e:nployee, whether his job will be secured for the future or 
whether he will be facing unemployment soon. This fear is 
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based 0:1 observations, made by the e mp l oyee. He may have 
discovered, that t:'le compa:1y uses faulty parts, ineffective 
procedures, or sir:tpl y wastes money in various ways of 
CO:1rl.ucting it's business. The empl oyee rr.ay ask himself. how 
long this behavior may keep the compa:1Y in business and his 
j ob avai l able. Th is uncertainty creates the fea~, hm'l l ong he 
'",i l l be er:tployed with this company. I n this cO:1text, Aguayo 
mentions again. that manag"'rs wQuld l ' ke to control 9-~ 
~ ef!"ective l y, because " .. they perceive fear to be a 
motivator.". Managers did not seem to have rea l ized, that fea~ 
can be a mot i vator ::'ndeed, b-..Jt it wi l l net direct '",orker's 
energy towards constru ctive ac:::ions. The worker wi l l be 
IT.o t iva t ed to make his performance 100:-<: good, e ven though i t 
may not be good, The company l ooses a l l the energy, the 
employee puts into his efforts to cha:1ge a faulty picture into 
a good looking one, without c:'1anging the p r ocess to make the 
performance itself gOOd. The ~ type of f ear, he mentions, 
is the fear of failure. Employees are under the pressure o f 
meeting quotas and deadlines. These are the performance 
criteria against which salaries and evaluations are measured 
and ranked. In Deming's theory, this false focus resul ts in 
ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and strained :celationships 
between management and workers. 
Ma.t:y Walton points out another fear i:1 her book about 
total quality management [Ref 4:p. 72-73]. She describes the 
fear to speak up and report any kind of deficiency i n the work 
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a!:'ea. A:1Y COP.1rr.ent about a situation which is nct along · .. ith 
company standards or procedurp.s way denounce the messen,!er a 
nuisance maker. And these pe:Jple 'lre the first onc' s to get 
rid of in a s i t_uation, where t he company must layoff -.. orkers . 
It may also have negat i ve effects on the ev'lluatien reports, 
which , in t urn , will affect. sillary and prol~\otion . 1':"1is -LS a 
f ear w:"1ich Ciln be f oued in all levels of a corp:Jrate 
hierarchy. Even higher level manilgers, who don' t unde!:'stand 
certain face':.s of their jobs o!:' have detected :ailures 
inefficiencies , may worry to ask for c l a!:'ificat ion cr 
addition'll guidelines. Deming says: 
What are people afraid of? Af~aid ':.0 cO:1t!:'ibute to [he 
8et t.er r.ot get out of l ine . Don't violate 
Do it exactly this · .. ay. 
Aguayo ' s book has a paragraph about fea~ in t he military 
[Ref 3 : p . 184-185]. He ta l ks about the question of whether 
fear is a nccessary too l in the military . Eis ubservilt ions 
didn't suppcrt this t heory. He considered military manager as 
effective as their business counterparts . T:1 his vi e w, fear 
should not be used in the military at a l l. Ee demcnstrates, by 
citing the battle of Marathon, that the voluntary Greek army, 
which was intrinsicly motivated, was superior tc r_he 
involuntary Persian ~nny , which was managed by :ear and 
extrins i c motivation. Even though the Greeks were out:1umbered 
by the Persians, they won the battle. 
Nearly at: the same time L'1e Greek won against t:he Persians 
(490 Bel, Sun Tzu wrote in his book "The Art of War" about the 
relationship bet:ween milit:ary leaders and their subordinates: 
War ~s a rnatt:er 0: vital importance 
state ... Therefore appraise it in terms of the 
funeamental factors . .. ':'he fi-::st of these factors is 
.'.. nfluence ; the secane ... Ey IT.oral i!1fluence I mean 
which causes the people to be in harmony with 
l eaders, so that they will accompany them in life U!1to 
death withcut fear of mortal peril ... \fuen one t:-eats 
peop:"e with benevolence, justice, and righteousness, and 
reposes confidence in them, the army will be united in 
mind and will be happy serve their leaders. T:le Book of 
Changes says: 'In r.appiness at overccming difticlJ.lties, 
people fo-:::-get the danger of death.' r~ef 3:p. 63-64 ] 
Sun Tzu ranks the moral i.nfl uence higher than a l l other 
factors. ThlJ.s, a positive relationship between the leaders and 
the l ed is a crucial pre-::equisite for success. Every manager 
shou l d thus try to vitalize and concent-::ate a:"l energy at his 
subord.'..nates towards a common goal. In o-::der to achieve the 
rr.aximum possible success , it wil l be necessary for management 
to establish and maintain a trustful and harmonic envi-:::-orunent 
for all participants to work in. Another quotation of Sun Tzu 
may il l ustrat e and underscore this thought: 
He whose ranks are united in purpose wi l l be victo-:::-icus. 
Tu Yu: Therefore Mencius said: 'The appropriac: e season is 
not as important as the advantage of the ground; these are 
not as important as harmonious human relations.' [~et. 5:p . 
83] 
Sun Tzu establishes a di-::ect link between the harmon ious human 
relationships and the capability to unify forces towards a 
common goal. Human relationships are viewed as the most 
important factor to a llow the leader to concent:-::ate his 
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available manpm.'er. I believe, :.hat the l:1verSe conclusiun is 
also true: if a If>ader is incapable of establishing ar.d 
maintaining positive re l ationships with his subordinates, he 
·.,,1 1 1 not be able tel arrange their efforts i:1 a way wr.ich is 
necessary to accorr.plish his mission. To achieve this favorable 
cQ:1stellati:::m of trustfu l relationships, fear is, according to 
Sun 'I'll.:' and Deming, the most inappropriace means, because, 
Deming pointed it out, "the economic loss from fear is 
a ppal l ing." [Ref 4:p 72.] . 
One of my research questions is · .. herher it -i s possible to 
e l i:rinate fear entire] y from the mi 1 i~ary wOY-js place. Aguayo's 
viPcw is as fo l lows : 
Fear is harmfu l to the company and to individuals. '1'0 
e:im~nat:e fear, mdnagement must strive to tap intrinsic 
motivation. Management:. may not be able to e l iminate all 
fear from the l ives of its employees but it can Pcliminate 
t he sources of fear built into the management structures 
[:ZPct. 3:p . 189 ] . 
He admits, that the endeavo:::." to r:reate a fearless work 
envirOru:1ent is l imited. But he also makes the distinct point, 
that management has the chance to reduce the fear 
significantly by creating favorab le management st:::."uctures . 
Those Strl:.ctures should apparently reflect the ideas of 
Deming's TQ:-1 philosophy. Aguayo does not talk in IT.ore detail 
about t:'le probable reasons, why the entire elimination of fear 
IT.ay be unattainable. From my perspective, one reason i s the 
complexity of the construct of fear. Fear is a multi l ayer 
phenomenon. Different areas of our lives can s t imulat e fears. 
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When we come to our · ... ork place, we carry those !:ears wit:'l us. 
I t is iIT.possib l e to separate "p:::-ivate and business fears". 
Furthe rmore, those fears inf l uence each other and rr.ay ever. 
increase eac:'l other. No manager has knowledge or control over 
al l aspects, which may s t imu late fear in his workers. Not ever. 
the worke:::- hi:nself may have this ab i lity. Thus, the 
elimination of all fea r s can not be a reasonable approach fo r 
mar..agers. But , as Aguayo c l earl y stated, the eliminat ~ on of 
fears, which are based on management structures and behaviors 
can and should be eliminated by management. This wou ld reduce 
the entire fear potent i al ir.. the workers sign i ficant l y. 
Moreover, the workers wou l d deve l op a much :nore favorable 
att i tude towards a "fearless work p l ace". E:nployees · ... ould then 
concentrate their efforts voluntari :' y and happily towards 
corporate goals. 
C. POSSIBLE COUNTERPOLES OF FEAR: TROST AND FAITH 
The tenn fear can not be explained sufficiently in an 
iso lated fashion. Fear is just one element of an emotiona l 
c ontinuum, that portrays parts of our l ives and behavi ors. At 
the other end of this spectrum we find express i ons l ike ~ 
or .Llit.h. Jack R. Gibb and Charles D. Bass describe the 
re l ationship between fear and trust and fear and faith, 
respectively. Their common intention is to evaluate this 
relationship and provide theories for overooming fear. They 
offer the reader two distinct ways of approaching and, 
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fiLJ.~ly, selv:--r:g L:le fear problem. 
sc':"cr:tifical~y based theory, w:"l::'le "'a.SS 
prov:"lies 
L"1e :-el':"qious 
Despile their di:'[eren:. methods, ::hey ~~'l.ve f'laey 
dSpCC~S i:l cem:nen. For eXaIl'.ple, beth d.lt.:lU:'·S.l;;e :.he symho:" of 
a seesa' .... , w'..t:"l fe.J.r 0.:: the O:1e e:1c. a:lc. trust or fdit:l o.t ::he 
e~.her eed. T: one elemen:. dominat.es, Lhe oLr.er su:fers. If 
low. =~. is ",:"so 
rel~larkabl e, :':"1at both authers 6.2:-ec L"lCtt the er.:.ir2 
el:"rr.indtion e[ [ear ':"'s eet possib~e. They ddmit, tha= tr.is 
..... ::lUld call for an idea:" cend:":.ion, which e.s p-:-oto.bly 
Ba.ss basef:l bif:l :'::l;:,ory '::lil the Bibl;:,. He sta.r::s wiLh ~.hc 
f:l:"tua::':"on w:len .::-esus and his disei[Jles c.::ossed tt:c SeCt of 
Galilee and a sto::::n CaIT.E up sJ.;.dd.E:1ly and unex[J2cted. 'The 
d':"sc':"[Jles s:"lo ..... ed s:'-:-O:lg s:"gns of fea-:- under tr.e impref:ls:",::m ::If 
gettir.g dro' .... r.cd SO::lr .. For Baf:ls, the quef:lt '::In, Jesus asked r.:"s 
d:"sciples, is the basis fo::: :"lis tr.eory: 
Bass qoes on ~o conclude: "W:"1i1e fear may evider.ce a lack ot 
taitn, ::he reverse :'s also true. FAITE CAN CONQUER FEAR i" 
[Ref. 1J :pS] . In h:"s book he a:"so describes the relat':"onships 
be::ween :ear and anxie:.y, stress, anger, depref:ls:'on, t:'midity, 
and embarrassment. He arrives at two inte~esting conclusicms, 
whi c h he derives from the d'--scussion of those ::-elationships: 
Flrst, if you are able >:'0 ove::-come fear, you wi l l, in most 
cases, overcome the other factors also. Second, a vast arf,ount 
of our energy i s used to cope w'-->:.h fear. The elimination of 
fear will free this energy, which then can be used for 
constructive, positive purposes. Bass' system ::'s tailored to 
provide valuable assistance for the ::'ndividual to improve his 
or her particular life situation. It is a belief-type system, 
wr.ere the mental processes and attitudes determine the success 
and the magnitude of the improvement. 
While Bass provides a v iable technique for the individual, 
Gibb's approach apparently targets the organizational arena. 
He investigates t:"1e consequences of the existence of fear in 
an organizational setting, establishes a counte::-pole to offser 
fear, and final l y creates his TORI (t rust, cpenness, 
realization, interdependency) management theory [Ref. ll:p. 
238]. For Gibb, most organizations are places with low trust 
leve l s. He goes even further by saying: 
Trust, unhappily, is not part of t he American, 
global, political way of life. I n fact, our present 
national culture - social, economic, even artistic, as 
well as political - is inhospitable to trust [Ref. l1:p. 
13] . 
He c:'laracterizes those organizations being often 
depersonalized and dehumanized. Their employees (workers and 
managers) invest a gr~at deal of their time in strategizing 
and defending activities. As a possible reason he identi:'--ed 
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feel.:::-. H~s re:nedy is tr..lst. In Lis opi:1~cn, t,he siz~ of .'!.n 
organization is dcterrr,i:1ant for :::_hc higL fear anc:: 10''; 
tr.lst level. In a s:nall grcLp {fa.mi::.y, pee:::- gL"C..lP, e:hnic 
,:/rut.:.p) t:1.e trust level :'s ust.:.ally higr .. FC:lple kllc'''' each ct:'"ler 
well, a h:'gh degree 0: openness is prevalent., li:::tle quest:.cr.s 
are asked, and people ::::c.s: eacr_ e:her ("T:::c.st :nakes ::.: 
'..In:1ecessa::y to exami:la :no:ive.s, to -_ock t:Jr :-t:'dden :ne:el':':1J3, 
t_8 :1.ave ~::: in w::'iting,. I :?2f : 1 :p. 141 tender_cy 
is, :::hat., t.he bigc.er tr_e ':Trec.p ':Tets, the Dcre tr_e ir.:::_f'ract.iu:1 
y~:d fo.::malized, st.andardized, and ctter. de.r:.l:nanized. 
G:::'bb c.ses a def:::':1::':ior_ fer trust, wr_ic:'"l "impli~s instinctive, 
ur.questioning oeliet i:1 and reliance upon sOIT.eth:::'ng. '1 [:?ef. 
II:;!. 14]. These are factors which require that the g:::oup 
melT,ber have an intimate knowledge of eac:'"l other. They bf-'l::'eve 
tr.e otr.er person, without checkir.g every act_ivity. They alsc 
dO:1't reter to or rely on procedures, rt:les, and n8:::ns as r.1uch 
as s:rangers would do. Strangers have a need to prctect 
themselves, oecause tr_ey ::"ack trust of eaeh ether. In a:1 
enVirOIL"l1e:1t, where people are unfami::"iar with eaeh other, the 
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situation, and/or the mission, more rules are establisrHod 
quickly to ~egulate the way of doing business. 
Gibb identifies four behaviors, which are integ~al parts 
of his defense process. T:1.ose behaviors are exhibited when the 
fear level is increasing and, consequent l y, the trust level 
decreasing: The first is depersonjng, · .. hich means, that a 
fearf "Jl person switches from being personal into some type of 
forma l role. This role is usua:'ly created on external p~essure 
and serves a p~otective function. The gain might be respect or 
control. Inc l uded in the apparent l osses are social relations 
and the results might be increased anxiety o~ host i lity. The 
second behavior is ~. In an effort of se l f protect~on 
fa:::ades are created to avoid intimacy and personal contact. 
Gibb assumes, that i nformation are filtered and distorted, 
distances are increased, and people ~esort to more fo=:' 
postures. In this context, people start strategizing wh i ch 
.. produces counter- strategy I social distance, circumvent i on, 
and aI"'. a~ray of counter defenses." [Ref. 1:":p. 30J. The third 
one is Q!!9.hting. The i ndividual is asking itself what the 
appropriate behavior would ce in response to exterr.al 
requisites. Own desires and wishes are suppressed in order to 
conform wi th organizational requirements and to avoid ar,y kind 
of pain. The fourth be?avior is ~. The fearful person 
is seeking or developing varicus types of controls, rules, o~ 
protective devices to keep it '8 life in order [Ref. 11:p. 26 -
31]. All those behaviors require a huge amount of energy to 
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bui ld up (l.:lc. t.O mJ.i:1tain. The be:'l(l.V~8rS are CO'~lnt_e~productive 
!-.O il.ny effective 8,::'::rar:lzat::.J-;nal Ll:lC:ic,m. '1'r_<2 e:1crgy is IlO:; 
ava~lGlc~c t':J::- prGd\lc~_ior_ pr8cesses, manago>IT.ent duties, or any 
ether necessi;I:-Y type of Cletioe w:'lich -.. muld sUpp:::J::-t-, the 
orgcc11zCltlc:n. G'-bc provides a list ',;itr. activit~es, -",hic11 
the energy: cva_\:a:~or., dist::::ust:, 11CJ::"'':'lzlr.g, 
c=-r::umve:1t:i::lll, d:..stor-:ior., fermality, i:1fluer.ce, pac;sivit:y, 
res:'-stance, ::teper_dency, IT.dn(l.3'O':ner:t, dnd rebcllicn. 'l'his lis:: 
tit Ce:n'-ng's stateDent, tr.at the eccnonir: loss of :eo..::' 
is Cip:;Jd':'llng. If a ~ L :hose e:1e:::'~~ es ''''ould be l:.scd ::1 a 
t.:::",lstfc:.l e:l'/ir'~Hur.ent to tr_c bcncfi::.:>~ tr_e organization, :r.e 
9"i:1 in ~rod'~lc-:-ivity, ::plality, and finally p::ofit WQc.ld bi:' 
?ol lcwinq Gibb's and Bass' princ::ples, trus-:- cr faitr. -"'i 1 1 
inr-:reas2 a:1d thc.s i:nprcve oc.r wellbeir_3, ef:ectiveeess, 
p=-Qdc.ct~vity, confidellr-:E', to :1aIT.e a few :a~t_o::-s. ~n bot:'! 
theories, fear is ~Q be subst::'~c.ted by e::'~her tLlst or :aith. 
Th~s would allow people r.ot to have fea::: ::n the :irst place. 
'1'he s"-lccess:c::l ::'rr.plementation of either :nethod w:;c.ld eliDir.at2 
the primary problem, to cope w::tr. fear at a::' 1 , becac::sc the 
deve~opmer.t 0: fear is prevented. 
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The approach of Cangemi and associates co:rbines the 
elements o f fear and trust with organizatio:1's and employee's 
needs . They made the observacion, t.hat trust is at a high 
leve l , '--f t:"1e two needs overlap signifL.:ant l y. Their 
int.e:::pretation of the ove::: l ap is, that it indicates 
.. . the presence of leadership behavio::: that: is 
s upportive of and sensitive to t:he needs of the emp l cyees; 
we can also assume t:hat the employee behavl.or is 
supportive of the o:::gar-ization's goals and the 
oryanization's l eade:::s:"1ip [Ref. 12:p . 3J. 
In this ~ituation, where trust is high, we can ta l k abol.'t a 
win/win situat'--on. Both, the organization and the employee 
wi:' l gair. from the positive atmosphere. Worke:::s feel f~ee to 
think, to participate, and make their contributions to the 
organizatio:1al deve:'opment . In this setti:1g even mistakes are 
made, because nobody fears :::etribution. When trust declines, 
distrust takes over and fears are deve l oped . The over:'ap of 
t:he two needs will be reduced, because the attention for this 
overl ap decreases a l so. Employees and manage:::s are more 
focused on t heir own problems, their defenses, and their 
strategies to survive. Cangemi and assoc i ates provide a list 
of leader behavi ors which goes along wi th the decl i ne of trust 
in an organization. I will d i splay some examples [Ref 12 ; p. 
4J : 
• Threats and punishment wi th little pra i se 
• Public criticism 
• Personal cri ticism 
• No i :1terest i:1 ir.put from employees 
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• The leac!ersr.ip is a: ways ri'J~"1= 
• FavoriLi",:n 
• DC·"'::lwa.::d cUlrur_u:lical~cn/r.cne upward 
• Ccr.stanl re~ eeticn 0: ideas 
• Litt:'e :-espeet ter CITployccs 
are locked upon as pa·"'ns/ohjec~_s 
prc·:ectional 
cowe::: they will meve tc,w3.rd l.:.nion:'..zat:'..on [:{e:. 11:p.4.1. Ti:e 
new sta~_e, wh=--r:h =--s desc:::ibed by Caeg~:Tl=-- a:ld aSSOCl.ates :),;1 a 
draDat:'..::: :ashlor. as 
cO:TlDUr.:_cCit':'()::l tJa.rriers be~weee lhf' e:n~)lcyccs ar.d the 
Dar.agf'IT.ent. T~'1e follow:'..ng oU:COr.les are pred=--cted by the 
aut~"1crs (examples from the co:nplete li,st cnly [ReI 12:~. 5::1: 
• Prod"-lct qua:'ity dctc::-lc·r:;J.tes 
• Scrap rate> is high 
• AbsenleeisIT. is r.ig:'1 
• l"".any capable/r.la::-ketab:'e people leave 
• 'Ceadli::lcs a::-e rarely :net 0:1 ~_ime 
• Careless use of macr.inery aed equipDent 
• Tr.ere ':'s muc:'1 shorl ~enl L:'1:'..nkieg 
• T:"1ere is little or r.o creat::'vity 
• ":'r.e company is seen as an enemy 
1::l their conclusions they gc along with Deming's statement, 
t:'1at the econorr,ic loss of :ear is enorP.1Ous. They agree, that 
the company will not be ab l e to sustain a competit. i ve pOs i tion 
'--n the marketp l ace. A downt.urn wil l fol 1cw. 
O. EXPLANATION OF LEADERSHIP 
In order to find answers to my research questions, it ' ... i 1 l 
be necessary to expl ore what is meant. by the te~':n 
·' l eadership". Associat.ed questions l ike "What is a leader?", 
"What is leadership?' "What is good or bad leadership?" 
"Eow can we improve the quality of :"eadership?" cone i nto 
mind. These questions- can be answered in an organizational 
I w'--l l use behavioral t erms to specify ~_he 
explanations. The scier.ce of organizational behavior is 
interested in exploring, understanding, and explail'. ing human 
behavior in various types of organizations, ::ruman behavi or is 
examined in relation to organizational performance. 3ot:h 
fac tors closely related and affect each ocher 
significantly. 
Organizations exist for a reason. One basic assumption is, 
t hat the existence of any organization is based upon or can 
usually be justified by the pursuit of some type of mission, 
Missions differ substaptially and may range froIT. makir.g profit 
to provide service without the intention to make any profit.. 
It may include the supply of a superior quality product or a 
unique item, or to capture market share. The organization c an 
be a production plant, where end products are manufactured or 
assembled, a service organization like an accounting or 
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consulting fi::-:n, t he govenllT,e:lta:" adninist~ation, or one of 
the mi litary services like the Army. Al l those organizations 
ne e d to estdblish f OnTld l struct_urcs to spec i fy and a:-range 
organizational design factors l ike authority. pcwer, 
res;J:.msibility, tasks, dnd j obs. The fermal scructure is tben 
~i l lerl. ';{ith individual workers ',;1'10 act:udlly perform the broad 
variety of dist .l.l'. ct tasks ",,:"1ich fina l ly sum up to the end 
produce. 
What is a leader? 
In th.. urganizati::m, peo ple are arranged in a 
hierarchica:" structure, '",hieh identifies superiors and 
subordinates. People werking in positio:1s from the top to t~e 
second t.o the last level of the hierarchy are called leaders. 
They may have differ~nt l abe l s :..ike C:20, Vice President, 
Direr:tor, manager or s'-lpervisor. In all cases they perfOrTI the 
leaders:"1ip functions. 
=n urder to stay in business and to fulfi l l t:"1e 
mission, the company has to be successEc;l. Leaders are tasked 
wi th the accompl ishment of certain goal s and obj ect i ves. ':'he 
leaders arrange, coordinate, guide, control, manipulate, 
check, counsel, coach, a!" evaluate their available reSOClrces. 
Those can be human resources (workers, employees), hard·,."are 
resources (property, bc;ildings, machinery, equipment, tools), 
or procedures/regulations/instructions. To achieve the goa l s 
in the most effective and eff icient way, t.he leaders should 
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find the optimal configuration of their ~esources. But this is 
only the mechanica l port i on of a leader's responsibility. The 
human i nteraction or human relationship aspec t s are crucial 
components to be considered carefully, when we talk about 
organizat i ona l success. The leadership, the way t:"1e l e ader 
1nteracts with his subordinates, determines to a great extent 
factors like orgaYliza t iona l climate, j ob 
satisfaction, etc. 
2. Presentation of leadership theories 
It is impossibl e to answer the question "\ihat 1S 
l eadership?" in a direct approach or a single sentence. 
Behavioral sc i entist have been working on a single definitioYl 
since decades. There success is lim':'ted. Fiedler presents a 
collection of definitions which is apt to illustrate t he 
problem. I wil l repeat some of the definitions here [Ref. 
13 :p. 3 - ,; ] : 
• The leader is one who succeeds in getting others to follow 
him (Cowley, 1928) 
• Leadership is the process of influencing group activi t ies 
towards goal setting and goal achievement (Stogdill, 1948) 
• The leader i s the person who creates the most e:'fective 
change in group performance (Cattel, 1951) 
• Leadership is the exercise of authority and the maki ng of 
decis i ons (Dubin, 1951) 
• Leadership is the initiation of acts that result in a 
consistent pattern of group interaction directed toward 
the solution of mutual problems (Hemphill, 1954) 
Leadership is a very complex theme. It involves t.-_~ leader and 
his subordinate as well as the environment. The environment 
can be d ivided up i nto .three distinct sub-envlronments: first, 
the situatior, in the workp l ace, wher-e the leader-subordinate 
interacti cm takes place. Second , the priva t e environment of 
the leader. Third, the private environmen t of t he subordinate. 
The pr i vate er.:vironment is comprised of factors Ilke family, 
cult u ral background, education, or ind i vidua l :ee1iog8 and 
thoughts. Thus, leadership is a t least a five - di:nensiona l 
relations h ip, with each factor constantly influenc ing the 
others. 
Over t i me several distinct t heoretical bases fer 
leaders :'1i p have been develope d. The e l dest one is the tra it 
theory or "grea t :nan" theory, whic :'1 implied, that some 
individuals were born to be leade~s. They e xhibited certain 
trai cs. which might be inborn or acqc;ired, and which made the 
people fo l low them. Researchers failed in most at t empt s to 
identi:y traits commO:l to all leaders , t o support the theory . 
The onl y t~ait which was clearly a frequently found factor i:1 
a ll investigations was intelligence. 
Group and exchange theories of leadership emphasized 
the interaction between the leader and the subordinates. 
Fiedler mentioned, that 
the leade r-member interaction thus involves some kind of 
psychological or economic e xchange . In che business worl d, 
this is usua l ly a wage or salary. But there is also likely 
to be some "psychic "income ", such as securi ty, the chance 
to do something unusual, the pleasure of a gratifying 
relat ionship with one's workers, or the sense of 
achievement when the group reaches an assigned goal. [Ref. 
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13 :p. 41 
He also men'::.ioned an emotional relationship. The leader was no 
10:1.ger viewed as isolated a:1.d unaffected by the group. 
Eeactions f::::-or:1 the group were found to be apt to ir.fluence the 
leade::::-. Piedler discovered, t hat the leader was responsive to 
the group behavior. The l eader's ego was identified as a part 
of the l eadership process and Fiedler stated, that "it makes 
a d i ffe:-ence to him w~'1e t her he is l iked or disliked; whetr.er 
:'1e is pe::::-ceived as fair or unfair and above all whether he has 
the support of his group in pe:- forming assigned t.asks." [OI:ef 
13 :p. 51. 
In the 1940s, social psychologists discovered, that. 
situatio!'lal factors seem to influe:1.ce leadership behavior. 
Earlier studies had preclu ded the situation as a variable. Now 
several situa'::.ional factors were discovered. But it took til l 
the early 1970s when Fiedler offered the first contingency 
model of leadership, which included situational factors in a 
sufficient way [Ref. 13J. 
The path-goal leadership theory [Ref 14;P. 426-429 ] 
ide:1.tified four major types of leadership styles: (1.) 
Directive leadership, which is very s imilar to t he 
authoritarian style. (2) Supportive leadership, which 
proposes, that the leader has a genuine concern for his 
subordinates. (3) participative leadership. The superior 
solicits input from the subordinates and even'::.ually 
incorporates them into his decision. But the decision is still 
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nade by tr.e boss. Ar:hieverr,E:1: - or len:ed leade:"s:'l:'.-p. The 
. reader allo',o/s a high deg:::ee 0: freelio:n for ~is s·.lbord~nateo; to 
achieve goal:,;. The goalo; a~l:' Telatlve~y 1.:1:00.:.1 aed set by t:r.e 
SL.:.per-~o::: The theory assl..:r:led tr.at the sc.pe::::ior ,'lcto; as a 
facili:::at:or. He prepareo; the fat:"} fa:" r.18 o;u!:Jordinates :::0 
styles app:::ofria:cly. 'T'~:'.-s ~_he()ry is slm~lar to the '--dea of 
t:,e organizat:iOl:a: and '--:1dividc:.al needs fulf'--llnen:::, desc::::-~r.ed 
!:lY Cd:1'-je:nl and a",soc'--a~_es [R.ef. 12]. 
AL. tr.ese L'leor les a:.tenpt to exp 1 a 1:1 lCcllicr !:lc:'avio:::. 
T::: is :::ecognized and · ... idely accepted :oday t:'1at cont'--r.ger.~y 
rrnde:s ",r.ie:') in::;o:::pora~J:' I:~e int:erdepcndcr:c:'.-cs :")C'tween the 
er:vironmC':-l::: are Dost apt :0 explail: tr.e :eader's be:'ldvi·:.JI 
sufficiently. 
3. Presentation of leadership styles 
The ~eadersr.ip style :::'8 t:'le way in which L'le leader 
:"nfluences his subordinates. Tr.e style is assumed to have" 
great i:npact on the effectiveness of leadership and t:J.us, 
finally, on the effectiveness and tr.e success 0: the 
ur3anization. Various styles, related to or derived traIT tr_e 
previously mer::ioned theories, r.ave been developed over time. 
They range from two-dimensional grids to elaborate three-
dimensional models. I will present a brief descrip~_ion 0: some 
styles. 
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In the 1950s, Tanner:.baum and Schmidt articulated a 
shift in the p~evailing leadership principles [Ref. 14:p. 
434 ] . During the fi::-st half of the century, leadership theory 
was dominated by the simple "black ar:.d white" approach which 
divided the workforce into leaders and followers, and which 
sought to identify the right attitude of the leader. The 
development of che concept of group dynamics char.ged this 
system in the 19505 and introduced a shift in the focus away 
from the leade-::- and F.lore towards the group :nembers. As a 
consequence, the increased emphasis on the human relationships 
rather than on the struct.ural co:r.ponents of an organization 
called fo~ new leadership behaviors. The au::.hors offer a 
continuum of l eadersr,ip [Ref. 14:p. 434] with boss-centered 
leadership styles at the l eft end and subordinace~centered 
leadership styles at the ::-ight end. The lef:. corner symbolizes 
the authoritar i an rr.anage::-, who makes all decisions by himself. 
At the r:'..ght end we find the participative manager, w:"10 
permits subordinates to operate wit h much freedom within 
specified boundaries. The subordinates wil l have a lot of 
freedom to make their own decisions and influence their work 
processes. Moreover, they describe seven different leadership 
style which change gradually as they go from the right to the 
left side and which cover the entire continuum. Tannenbaum and 
Schmidt s uggest. that managers chose the appropriate style in 
accordance w'..th the particular leade~ship situation at hand. 
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The managerial grid, developed by Blake and 1Ilou ton, 
defines management in a two-dimensional grid, with the 
horizonta l axis representing concern for people and the 
ve~tical axis r~prcs0nting concern f or production . ~anagement 
styles are e xp lained in accordance to the preferences of the 
superior [Re f . 14:p. 435]. 
Toe no.:::native model, developed by Vrocffi - Yetton, al l ows 
the manager to select a specific behavior in a given 
situation. They provide a dec i sion tree with seven distinct 
ques t ions . According to the problem and t.he s ituacion at hand, 
the IT.doager answe!"s himself through the decision tree and 
se l ects tr.e most appropriate behavior, which is des cribed at 
the end of each branch [Ref . 14 :p. 442 ]. 
The t.wo previous described :nodels a l lew the 
identification of a certair:. s t y l e , but they are not related to 
effectiveness. The most elaborate system, Redd in's 3-D mede l 
cf leadersh::'p effectiveness, makes up for that deficiency. He 
discriminat.es more effective and less effective sty l es, 
starting out with four basic leadership st.yles. L1.e model a l so 
incorporates t he element.s of task orientation and relationship 
orientation, which captures the preference of the particular 
manager. His model offers twelve different. styles, with four 
of them assumed to be the most effect.ive ones. The model 
inc l udes leader traits as well as the situa tion and the 
personal relationships between superior and Sl.lbordina r.es . 
Reddin emphasized that a manager sho'.lld be adaptive to the 
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situation to chose a style which would l ead to effectiveness 
[Ref. 14:p.436]. 
ON THE RELATIONS8IP BETWEEN LEADERSHIP AND FEAR 
In the book by Ryan and Cestreich "Driving fear out of the 
workplace" t he a'-Ithors present their findings about fear in 
the workp l ace, Also s:imulated by Deming's point number eight, 
they focused [ heir research on the negative impacts that: fear 
can h e. e on the production process and ultimately on the 
quality of the product. They chose a definition which is 
closely related to t his issue: 
We define fear in the workp lace as feeling threatened by 
possible repercussions as a resul t of speaking up about work 
related concerns [Ref. 15 :p. 21]. One significant factor in 
this definition is, that t he threat does not have to be real. 
It is the individual ' perception (feeling threatened) wh i ch 
shapes the fearful fee l ing and thus, the response of t.he 
individual. Another important findings was, tr.at. "management 
practices" were the larges t single category of issues, people 
did not dare to talk about, regardless of the possible need to 
express their feel ings or to make viable suggestions for 
improvements. The basic reason was the fear of reperc.lssions 
[Ref. 15 ;p. 31]. 
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Ryan and Oes tre i ch a l.sc invest~gated the relat~onships aoc 
the ir.te:::personal communica Li::l!l b e tween managers and t helr 
subordinates . I n t his cont e x t , t hey ide.ntJ.fied an array of 
di.ffer-ent f.ea r s : 
• Havi ng e ne's cred i bi l ity q uest i oned 
• Being l eft out o f the decision making 
• Be ing cr i t ici zed i e fr:.l!lt of others 
• Not get t ing informatiou necessaTY to succeed 
• Having a key as;:;ig:IDlent given to someo:c!e else 
• Di s a g reemen t s which mighL lead t o damaged re l a tionsh i ps 
• Getting stuck -: .0 a dead - end job 
• No t gett ing dese rved recognit ion 
• Not b eing seen as a team p lay er 
• Suggest i ons be ing mis i:1 terpreted as criticisms 
• Poor 1 eve l s of perEo!:manc e 
• Gett i ng fired [ReE. 15:p. 4 -5 ) 
Al l t hose f e ars were apt to have negat ive i mpacLs 0:1 the wo-::-k 
dtmasphere , productivity, dnd oVf'cral:'.. company per-formance. 
Effect i ve ness and efficiency are reduced . F:.lrthermore , t he 
consequences are he l d .to deplete the c ompet it ive power of an 
organization and to endanger it's l o ng t erm survivabil i t y . The 
authors mentioned four sources, where f earful fee lings can 
o r ig inate f r om: 
• Actual e xperience in the c u rrent s ituaLior: , or in a past 
s i milar situation 
• Stories about o t her's experiences 
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• Assumptions and private interpretations of otht'r's 
behavior 
• Negative , culturally based stereotypes about those with 
superv~sory power· 
• Any given s :'.. t..uation c an ref l ect on or more of these 
sourc:es [Ref. 15;p. 21 ]. 
'::he authors acknowledge that fear can be a phenomenon based on 
a siPogle stimulus as we l l as being a compl ica t ed, mu l ti l ayer 
structure, combining different sources of fear . '::his makes it 
very complicated fo r everybody :superior , peers, subordinates, 
and the individual itself) to cope wi th this situatio:l and to 
seek for possible solutions . 
Ryan and Oestreich briefly touch on t he idea, whether fear 
could be used as a positive motivator. Their overall findings 
we-::e disapproving. Fear keeps a destructive mode whether it is 
used under short :Jr long term condi tions . An interesting 
finding was that fear seems to work for some people as a 
motivator if it is self-imposed. The authors corrment, that. 
"when a person takes on a risk as a personal or professional 
st.retch , fear may be a successful self -motivator. tr [Ref. 15:p . 
68] In all other cases, the i:1 teL'Viewed workers reported, that. 
fear has negative consequences, when used as a motivator. 
F, TWO VIEWS OF MANAGING FEAR IN THE MILITARY 
One opportunity to explore the notion Qf fear in the 
military is to look at the time when fear is assumed to be at 
a peak: war time. I found a variety of statements related to 
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lear l:1 porter B. Willia:nscr.'s cC)(.Jk abo·-.lt Genera:" ratt:::c's 
principles lRef 6]. Pa:.ton was known as a v"'".ry hard a:1d strict 
leader, whQ was sernetiDes nis;s:"cg a seese of delicacy, 
dca 1 ing with his SUbordinates. Even 8en:"o::- Colcr.els '""ere 
frequcontly addressed ~aTs:'11y or ","-vee bluc1t 1 y. 
fl"'". saIT.e Pa::ton, ' .... 1'.0 was a very rel:"gious man aed had a:1 
intLnate k:1Qw1!'!dg"'". c: t:'1e Eitle, d"'".vot.!'!d deep and se::-iQUS 
thm.:.g:'lts te> t:'1e possible deaths of his sQldiers" :'"or him, 
d!'!ath ","as a natu:::al part of life a:1d it was said, that h"'". 
cris favo.::ite w:"sh was to be killed in combat and :'1:"s "-.l::'tiDate 
wish ' .... as to be killed by ::he last bc.lle:: fi::-ed in the las:. 
· .... a~. This does; not mean, he was eager to reach t.he end of his 
life quickly, but it reflects his attitude to' .... ards the 
relationship between death and life. T:'1e core element in his 
thoughts was the relationship bet· .... een fear and fai:.h. 
Everyth:"ng is in balance! Just perfect. Just like fear 
and faith. You get to having too much fear, you got.ta find 
the faith to match the fear. You get mo'.:'e faith, you will 
ge:: more fears to test your faith. God keeps you tryicg to 
cor.quer all fears ::0 see jl:.st how ml:.ch you ca:1 take. :--ie 
wi l l never give you more tha:1 you can cO:1quer. Of course, 
you ca!1 give up and fal l down with your fea!""s. Eut if you 
don't give up, you 'can destroy all of your fears. [::I.ef 
6 :p. 15'.. ] 
?atton never refused to admit that he was sca!""ed about ma::1y 
things. :Ie believed that fear was a natural part of l ife. Eut 
he a l so made a clea!"" distinction, when a so ldi",,!"" should 
respond to his fea!""s and when not. "There is a time to take 
counsel of your fears, and there is time to never l isten to 
any fear. It is always impo!""tant to know what you are doing. " 
[Ref. 6:p. 78]. :Ie favo!""ed the idea to listen to any concerns 
and fears in the preparation phase of important decisions . 
Once a decision was reached, it should be ca!""ried out without 
further :'istening to any fears. The pe!""son shou l d control the 
situatio:"l and his or her actions, :"lot vice versa. "When you 
have collected all the facts and fears and made you-::- decision, 
tu!""n off all your fears and go ahead!" (Ref 6:p. 78]. Gen . 
Patton devoted an enormous amount of time to drive out fear 
cut of his s o l diers. wi lliamson considers Patton's ability to 
take fears from the minds of his soldiers as O:1e of his 
greatest talents. Patton used a simple equation to determine 
his approach, how t o create fearless troops: "He 
cO::1stantly striving to kill the fears of everyone of his 
soldiers. Faith and confidence builds pride, and pride 
destroys f ears." [Ref 6:p. 69]. He applied this simple formula 
first to himself and made himself the incarnation of what he 
wanted his soldiers to live up tao 
In his speeches he c~mveyed his opinions and expla :- ned t_he 
benefits o t following his leeas : E..:iLll . to be a me:nber of the 
Thi rd Arrr,y and thus be among t he best so l diers around and 
~, because of that, to have a much higher chnnce to 
survJ.ve longer . His visits i n the front Il n!:'s and h::ts exposure 
to enemy fi r e underscored his t_houghts and made his man 
be l ::teve that he meant what he sa i d . ?atton ' .... as convl nced t_hat 
it was possible to eliminate fear i n his SO l diers . 3u[ it 
seerr,s that be wanted to achieve this not_ by actually 
e l imi nating their fears , but by teaching his treops w<:<ys to 
gain u l timate and total control over the '-- r fears. So they were 
able [8 pursue their objectives, driven by their confidence 
which was based on their traini n g and their mi l itary s:"-ills . 
He t r ained ar.d discip l ined his troops to such a high level of 
competency, that they believed to be i nvincible . In Patton's 
view, the combir.ation of faith and competency would give t.he 
soldie r s the solid me n tal basis to control their fears 
effect.ively . 
From his commanders he demanded that they sho·clld never 
show fea r in tront of their troops . Patton believed , that t:"1is 
wou l d automatically discourage the soldiers . This cO·clld result 
in failu r e to accomplish the mission, in a hi gher nwnber of 
cas ualties, or in the decrease of mo r al. Any commander had to 
c ontrol his fear s , it he had some , i n order to provide 
pennaner.tly a mot.iva t ing and perfect military i mage fo!:" the 
troops. 
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I t takes a lot of couraqe to lead men into ba t tles where 
they ca:1 be killed . A c:)rr:'l1ander d oes r,ot dare to have any 
:ears . If a co:nmander shows any fear, the men can tell 
[Ref . 6:p . 76]. 
General Patton favored tradit ional leadership principles and 
had a distinct aversion to new ma:1agement practices. Officers, 
who t ried to introduce innovative i deas we re reminded, t:-1at 
"Al l that 'save the e go' busines s is not for war." [Ref 6 :p. 
33]. In Patton's philosophy, a dead mar:. did r:.ot. have an ego 
any longer, and part 0: his tr.ission was, t o keep h is men 
alive. :i8 considered his l eaders hip style the appropriate way 
t. o assure success for this critical part 0: his mission. He 
demanded perfect discipline from every man a:1d was wil l ing to 
use fear to ensure that t:"1is goal was reached . Even in a 
t raining si tuation it was apparent that he used int imidat ion 
to enforce perfect discipline: 
I cannot ki l l a man in our combat training, but I can 
make every rran wish to be dead rathe r than take the wrath 
of my anger! [Ref . 6 : p . 35] . 
Genera l Patton seemed t o accept the application of fear in a 
training and/or disciplinary context. 
Sun Tzu described in his chapter a bout. estimates command 
a s one of the five factors, which should be thorO'..lghly 
studied, before getting engaged in war. S tr ictness is one 
element , Sun Tzu vie,,!,ed essential for a good general. "If 
strict, his troops a r e disciplined because they are i n awe of 
him and are a fra id of punishment. 11 [Ref. 5: p. 65]. It. seems , 
that even Sun Tzu to l erates some degree of fear with r egard to 
disciflins. Mcye:;lve:::-, I Cl-ss(;.oe that he, as we::'l Pat::oll, 
vie·,."ed it as a lcgical c811sec::uence i:1 order 
c.-=--scipli:1e. 
It see:ns to me, that t_he aware:1ess c: just 9c:.eisiL"rlent, 
::r.e C"lse 8f faL.c:.re, :.:> nut based U:1 tl:e active (;.se of tear by 
t_he rriliti'iry leader . .:.:: seeIT_S to De ::'nherer.:: lU the peoLJle, 
The y have been tra ir.ed to execc:te cert_air. and U·.ey 
kncw exac::ly, · ... ha:: they are expected aed aIsc, ,,.hat t:"1ey 
wil:' :::-eceive, it they :ail. A leac.er, who enforces c.iscip::'i:le, 
does :1ot have use fear at 0.:'1. The :leut ra l an:10C::1CeIT.en::., 
L"1at disc:'pline wi::'l br,o strictly e:ltorced, i:1s:::'::'ls :ear ir. 
n·.ose, · ... h8 know L"1at t:"1ey fai::'ed. 
The Department c: the Navy issued -=--n Jaclary l),)J ar. 
article, writ::en by .T .G. Suayez, abc·.lt "Ma:lagi:lg Fear in the 
Workplace". The autr.or states, that "fear is a respu:1se to a 
clearl y ider.t.itiable a:1d c:'rccr!1scribed stimt:lus" [Ret 15: p. 
::.!. In :"1::'s upini8n, fear co.:1 never be ent:'re:'y elim::'na::r,od, bt:t 
IT.anagers have the du::y to manage it. The f:'rst step ::0 
IT.aniiging fear s".lccessft:lly is t8 acknow::'ec.ge it. Fear has ::'0 
be ac:cep::.ed as a natural fact of life, experienced by al:uost 
all individuals some time. H::s list of possib::'e fears incll:de 
"fear ot repr::'sal or receiving poor appraisals, =ear of 
fa-=--lure, fear of math [related to the ir:creasi:1gly data drivr,on 
work er:vironmer:t], fear of change, fea r of speaic::'ng up, and, 
surpris:'ngIy, the fear of success." LRef. 16:p. 4:. The fear 
at success ::s explai:1ed by the increasi:1g number of enemies, 
' ... hich are encGunte!'ed in the wake a f successful ape!'ations . 
The au t her believes, that three facto!'s are necessa!'y 
create the environme nt, which would al l ow the individual to 
cope success ful w:'" t h fear. I.iI:.ll , the leadership has to 
include certain attribu t es like "the syste:n i s composed of 
people, quick responses to employee concerns a nd ideas, reward 
o f coope!'at i on a::ld innovat. i on, and freely shared in f ormation ," 
[Ref. 16:p . 6J . ~, trust must be built ·ctp bet weer. al l 
levels of t he hiera!'chy and hor:"' zontally at eac h level . Thi s 
includes the so l icitation of true inputs from all employees. 
Questions, which ask Simply for "yes" or "no" responses, :"1ave 
:'0 be avoided. Suarez proposes an initiative, taken by 
mar.agerr.ent, to launch the trus t building e:1ceavor: 
I t is t he leader's duty to find out what generates fear 
in the erganizatio:1. In addit i on to listening to ar.d 
observing the s:"'gns of ~ear, management should take the 
l ead on speaking up about fear [Re f. 16:p . 5J. 
Eis ~ peint is, that management r.as to provide a clear 
vision for the organization. This will be a sig::l o ~ certainty 
ar.d a goal to strive for all employees. I t a l so gives the 
workers the feeling , that their job will be secu::::-ed for the 
future . 
G. TWO ARMY STODIES RELATED TO EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT 
In an attempt t o analyze satisfaction wi t h cun:·er.t 
l eadership p rac tices, the Army l aunched a series of studies in 
the early 19708. The "Lead~ rship Monograph Series" was the 
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first effa!'t t:J cope with t_he leadership isslle . One inter,tion 
was to provide specific guidance for the Army leaders in the 
19708 and perr.aps 19808. 
The findings, repo:cted in this monograph were posicive , if not 
enthusiastica L Ly : 
This is a highly positive indicator of the generally 
high caliber of Army leadership ... Army leadership, .. . , lS 
extremely ge e d. Most of t_hcse ir.volved--superiors, 
l eaders, and subordinates alike -- are genera l ly satisfied 
wi th the leadership at all levels within the Army [Ref. 
17:p. J 21 . 
The comment is suppor~_ed by data, which shew, t:hat ir: all 
surveys at least 70% 'of the people reported seme degree of 
satisfact.ion. Detai led findir,gs demonstrated, t_hal: open 
ccmrr.unication determinant fer satisfCl.ct ion. 
Furthermore, the facts, that the leader was setting an eXCir:1ple 
on and off duty, and that he was setting h igh performanc;e 
standards, were identified as being high ly related to 
satisfaction [Ref. 17:p. 13 ] . 
At the saIne time, an interesting persona l experiment was 
conducted by an Army battalion commander. Based on his 
training in psychology and sociology, he applied modern 
leadership techniques to his battalion. 
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Unlike common military practices, the Be useo. 
contingency management. t.echniques to mo c ivate 
subordinates. He would wait (when circuIT.sta!1ces perni tte:il 
unt i l his subordinates behaved in appropr i ate ways and 
then reward them, rather than tell them wha c to do and 
then threaten them i: they failed to do it. In fac t , 
p'Jnishment and threats were absent by design ... Instead, he 
told h i s commanders to . Do what YO'..! think is best.' Lacer, 
'Nhen they passed [ the inspection], he verbally rewarded 
them wi th references to t heir ability and self- i ni t iati".re 
[Ref. 18:p. 2-3 ] . 
The battalion commander used t:cust and confidence to shape the 
work atmosphere a:1d he t reated his personnel as "competent 
i ndiv i duals ar.d professiona l s." [Ref. 1 8:p. 3] The people were 
working hard, but: "none felt c hat their e:1thusiasm for getting 
the job done could be attributed to :ear or threat of 
pun i shment, verbal or o t herwise." [Ref. 18: p. 3] Open 
com.'11unica t ion was a basic design eler:terx in t his experiment. 
The battalion comrr.ander kept an open door pol i cy and was 
quickly recognized as a g o od listener. Peop l e :elt comfortable 
to present their problems and suggestio:1s to h i m. His ca l m and 
relaxed appearance motivated his subordinates and gave t h em 
the safe feeling to approacr. him, · .... henever they felt, it was 
necessary. 
Because he alway!:? maintained a relaxed, analytical, 
problem-solving approach, subordinates did r..ot feel 
t hreatened or embarrassed by let ting him know their i deas 
or feelings [Ref. 18:p. 3] 
I ncluded in the open commu.nication was a continuous evaluation 
process rather than a one time rating event. Thus, t:"1e 
soldiers were always aware of their performance and 
specifically about the areas, where improvements were required 
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'.o'i thin a given time frame. This redu ced t he anxiety level 
significantl y and fostered a min i mization o t i:ldividual 
interesting question is raised at t he end o f this 
repo::-t . The ',;ay this battalion cO!l'~'l1ar.der chose, 
t ota l ly perfect with respect to the effectiveness of his 
crganizat i o:1. Failures occurred and it is reported, that he 
got punished for them by his s uperiors . Thus, the experiment 
had an ir.dividual price for him. What gave him the security to 
ccntim.:e his way in the light of punish.'nent? His believe to 
get his next assigrunent for sure, might have given h i m some 
secur ity . The aut:hors raised the questiun, whe t- her the risk 
',;as appropriate or perhaps too high . The question was assumed 
to be especially important under the assumption, t-hat other 
officers may want to repeat or extent the experiment in the 
future . No answer is provided for this quescion. 
V. METHODOLOGY 
A . GENERAL THOUGHTS 
The overall ob jective of this study is to exp l ore r_ he 
phenomer.on of ~ear i n the workp l ace , and i n particular to 
docu ment various manifestations of fear in a superior· 
s ubordi nate relationshio . Specifically I wi l l address the 
three research quest~-::ns stated in Chapter III. While r:Lu ch 
work has been done to apply Deming's "Total Qua l ity ·' theory in 
toto after an organization d ecides to emba r k on the TQM 
course, I have found l i tt l e research material on specif ic 
points out o f the array of his 1 4 points. My special interest 
conce n trates on his point number eight , "Drive out fear" . 
B. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The study :ocuses on the explorat i on and docuIT.entation o f 
var i o u s manifesta t ions of fear in a limited and clearly 
defined environment . . My intention is to provide basic 
i n f o!;11'.ation on a ve ry specific topic which has r eceived litt l e 
attention in the past . The empha s is wil l be on information 
dept h rather than breadth. A generaliza tion of the findings to 
a larger env ironment i s not i ntended and would not be 
appropria t e wi t hout f u r ther wo r k, because the data will onl y 
al l ow conclusions for the small sample unde r invest igation. 
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Nevertheless, i1: is my intention to identi f y materia l which 
may lead to further research questions. 
The study ",,1.11 be based on the infonTlation provided by a 
pair of officers who serve in the US Army, st.atiened at Fort 
Ord, Xontercy, California . I chose a Commandir.g Officer and 
his Exec.utive Officer to include a superior - subordinat.e 
relationship into the study (in the following text they are 
refe rred to as CO and XO respec t ivel yl. This relationsh i p 
serves the purpose to e xp l ore whether fear was 'cIscd by the 
leader and how .l..t may be perceived by the subordinate. 
C. EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY 
A variety of epist.cmological and metho::lological approaches 
are used in social sciences . By socia l sciences I mean those 
studies , .... hich seek to understand human systeIl',s or systems of 
human interaction . Certainly management in t :"1e workplace is a 
:"1uman syst.e:n, and it s stc:dy is a pare of social science , 
regardless of the mater'--al and technical component.s . 
Research into human systems is most com:ncnly of the 
"snapshot" or sociological variety . Thls kind of research 
generally tries to "discover " and assess the relat'--onship 
between previously def ined categories across a population, or 
8dmple, ot: identical cases, or objects , at a given ,?oint in 
time. T:"1e result i s tq provide information on the pattern of 
relationships whic h is presumed to exist and endure through 
On these discovered relationships a law is r.ypothesized 
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ar-d tested. Subsequent real werld events fit this law with a 
some probability. This is the conventional paradigm 0:: 
positivistic research. 
The resea:::.-ch approach chosen for L'1is study is UQ1. of that 
kl nd, but is of the anthropological or phen omenological 
var~ety. I n th~s kip.,d of research, a 9articular case is 
stl.:died i n depth in order t o observe what is actually OCCUrll'.g 
in that particular, concrete case. The actual phenol'lenor. is 
attended to and noted, often before relevant categories can be 
specified. The yield from such research is the generatiol: of 
meaningful categories for subsequent research and the 
exp l oratio::l of possible r:lechanisms that rr,ight account for the 
phenomenon in the observed case. Subseql.:ently the "theory" 
that is developed from the single, particular case is t h en 
applied and mcdified by the phenomena in other particu l ar 
Such research is. common in anthropology, i!"l c 1 inical 
stl.:dies (where the developme:1t of !"lew practice is the gcal) , 
in case research, and in ethnographic studies. It is scmetimes 
referred to as "N of one" research, (in ccntrast to "multiple 
N" research) and is necessary whenever a new field or topic is 
being studied. This is the situation with the topic of fear in 
the workplace. 
The distinction between these twe types of research has 
often been discussed in the epistemological literature, as 
illustrated by the following table. 
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Associated Name 
~ Resea~c:1. Type of Resea::::-ch 
Extensive Intens .l.ve 
Multiple ",," "N" of one 
Surface :Jeep Chomsky 
Reconstruc.t:e~ Logic i n-use Kap l an 
l ogic 
Et ic I Emic Pike 
Aris t otelian I Galilean Lewin 
I 
Lewin 's distinction is pa~ti::::u l arly useful . w.'lat he calls 
the "Ga l ilean" approach to theory cO:1struction is based on the 
study of cor.crete , individual caSeS, whereas the 
"A::::-is t otelian" approach to t heory cons t ::::-uction is based on the 
average over a great many cases in which the relationship 
between general categories is determined. In the Ga l ilea:1 
approach, the individual case, or event, or occurrenc.e, is the 
source of our knowledge. The unique, concrete, individual case 
is precisely governed by whatever actual laws are ac.t'Jally 
operating. In t h e Ar istotelian approach, the individual case, 
or event, is thought of as a chance occurrence around some 
presumed genera l law. Events are viewed as having a variance 
around a ru l e. 
This study of fea!:." :'-n "-he workpl ace is designed to be 
conducted in the Galilean mode. Data a~e collected t:'1rcugh 3. 
sequence of in - depth interviews wi"-h the twO pe!:."sons who 
comprise t:"1e particular, focal, authority dyad (suiJordinate -
superior) that I selected for th"'-s study. 
CONDUCT OF THE STUDY 
This study explores the dynamics of a superior-subordinate 
relationship_ The selection of the authority-dyad was based on 
the fol l owing criteria: 
• The mi l itary instalation had to be close to the Naval 
Postgraduate School to allow for convenience and 
!':lexibilit.y in scheduling t.he interviews 
• The second reason to chose a close by facility was that I 
intended to establish privat.e cootacts beyond the 
ir.terview process to create growlng personal 
relationships _ I considered this helpful for the conduct 
of the study and for the discovery of deeper rooted fears_ 
• For t Ord offered the largest number of superior -
subordinate pairs ' which allowed me to pick the pair at 
random from t r_at large popu l a t ion 
• As a Navy officer I found it very interesting to explore 
the cuI tu!:."e of another service 
• The choice of Fort Ord reduced travel expenses 
TO answer the research quest i ons stated in the previous 
chapter, data was collected and evaluated . As an explanation 
aid I used a three-circle model in an attempt to explore and 
classify ::.he various detected fears. The model is displayed in 
Figure 3. A description of the model, and some of its inheren"-
difficu l ties , will be provided at the end of ::.his sect ion. The 
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mode::' was created before the ::"nterviews aC~·.laL_y star~.ed. My 
-:":l=-enti::m ' ... as to evolve L"1e Dodel ovc::- t-:":ne, der::e:ldi:lg or: =-he 
incon·.ing infOIT.lati:)l: fro:n the i:1"::erviews. This ac::io:1-
research - type dPproac:"1 a1:" ... ow8 :ne to finC7.".lnC :::"1e rrndel. 
Adjustrrf":1ts wi:"l reflect the cur:::-en:: sta~e 0: ~.he rcseClrc:"1 
pr:y:;ess ct:ld dll:Jw n·.e each t:"n·.e to start the next in~e:::\Tie' ... s 
w::..::r. a :nodified :nodel. 
The DCltCl c:)llection encompassed foc.r of inter<.riews. 
Each single set consi~ted uf one inte:::-view w::"::h the and G:le 
-",i=-h L"1e XU. They ' ... ere to be i:1terv:'ewed sepa::-atcly to 
maintClin t~ei::- ;:crsm~a:" intcg::-ity a:1d respect L"1eir military 
re:"atl:::mship. F.lrtr.errnore, l":ly i:1=-ention was te captu::-e =-r.eir 
indiv::"dua:" in·.pressions withemt a:1Y ir.terferer.ce witr_ oL"1er 
perS:):1 or the other perscr.· s opi:1ions. Individual ::"r.terv-:"ews 
were likely =-0 prodc.ce rrore authel:~.ici~.y in =-he collec::ed 
:"nforrnation. j:<·urtherrr.ore, O:1e of my mai:l ir.::erests is ::0 :i:18. 
out, wr_et~er the super:"cr ".lsed or was l:.sing fea::- as a 
manage:ne:1t tool and ho'''' :"t migr.t be perceived by ::he 
subordinate. I:1div:'dua:" inquiry was considered tr.e :):lly 
appropriate :.echnique to get -:"r.formation en :.ha:: par::icular 
a:1d sensit::"ve issue. 
At =-he end of eac1-. set of interviews the inforrr.atior: was 
examined and <:::lassified ::'n accordance with the :ncdel. As a 
next step, the model will be changed, i~ the collected data 
justi:y or require an adjustme:1t. ":'he ultimate goal is to 
develop ::he mode:" on a basis to i:nprove ::"::s 
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capabilities to aid we in t:'1e classification of al l or, at 
least, most of t.he incoming data. 
A final meeting wa;; scheduled after comp l etion of the fcur 
sets of i r.tenriews. This meeting would senre the purpose to 
give the officers some feedback and enter into a discussion 
about l eadersh i p styles. During this discussion I 'Hanted to 
solicit their opinions about the element of fear i n the 
leadership process. F';lrtr.ermore, I expected interesting data 
en how they would discuss this topic in the lig:'1t of their 
superior-subordinate ::-elationship. Figure 1 g i ves a graphic 
display of the process a!ld the iterations. 
The interviews were set up in an attempt to achieve an 
increasing focus. I started out with a broad, unrestricted, 
range, allowi:1g the officers to explo~e any type of fear 
during t.he early phases. A basic assumption was that fear is 
a very intimate issue which someone usually does :lot freely 
and easi l y share with somebody else. Furthermore, I took into 
account, that I was a foreigner for the two officers; not even 
somebody of their own nationality . Thus, the first interviews 
served two purposes; ~, to reduce the reluctance lor fear) 
to explore one's own fears. The officers were given time and 
opportunity to familiarize themselves with the perhaps unusual 
topic. They had the chance to explore fear as a multifarious 
construct without being forced to link the sensitive topic 
immediately to themselves. r assumed that, while we were 
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steadi l y and automatical l y approach the 1 in:<::8 between the 
t heory a:ld the individua l officer. ~, to build a trustful 
re l ationship as quic;dy as possible. I considered the time I 
decided co invest Eo r the reduction of possible barriers 
between us, the vital fac tor for the success of the entire 
study. For t.he pursuit cf this delica t e topic a hart:lonicus 
relac icns:'li p would be crucial. Would the officers exercise 
strong restraints over a longer period, the l ikelihood of 
unccverl.ng meaningful information wou l d be decreased 
significantly. As a consequence, the results of the res e arch 
would be severely limited. During the progress of the 
interview pr-ccess r gradual ly directed the focus more and more 
t o the military environment and, fina l ly on the particula:::-
r elationship between t he two officers. Thus, I switched !:rom 
unstructured int erviews, which were employed during the first 
three sessions, to a structured interview in the fcurth 
IT.eeting. Furthenr.o:::-e, I restricted the scope of the interviews 
more towards the military topics and away from the civilian 
envi!:onment. 
AS a final step I conducted an interview with Dr. David 
Wi llard, a clinical psychologist. My intention was to sol icit 
his a!"lalysis of the data base from the perspective of a 
psychologist. I compared his findings and comments with my 
res'J.lts i!"l an attempt to outline differences and simila!:ities. 
A graphical display of the interview protocol is provided 
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E. THE FEAR MODEL 
To aid in t:"e classification of the gathered data, 
developed a model, which is dis;Jlayed ir. Figure 3. r"y 
expec tation was to get confron:.ed with a large variety of 
differe:1:' types of fea::::-, which would probably include novel 
ones that I had not anticipated. 
The model consists of three primary source c ircles "a::led 
A, E, and C. overla;Jping a::::-eas we r e l abeled T, I I , III. 
Observed fears could be classified into one o f those circ:'es 
I discovered an interesting parallel between my mode l and 
an ap;Jroach Tannenbaum and Schmidt developed in the late 19508 
to analyze changing rranagement requirements wh ich had been 
identified in the 19508 [Ref. 22 ]. They formulated their 
concept of the three factors or forces which influence the 
leadership situation. The origins of their forces a re (1) .ill 
t.~, (2) in the subardinat and (3) in the sitJlat i or.. 
Wh ile Tannenbau.'Tl and Sclunidt based t heir theory of force s, the 
focus of my study will be on the fears which are prevalen t i:1 
a leadership situation. 
My basic fear model consists of three circles which 
represent the origin of the different fears. The origins are 
identical wi t h those used by Tannenbaum and sclunidt.. The 
circles are labeled "Fear inherent in :.he superior', "Fear 
inherent in the subordinat2", and "Fear i nherent in t he 
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Figure 3 The Preliminary Fear Model 
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sit.uat.ion". Addit.ionally, my particular arrangement- o f the 
three circles ::reates overlap areas which reflect mult.iple 
origins for a fear. 
It. was my intent to scart the intervie' .... process wi thout 
limitations. The first set of interviews was meant t-o g i ve :ny 
interview partners an unrestrict-ed opportun i ty to present 
their thoughts about various aspects of fear. My intention was 
to allow them to explore al l poss i b le dimensions t:'1ey might 
have experienced. The collected informat i on were then used to 
iterate and modify t he model, which woul d serve as t he basis 
for the second set of interviews. The bas i c mode l was designed 
wi t h the fol lowi ng elements; 
• Fear inherent in and/or c reated by the CO (Circle A) 
• Fear inherent i n the XO (Circ l e B) 
• Fear inherent in the situation (Circle C) 
The t erm "inherent" will be described in t-he following 
s ection . 
The arrangement in circles creates some areas of overlap 
(I, I I, III, and IV). The intention of this configu rat ion is 
to capture types of fear which may be a mixture of two (areas 
I, II, or III) or at most all three different types of fear 
(area IV). Let's assume for example, that the CO would be a 
very shy person, who is afraid of speaking in front of many 
people and he would be confronted with a situation, where he 
had to give a very crucial briefing to an audience known for 
i ts criticism and impatience . Fear would arise from t he 
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attitude of the CO as we:1 as from the unfavo~al.; l e situation. 
This fear would be ::-elated to the area I, because the origin 
for it .l ies in the intersection of the two circ l es A and c. 
This model allowed me to c lassify the informa~_ion prov1.ded 
during the interviews' and ass'--gn t.hem tu one of the three 
categories. All t.he data which we::-e not re l ated to either of 
the categories would be trear:ed separately. 
Addi t ionally, I extract-Ed some basic factors from the 
literature t.:"1at are associated with fear . I selected the 
fo l lowing nine broad terms whic h wou ld help me during t.he 
actual i nte:::-views to listen and respond appropr1.ately: 
• uncert.ainty 








Furthermore, i':. would be in::eresting :'0 see if the 
officers mention the positive aspects fea~ can have sometimes. 
Under certain circumstances fear can be a driving force that 
provides power to overcome threats, obstacles , and ba~riers. 
I t gives people an unusual and, for outsiders, generally 
unexpe cted staying pcwer. Humans are then capable of enduring 
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s::'tuations that are generally considered to be beyond all 
bearing. 
In most cases the negative features are recognized more 
eas :l. ly and more frequently then positive. This stems from au:: 
perception that fear in general is related to a negative 
situation. We Eeel threatened, lost, we are uncertain about 
circumstances or outcomes, we are intimi dated, or feel lonely. 
In each instance there is nothing positive attached to our 
fee l ings or perceptions. The positive fac ets of fear are 
rarely recognized by the individua l because the negative 
aspects are dominant. 
The information of t:'le interview was expected to be 
helpful and suitable to answer the question: "W:'1.at creates or 
influences fear?" 
OBTAINING DATA ABOUT A PERSONS FEARS. 
The preparation for the interview raised some concerns. 
~, to what extent woul d the inte::::-viewees be willing to 
respond to my questions? Questions about fear target a very 
sens itive area of an ~ndividual 's personality. Not everybody 
may want to expose sensitive feelings, emotions, or memories 
publicly, even not for t:'le purpose of scientific research. For 
example , some memories about situations where the individual 
experienced fear may be very painful. Thus , the person would 
not be wil ling to recall this situation deliberacely and live 
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through a probable pain again. I expected, that my 
interviewees would try to hide unpleasant memories or 
si t uations from me . My major concern was to what extent: :z 
would encounter de n ial and what ' ... culd the impact be on che 
rIata gather i ng proce"" and final l y on the deve l opment of the 
model. S'-cond, I presumed that the success o f r'ly researr:!1 · ... as 
close l y cien to the personal relationship bet '"een me and my 
:'nteI:view partners. /I. factua l and d i stant atmosphere deemed 
inappropriate for this type of topic and wou l d not allow to 
ac cess the desired informat i on. The introductory mee ting at 
Furt Ord had served administrative purposes and gave me the 
~mpresslon that at least one additional meetinq ' .... auld be 
beneficial to estab l ish a more personal contact before t he 
interviews start e d. The following week I me t each of them 
separate l y i n a private and casLal atmosphere. During these 
meetir.gs I tried to estab l i sh ar. e:1viror:me:1t of :nutual trust 
and respect . My intention was to reduce probable barr'..ers 
between us as much as possible. The officers should feel 
comfortable during the interviews to talk about thei, fears in 
some depth . TIli.J::..Q. , every interpersonal corrmunication process 
is subject to certain rules and dynamics which are often not 
Eu l ly realized by the people involved in the corrunuc.ication. 
Joe Luft and Harry Ingram developed the HJohari Window" in an 
attempt to explain various communication styl es. "The model 
measures interpersonal style in terms of communication 
awareness by presenting a two - dimensional, four-celled figt:re 
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based on the interac'::.ion of two sources of information - the 
self and others. In the model, each cell represents a 
particular area of knowledge about the self and illustrates 
the qua l ity of the interpersonal cornrnunica:.ion process." [Ref. 
2J:p. 297] . The first cell, "the public area" involves al l 
the behaviors, feelings, and thoughts which a~e known to the 
speaker and others. In the second cell, labe l ed "the b l ind 
area" we find thoughts, feelings. and behaviors which are not 
known to us, but which are well recognized by others. The 
f e eli:1gs, :.houghts. and behaviors of :.he third area, "the 
closed area", are not :<nown to others. '>'Ie are aware of them 
and an int.entionally disclosure is necessary if we want to 
share them wi th this audience. The last. cell, "the unknown 
a~ea", represents all the feelings, thoughts, and behaviors 
which are not known by l.:.S nor by our audience. 
The ::::-e l evance of this concept for my study is the 
lim::'tation which flows from it. As I rely sole l y on interviews 
as the data gathering instrument, I have to be aware of the 
problems verbal interpersonal communication create. f.iI:.ll. 
each officer's awaren~ss of his fears is restricted to the 
"known area". The "unknown a::::-ea" is not accessible for him. 
~, he may not be willing to present. all his known fears 
to me . Thus, his selection of fears he deliberately p~ovides 
in t..he interviews further reduces the percentage of finally 
d::'scovered fears. He may want to keep certain fears 
unidentified and will thus not express them . .l:b.i1:J:1., f::::-om the 
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The Nc1osed" area.. 
Unexpressed or 
hidden fear. 
~ear not recorded by interviewer 
(missed) 
Figure" ':'he Inf l uence of Inte r pe r sonal Communication 
Problems on the I nterview Process 
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nurrber of fears expressed, a unident:ified number rr.ay escape my 
attention. Thus, t:he t ota l amount of finally recorded fears is 
only a fract i on of the en:.ire f ear pot ential. Fourt h , a 
genera l problem which must be recognized in tfl. i s context is 
the fact that the dimension or the importance of the recorded 
and L'1e not recorded fears can not be assessed exactly. It ~s 
Lheoretica l ly poss ibl ~ that the r:\ajor fears have not been 
exp:::-essed and are thus not included in the study. An exampl e 
would be, that the fear is an element of the "un:'l:nown area", 
at: the of:icer decided not to present th i s f ear at a l l. Fi gure 
4 displays t h e concerns graphically. 
G. EXPLANATION OF THE TERM MINHERENT" 
The expression inherent needs to oe expla i ned. In the 
context o f th i s study I will use the word inherent to describe 
that the specific fear under investigation is originated i n 
either the CO, the XO, or the particular situation. For the 
two persons and their respective areas A and 8 it means that 
the fear is based for example upon their particular mental 
structures, experiences, knowledge, backgrounds, atti t udes, 
feelings, and educat i ons. For the area C it means that the 
fear is based on what the particular situation al l ows or 
prohibits. This represents the general play::'ng f i eld for the 
two players, the CO and the XO, with all i ts degrees of 
freedor'! as well as al l the boundaries and limitations. Certain 
courses of action mayor may not be available to them. 
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Constra~nts, which they mayor may not be aware of, '--nfluence 
the:'-r actions. T:'1e impact of actions or non actions of other 
indivi duals, net represented exp l icitly in the model, w'--l l be 
captured under area C. Two exa:npl es may i l lustrate the 
st".ruct u re. Let· s assume the CO has the fear of fai l ure. I f his 
fearful fee l ing is based on an actual or p e rceived weakness of 
himsel f. I wi ll attr i bute thi s tear t o area A I fear inheren t 
in the CO). In this case, L'1e orig i n of the fear can lle t.raced 
bac:< to t.he consc.ious of the CO. I t i s not originated i n the 
XO or a situatio ll. A similar examp l e can be used to 
demonstrate what is :neant by fear i nherent. in the s i tuation . 
In t his case we wil l aSSCl:ne that the CO is confident. abo'Jt his 
capabi l ities to achieve t.he goa l s of his actual ass i gnrr.en t . 
His conf i dence is based on his educat.ion, k:lowledge, and 
experience . Fear comes in when his super i or se t s goals which 
exceed or are inconsistent with the requirement s for t he 
bi l let . The CO nay be very well prepared for his job, but if 
his superior puts the benchmark at extraordinary high leve l s , 
the fear of the CO wi ll be generated by the unfavorable 
situat ion he faces . In general , when fear is inhere,lt in t!1c 
situation, individuals have no or onl y very l it t le control 
over t!1e conditions which constitute this particular 
si t uation . 
DIFFICULT DISTINCTIONS 
::t is some times hard to tell whether an expressed feaz: 
belongs to exact l y one ot t:'l8 categories A,B, or C. In many 
cases fear wiL. be inherent in Q:11y one category, but in other 
in;;td!1CeS it may also depend on t he relat'--onship with at least 
one othe::::- category. A hypothetical example will i l lustrate 
this . The XO may be required to make a decision, but the 
information avai l able at that poir:.t in time is deemed 
insufficient to him. As a consequence he develops a fear of 
making an improper decision. Eased on my model there a re two 
different ways capable of explaini:19 this phenomenon. First, 
it could have been exclusively the fault of the XO. He may 
have neglected t o gather or to utilize data which were 
attainab::"e for h'--m. T:'lis would be an occasion where we would 
attribute the fea r so l ely to the area B (fear inherent in the 
XQ). because the origin l ies in his behav'--or and is not 
lnfluenced by actions ,or non action of t he CO (area A) or by 
any problems originated in a particular situation (area C). 
Second, the XO may not have been able t o collect the 
appropriate amount of data. A typical constraint would be a 
very short deadline. The available time span is insufficient 
:or a thorough investigation. Another explanation could be 
that the required files are not accessible at that poi:1t in 
time :or some reasons. In either case, circumstances ove ":: 
wh i ch the xa has no control dictate the conditions under which 
he has to make his decision. His process of arriving at the 
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decision is heavily influenced by fac::or-s or-iginated in ar-ea 
C. Thus, ~is fear- would be attr-ibuted to area C. In the case 
where the explana::ion wou::'d include a failure of the XO L"1e 
failed to ce l lect da::aJ as well as a constraint, origir.ated in 
t:"1e situation (fi l es not accessibl e) , the fear wou l d be 
attributed to area II, the overlap between fear tha t is 
i"herer.t in the XO and the fear that is inr,ere!lt i n the 
situat:"on. 
LIMITAT IONS 
1 . The study was cQ!lstructed to cap::ure the information 
gathered from a pair of officers who worked in a c::m',pany in 
Fort Ord . Thus, the study wil l on l y reflect the data provided 
by these two peop l e who wer e in::erviewed intensively to 
explore their speCific opinions and their !:.""elationship. The 
r-esear-ch was conducted the militar-y envir-onment, 
specifically in the Army env irol'.men:: at Fort Ord. D'clring the 
time of my research ?ort Ord was a very turbulent Army post in 
the late stages 0:: the elirr:ina::ion of the 7th Light Fighter 
Division. Units were moved to other p l aces a l lover ::he us or 
disbanded and soldiers were transferred between units. This 
created straini ng work conditions for all military personne l 
in 1e<J.ding positions. This pa!:.""t':"c:..llar unit was facing a Change 
i n command at the end of my i!"lVestigation peried. Furthermore, 
::he unit was to be disbanded two month after my research was 
scheduled to be finished. I anticipated, that these 
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unfavorable circumstances would influence my work somehow. 
Expected influences could, for example, st-em from the 
availability of the officers, their willingness to devote the 
necessary time for the interviews, their abilit-y to focus on 
the subject while pressing duties were waiting, or demands 
from superior authorities, which would the officers not allow 
to pa:::-ticipate in the inquiry as scheduled. 
2. My study focused on a very small socia system, the pair 
of t.wo A:::-my office:::-s in a specific superior-subordinate 
:::-elationship. To maintain a narrow focus is one met.hod to 
start research. The in depth examination of th is limited 
system was assumed to provide valuable data on the resea:::-c:'1 
questions. I recognized, that the :1a:::-row focus may not allow 
for generalization or the application of the findings t.o any 
other, nansimilar situation. This limitation was acceptab::'e, 
because the main emphasis of the study was to explore the 
dyna:nics of fear in the superior·subordinat.e relationship in 
order to approach the research questions. Fu:::-therrnore, 
anticipated the :::-esul::s to be suitable to stimula::e fu:::-ther 
research. This study was not. conducted in an at::err.pt to f i nd 
exhaustive answers on a broad scale which may a l low 
generalization. Rather it was to exp:'ore a complex, re lativ ely 
unexamined topic . 
3. A salient advantage of the interview techniqLle is its 
ability to capture peop l e's impressions, which was exactly 
intended in my study. 3ut the method has a l so some 
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def iciencies. On e is the selection of the participatiYlg 
people. I have tried ::0 reduce a ny bias by selecting the 
participants randomly. The selection process was only 
restricted by the factor "availabili t y". It was a requirenent, 
that.. both officers were available for a certain t ime period to 
cond uct the in t e:::v-iews properly. Anether deficiency can be the 
ir,troductio:1 of some sort of bias by the researcher in 
selecting the questions for lhe in:;e:::-views. My approach to 
minirr,ize this deficiency was to give Lhe inte:::viewees during 
the f irst t:'1ree ir.terview sessions ample freedom to express 
t:'1eir opinions. Even though I gave them some broad guidelines 
as an orientation aid, they were not fo rced to comply with 
them. They were invited to follow their own train of t~oughts 
and provide whatever they felt would be valuable and 
meaningful information with regard to the described topic. The 
fourth inte:::view was more st :::-uctured and thus entailed the 
dange::;o of SOIT.e bias. For t h is type of research it is 
impossib le 1..0 elininate bias er-tirely. My approach was set up 
in an atte:npt to keep any bias at a minimum. 
4. Another limit.ation was the sole deper.dence on v erbal 
information. I used in.terviews a s a data gathering method ar.d 
: was aware of the !':act that it was highly subjective. No 
wri tten questionnaires were employed. I favored a mixture of 
unst:""uct.ured and structured inte:::views over questionnai:::-es, 
because they offered a very suitable method to explore the 
opinions of my interview partners without imposing too tight 
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restric:.ions on them. Moreover, I wanted to give them as much 
freedom as possibl e to descr ibe their thoughts. The 
exp l oration of a persons various fears is a very delicate 
endeavor. For t wo reasons I considered it helpful to give the 
t\OlO individuals the opportunity to express their thoughts in 
an open fashion. ~, I be l ieved that the climate of a 
personal interview situat.ion would be more favorable to reveal 
more deeply rooted fears. ~, a questionnaire bore the 
danger of uncovering onl y a portion of the available 
infonnation, because the questions may not have been stated 
accurate enough or may have covered the wrong area. Thus, the 
in::.erview had the advantage that the officers could explain 
whatever they considered valuable and, a~ the same time, i:. 
would allow me to follow up with questions about of 
specific interest to me. 
5. It is a l so recognized that interview is a dynamic 
process. Interviewer and interviewee will inevi tably affect 
each othe~s behavior :'0 some extent. This is partially 
attributabl e to the Hawthorne effect, which means in this 
case, that the mere presence of a researcher may sr.ape the 
behavior of t~e interviewees [Ref 7:p.16]. Ot~er de':erminan':s. 
w~ich may affect the interview outcomes could be the different 
backgrounds (US vs German educa:.ion , training, thinking), age 
(both interviewees were some years younger than I), rank (I 
was superior to both of them), attitudes, motivations, 
percept ~ons, or previous experience with research programs. I 
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expected a var i ety of invisible and intangible facto!'s t:J be 
present during the entire research process . My concern from 
the beginning was, to what extent any of those fa:::tors might 
hinder o r constrain rr.y work efforts. I was surprised 
through:Jut the program about one fact in particul ar. Basically 
no barriers s eemed to exist. Eoth officers provided intimate, 
private information to a degree t hat I did not. expect in 
advar.ce. A possib l e explanation is offered later. The effect 
of the other dete:::-minar.ts i s not assessable . No data have been 
gathered tc evaluate their specific influence. 
6. Some other factors l ir.1it this specific study and are 
considered addi tional reasons, why generalization will not be 
possible: {l) My study was conducted wi::h two males. The 
outcomes w:Juld probably be different if fema l es or members of 
mino!"ity groups would be inc l uded. 12 ) I focused on a very 
specific Arrny envirol1TIent . Simila!" questio:ls may be resea!'ched 
u:lder different condit i ons in the Army or in any other 
service. {3) The unit under :l.nVeStlgatl o n had 
administrative miss i on during the t i me, the research was 
conducted . I assume, that different findings wou :' d be made in 
units with a combat or technical mission. (4 ) r-ly study 
targeted the CO of a company, a relatively low level in the 
mi l i tary hierarchy. I t mi ght be interesting to conduct s i mi lar 
research at higher levels t o compare the outcomes. 
VI. PRESENTATION a:F DATA COLLECTED FROM THE INTERVIEWS 
The statements and descriptions made in this chapter 
represent t he opinion, experience or the theoretical CO!lstruct 
of the interviewees. They d o :-lot represent the au-:.hor's 
opinion , experience or theoretical cons truct . COrM'lents and 
concl u sions r:\ade by the researcher are clearly labeled as 
s u ch. 
This sec tion contains my written records of the sequence 
of interviews , I held with the CO, the XD, and the 
psychologist at Fort Ord . In all , an introductory meeting , 
eigth i n terviews, a final r:teeting , and a revi ew interview with 
a third party were carried out . lasting approximately 18 
hours . Here is a chronological list: 
Introductory meeting 
2 . First interview with CO 
First interview wi th XO 
4. Second inte rview with CO 
5 . Second interview with XO 
Third interview with XO 
Third interview with CO 
8. Fourth interview with XO 
9. Fourth interview with CO 
10. Fina l meeting w::'th CO and XO 
7B 
11. :nterview with Dr. Willard Fort Ord Psycbologis t 
INTRODUCTORY MEETING 
The introductory meeting was arranged to introduce myself 
a!1d present the topic 1:1 more detail to the two officers . We 
met at Fort Ord in an office late in the afternoon. During my 
presentation I got the impression that both officers were 
interested in the topi::. Especially the CO started immedia te l y 
to ask questions and was interested in more detailed 
information. The CO appeared to be dOF.linant ir, the discl:.ssicn 
while his XO kept a relative l y quiet positior .. I addressed 
SOI1'.e questions d i rect l y to the XO and he responded very short 
and precise:y. It s eemed to me t hat their behavior was i!1 
accordance with their typical military roles. 
Tr.e CO expressed concern about how the collected 
information would be used . He was espec i ally worried that t!1e 
fi:1d i :1gs of the thesis may contribu te to a negative image of 
the Arrny . He was proud of serving in the Army and wanted t o 
avoid every action or · statements that cou l d have a :1egativ e 
impact on the Army. Finally , he made clear that one of his 
concer:1s was that any u nfavorable information provi ded by him 
p :::'"obably could be t:::'"aced back to his person. Besides his 
hono!:'able concez:-n of not wanting to damage the image ot the 
Army, he was afraid of personal repercussions if one of his 
superiors wOllld be able to identify him as t he SO"clrCe of 
undesirable inforrr,a t ion . Both officers accepted my statement 
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that the names of al~ my interview partners would be kept 
anonymous throughout the research process. 
FIRST INTERVIEW: FIRST INTERVIEW WITH CO 
Por this interview we met in the library of the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS). I recommended this place to ensure 
we would have a very quiet environment without any 
interruptions. I favored the i solated study room atmosphere 
over any room in the company buildings in Fort Ord . It seemed 
crucial to me that the first interview could be conducted 
without any interruptions. Furthermore, I intended to bring 
the interviewee in a neutral environment and away fro:n his 
daily rout ine. My reasoning was to give him enough ti:l1e to let 
go his thoughts about all the problems he had encountered in 
his company and get focused on the interview topic during the 
trar-sit to the library. It did not work out perfectly, because 
he had some difficult problems to solve. I felt we were ready 
for the interview after we talked about some relaxing topics 
like sport and weekend activities. 
The intention of the first interview was to identify the 
interviewee's various perceptions of fear. He was asked to 
state different types of fear he has experienced and provide 
supporting examples wherever possible. I did not limit him in 
any specific way at the beginning of the interview. 
In the CO's view all types of fear are characterized by 
the common denominator of " ... something is at risk.". 
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particular he distinguished three categories of fear: Qhy~~ 
~, concerns for athe!" peop l e , and fear of personal failure . 
The first ,:ype . physical fear . is re l ated to physica l 
injuries and in the worst case phys i cal disabilities. In the 
mi l i tary as wel l as in civi:'ian li fe people are exposed to 
danger-Qus situations : Especia l ly the rdlitary re:J:uires 
soldiers to ir:.cur a certain amount of risk du!"ing traini:lg and 
operation to acquire and use sk:il:'s necessary to fulf i ll the 
mission . Nevertheless , there is a fear of suffering an injury 
during these activities. In another example he mentioned that 
elements like r isk and c :"1al l enge mai<.:.e extraordinary sport 
activi t ies (deep snow skiing, mountain biking) attractive and 
exciting especial l y when they are done ir:. gruups, The 
thrilling experience of going r i ght to the edge of one ' s 
abilities and skills provides a lot of fun b'clt it a l so creates 
fear the more the edge is approached. At this point it is 
extremely difficult to maint ain cont!"O:' (over tlle ski or the 
bike; and a mistaKe wil l mos::. likely result in major inju!'ies , 
Fear is present and is usual l y recognized b 'clt in r.mst cases 
::.he excitement s::.ill prevails and L"1e exhilarating activity 
wi l l be continued. This behavior can be exp l ained by two 
factors: the hope that nothing wil l go wrong and t h e fea::- o~ 
a dmitting to have fear. He emphasized that he needs a certain 
amount of !'isk to make a job interesting and challenging :: ur 
him ("People who a::-e afraid of injury of their body or their 
ego never make it off their living room couC:"1.'" 
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He related his second fear, the fear of selecting always 
the correct course of action derived from his concerns for 
others, t o the responsibilities of a leader. ("A fear for the 
welfare of the soldiers that work for me if 1 am always making 
the right decision." ) This permanent fear is rooted in a 
possib ility that negative consequences for his p eople as weI:;' 
as for himself could result from wrong decisions. His 
subordinates may receive unfair or incorrect treatment. He was 
worried about negative consequences showing up in his next 
evaluation. A constant element of doubt shaped his precaution 
towards decision making. He mentioned he never felt sure he 
had done everything that could be done. He related this fear 
to the vast amount of regulations pertaining t o his current 
position and t he special difficulties he was currently 
experiencing in his company. For example, he has to decide 
legal cases that were initiated by other units. During the 
case these units had been eliminated and the soldiers had been 
transfer red to his company. The law requires that the decision 
has to be made with in a certain time frame. As a consequence 
he has to base his decisions mostly on written evidence , which 
doesn't make him feel comfortable ("Have 1 ruined somebody' s 
life", "There is a fear in there, am I doing everything that's 
just, that's honorable?"). 
He made a clear statement that he has absolutely no fear 
to make any decision ("1 don't fear . I make the decisions. "). 
His problem is wheL'ler he makes the cor r ect decision. 
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His third category is fear of pe::::-sonal fail ure . 
emphasized that this is his greatest fear. He gave some 
examp l es to demonstrate what persona l failure mear.s to him: 
(1) A former superior worked from 0530 a.m. til.l late in the 
night to do e verything as correctly as poss ible to minimize 
the chance of personal fai l ure. ~2) Wrong decisions lead to 
personal [a i lure. He s~ated that this creates a trerrendous 
source of fear for a l o~ of officers in the Army. (3) In many 
groups conformi~y and adhe::::-ence to group values and norms is 
enforced by peer pressure . The CO believed that this creates 
the fear oE Eail'-lre within many group members. (4} He a::'so 
related ~he fear of losing cor.trol closely to the fear of 
failure. In :"1is opinion the average l eade::::- is striving for a. 
high degree of personal sec'-lrity in a sense that operations 
wi::' l go correct l y to a certain degree. He mentioned cas who 
were a Eraid of ha nd i ng over their units to the XO for the time 
they were on business trips or vacations. Tt,ey feared their 
subordinates couldn't do ~he job satisfactorily withou t their 
presence. I t was the interviewees opinion that such a behavior 
is inconsistent with rr.odern management practices. He fe lt tt,a~ 
Superlor who doesn't feel comfortable give 
responsibilities to his subordinates hasn't done his j ob 
cor::::-ectly in the fi::::-st place. (5) He considers himself a good 
public speaker witho;;t fear of acting in frO:1t of people. 3ut 
he e xper ienced fear when he had to give presentations to 
higher ranked officers. The reason is the higher risk. 
Speaking in front of superiors includes the chance that all cf 
a sudden your own career is at stake if you fail. A failure 
Il'.ay result in a situation where " ... your name gets kno wn by 
:.he senior rater ... ". The senior rater is one of two persons 
who have distinct influence on the career via the evaluation 
process. The phrase "gets known by the senior rater" rr.eans 
known in a negative sense. The widespread perception seems to 
be, chat, if one's name is "known". this knowledge can only be 
based on negative events and thus will be likely to have 
negat ive consequences for ehe career. In ehe current military 
environment, which is highly competitive due to the downsizing 
process. every fai lure has the fatal po':ential to put so:nebody 
on the termination list, which creates a threat for :.he 
military career as well as for the welfar e of the families. As 
a result, everybody tries to avoid failure which in turn 
creates a cons tan:. fear of failure. (6) The fear of looking 
!::oolish in fran:. of soldiers and losing the respect of the 
troops. For example, Cos c onduct award ceremonies on a regular 
basis. Despite a lot of rehearsals usually something goes 
wrong ("You drop the award. Somebody pronounces the name 
incorrectly. "). Nobody wou l d dare laugh but "There is that 
feeling in the air". And the CO feels du:nb. (7) The fear of 
changing a situation even though it is obvious t hat the 
orga:1.izational arrangements are inappropriate to respond 
effectively to present challenges. Part of tr.is fear is the 
doubt in own's abilities such as sufficient knowledge, 
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ana l ytical ski l ls, prOblem-solving sk U .ls, presentation of 
facts to superiors, etc. ("Risk causes doubt, doubt works his 
way into fear."). Fur.thermore, these people o!'ten lack the 
necessary se l f - con!'idence to confront s ·.lperiors with the 
detected problems. This confrontatioll usua l l y mear.s fighting 
one's observations and proposals through higher l ayers of the 
echelon to convince higher ranked officials of a real problem 
that needs to be solved . The CO stressed again that the 
fighting for a safe posit i on i n the current competitive Army 
enviror-1t'.ent (" ... lay l ow, don':. make any waves ... ") has a much 
h i gher r-riority tor rr.any peop l e than articulating a 
potentially co:npetent but different view. The primary goal is 
t.o secure one's posit i on rather than to take any risk. :8 ) The 
fear of getting punis~ed foy fai l ures the subordinates make. 
He rr.en::ioned a situation where a gunnery sergeant point.ed the 
gun in the wrong direction and fired outside t.he safety range. 
The CO and the sergear.t were re l ieved of their duties. The CO 
had abso l utely zero control over that. particu l ar situat::'on at 
that particul ar point of time. B"clt he was responsible for the 
action of his subordinat.e . Superiors tend t o respond to 
L"1reats like that by impl ementing mo:::e and more safety 
regulations and organizational contro l mechanisms to achieve 
the highest l evel of con:::::ol and thus personal security. This 
behavior reduces risk taking and the wil l ingness of 
experimentation. 
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The CO mentioned that the fear of failure goes beyond 
military career. It affects the overall balance of life . For 
exall'.ple, he wants to progress in the Army and make it a 
caree:::-. At the same time he wants his son to receive a very 
good education . He and his wife have already determined which 
schools they consider appropriate to guarantee L'1e desired 
education and which wil l definitely not. FurL'1ermore, the 
parents want t o live i.l1 a distinct geographic area to provide 
L'1e proper family envir-onment. Fear arises because these 
requirements are very likely to be incompatible with the 
military career prospects and the interviewee hasn't found a 
solution yet. Thus, the inc..erference of military and 
individual environment is ,:r.e basis fo:::.- this type of fear. 
So:ne of his examples referred to corr.bat situations. The 
combat environment is not part: of this study, but I want to 
de:::.-ive a gene:::.-al idea from his comments. He talked about his 
fear that a borr.b may fall upon t:he head of his soldiers, that 
some of his soldiers may get killed. This is a fear that 
relates to a certain situation and it is related to othe:::.-
people not only to himself. Tr.is is a fear wh ich is inherent 
in tr.e situation and that is beyond his direct control. He 
recognized that fear is related to the s '- t:'.lation and that it 
will cr.ange if the environment changes. 
At the end o~ the interview when the tape had already been 
turned off the CO asked me to investigate an issue f or him. 
So:ne time ago he had offered the XO the general opportunity to 
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present suggestior.s for improvements. This offer in:..:luded 
cc:rments abou~ the C0' S Dehavicr cr his way of doir.g his 
business . Basically, the CO had asked the XO to criticize him. 
The XO never responded to that offer. The CO, whi l e wait ing 
fo!:" the respond, was not sure about the XO's reasons. Ee 
supposed the XO was too fea~ful to confr-ont his CO. He asked 
to talk to the XO and investigate :'1i8 motives. 
C. SECOND INTERVIEW: FIRST INTERVIEW WITH XO 
For thi s interview I chose the same environment as for L'le 
CO's interview. We met in one of the study rooms in the NPS 
library. The XO arrived after a short drive from Fort Ord . I 
got the impress i on that he cO'-l l d relax much quicker than the 
CO. His appearance wa~ at ease and we started talking abO·.lt 
different things (r.ct military related) while we were walking 
to the study :::-oom. We could begin the interview immediately 
and the xo seemed to be exited about participating in this 
research. Overall it was a very suppo:::-tive and constructive 
clir:tate. 
The inter.tion of the first interview was to i dent.'-fy t:'le 
interviewee's var ious perceptions of fear. He was asked to 
state diffe:::-ent types of fea:::- he has e xpeyi enced ar.d provide 
sUPElorting examples w:le:::-eve:::- possible. r did not l imit him in 
any specific way at the beg i nning of the interview. 
His first stater:tent included t:lat fea:::- is something 
" ... pecp l e deal with all the time, on a daily basis. 
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Furthermore, he emphasized that fear includes for him the 
e l ement of the unknown ("People fear what they don' t 
understand. rr, rr For me the biggest thing about fear is the 
unknown.") As an example f or this phenomenon he mentioned the 
fear of death . 1:1 contrast to the CO's physica:L fear, the XO 
was not afraid of the physical part of death. He rela::ed his 
fear about death to the inability of' assessing or predicting 
by any means what might happen after death (' ... You don't know 
what happens once yon die. Is there somethi :1g once you have 
died or does everythi:1g just cease . ") 
The XO' s fear about the unknown was bigger in the past 
than it is today. He also recognized that while, with the 
passage of time, the human species increased it s volume of 
knowledge and learned to master the "previous unknown", each 
new day bears "new unknowns". Thus, we seem to be 
endless spiral of' learning to handle old fears while 
continuously being confronted with new ones. 
His second catego.I"Y was related to expectations he saw 
himself confronted with (" ... the fear of the expectat ions t hat 
are placed on you."J. These expectations can be originated ir. 
superiors, a peer group, or subordinates. For example, to be 
the new officer in a company places a lot of expectations 0:1 
!"lim from all three directions. He was concerned abollt his 
overall ability Of meet.ing t.hese expect.at.ior.s. His even more 
significant concern was associated with the probability, that 
he might not explicitly be of al l expectations. The 
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realization of th::'s potential problem area often stimulates a 
fee l ing of uncertainty which in tu;:-n l eads to skepticism 
'",'hether his be!1avior is appropriate. The fact :.hat somebody 
:nay not meet certain standards can have severe consequences. 
He mentioned a particular effect many officers seem to be 
afraid of . ("If you are not ... quali fied you are looked at as 
less of a man, as l ess of an officer, as incompetent, dod 
that's really not the case . ") 
In the S3r:le context he also mentioned the fear of failure, 
l ike the CO did. The XO's opinion, examp l es, and fee l ings ;.,'ere 
very similar to the cne ' s described earlier by the co. The XO 
gave some examples to il l ustrate his opinion . (1) Wrong 
decisions l ead to personal failure . ;.Ie stated that this 
creates a tremendous source o f fea::- for a lot of officers ir. 
the Army. ;.Ie is working long hours to make sure he has done 
everything he could possibly do to achieve a high degree of 
accuracy. Nevertheless, the fear of fai l ure rerr.ains, because 
nobody is capable of kncwing all procedures, o::-ders, and 
regulations pertaining to a certain situation. Especia l ly the 
handlir:.g of the very sensi t ive issues in the company ( l ega l 
and medical questions related to the regular termination of 
the contracts of enl isted perscnnel) requires applicat.ion of 
regulations officers do not use frequent.ly u:1der :1o~a l 
conditior:s. I n addition, t.he time constraint today i s much 
higher . tenninatio:1s have to be made in accordance with 
downsizing regu l ations. In some cases the avai l able time for 
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the paper work is extreme l y short. (2) In many groups 
confo=ity and adherence to group va:'ues and norms is enforced 
by peer pressure . The XO believed that this creates the fear 
of failure within many group members. (3) The fear of looking 
foo l ish ir. :ront of troops. The respect the soldiers have for 
their superiors is a very sensitive point to him. RespeC'c is 
a vita l eler:1enc for him in any military unit. It is re l atively 
easy to loose this respect by not behaving in accordance with 
the leadership role . To regain this respect is very hard if 
not impossible. (4) He feared also getting punished for 
mistakes somebody e l se rr.akes. In any leadership position wer:..;: 
is de l egated . Supervisors control work stations, processes, 
and outputs, but they don't have the potential to be 
omnipresent. Thus, somebody may make a mistake and the 
superior is not even aware of it. The fear is, that a highe~ 
level superior may be made aware of the failure earlier than 
he recognizes it himself. 
A 7.hird dimension was 7.he fear that can be creat.ed :Oy the 
various F.lyths about situations peop l e may enccun'~~r in their 
very near future ("They inspired a great deal of fear in me 
going to that course.", .. 1 was so scared, I wasn't myself 
when I got there."). These myths, conveyed by peop l e who have 
already been there and thus are deemed to have the proper 
experience, have the potential to generate a negative :1otion 
or bias up front. It is recognized that the bias can be 
positive as well but the positive bearing is not under 
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i:lvestigation i n this st1.:dy. This i!lspired fear can r.egat i vely 
affect people's performance. The bias may create an adverse 
attit. 'Jde towards the unknown situat ion wh ich could hamper a 
pe::-son's abil i ty to perform in an optimal way. A.'1other aspect 
is that people may be too caut.ious, too respectful, to develop 
their fu::'l potential. In both cases the fear might lead 
:legative outcomes in the form of a reduced level of 
performa:lce and thus, higher risk of failure. 
The XO viewed fear as a natura l occurrence in human l ife. 
("It's nothing wrong with being scared. I firml y believe you 
are legitimately authorized to be scared of thir.gs.") 
Furthermore, he recognized that fear has a life - saving aspect, 
because". . when you lose fear of something you are ask i ng for 
something bad to happen." In h i s opinion fear functions as a 
healthy reminder. I t usually sends early warr.ing signals which 
can prevent people from getting cayeless if they are 
recogni zed appropriacely (" Fear makes people be me::icu l ous. " ) . 
Beyond L'1e poi!1t of merely ack!1owl edging the legitirracy of 
having fear the xo emphas i zed that he feels it i s import.ant to 
develop mechanisms or proceduyes deal with fear 
effectivel y. He expressed the opinion that fear can be 
controlled {" ... once you got'. used to that fear it wasn't so 
bad. You realized, yes, that is tough but. it's not goir.g to 
k.lll you. ") He referred to an increased knowledge as a basis 
for reduci:lg fear. For the XO, fear gets reduced in a!1 
al.:tcmatic-type fas:'1ion when learning takes p:'ace. The 
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increasing knowledge {wh ich may be acquired through training 
or by actual l y performing a task in the work environment ) 
about the previous unknown circumstances provides a more 
comfortable feeling. People learn how to master diff icult a nd 
unfamiliar situations which in turn reduces t heir fear and 
strengthens thei r self confidence. Furthermore, he stressed 
that fear has to be controlled by the individual to the 
greatest extent possible in order to accomplish the mission 
I" ... if you le t fear control you and let it get the best of 
you, ther. you can become ineffective. Then you are wrong."J. 
He demanded that everybody shou l d try to ". . control fear to 
the best you can. The control o f fear as a means to 
successful mission accomplishment seems t.o be a fundamental 
requis it e for him. 
He was scared that somebody else " ... may screw up your 
life." As an example, he F.lentioned that in preparation for 
parachute jumps the parachutes are packed by different peop l e 
than who actually jump with the parachutes on their back. 
Everybody picks up one of the prepacked parachutes. The fear 
of having gOt a faulty packed (having no control over the 
pack ing process J remains until the parachute actually opens 
when they are in the air. He mentioned t.hat in an organization 
of a certain magnitude tasks have to be delegated. But very 
often I:here exisl:s a conl:inuous doubt whel:her thp. person the 
job was delegal:ed to will do il: correctly. This in turn 
re l al:es to the responsibility issue. A superior is responsible 
for his s ubordinates. If they don't fu l f i l l their jobs, t.he 
superior is threatened with heing r.egatively evaluated, 
because he is unabl e to accomp l ish his nissior:s either. A 
superior is :!1eld responsible for the action, or not action, of 
his s.lbordinates. 
Next the XO described a relationship between fear and 
ac t ion. ::<'ear can cause quite different reflexi ve or intended 
actions in each individual. He characterized the extreme 
points 0: a probab l e reaction spectrum as " ... fight or 
flight. Fight means that the individual stays and pursues 
th e mission thus, deals positively with fear a:1d final l y 
overcomes it, whereas flight i:1dicates t.hat fear is of such a 
magnitude t hat the individual witndra'Hs for safety reasons, 
hasically t.o save his l ife. Anot;her possible t.ype of reaction 
is paralysis. Again, as the xo mentioned, the magnitude of 
fear can be such that t:'1e ir.dividua l is incapab l e of any 
reaction. He st.ressed that the liltter type of reaction is the 
least preferred for soldiers because it dra:natically increases 
the da!1ger of getti!1g shot. The XO mentioned that training is 
aimed at; prepari!1g the soldier for sit.uations suc:'1 that 
... when fear kicks in so does trainir.g.". Trai!1ing experience 
should guide t.he reaction, giving the soldier a feeling of 
secL:rity based on his skills ar::d k!1owledge. The confidence 
gained through his automated response shou l d than reduce the 
fear and til:a l ly let t.he person fu l ly regain his ability to 
act consciously. He emphasized tha t the last point is 
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extremely important for leaders. They are expected to keep 
their freedom of action all the time. If the leader gets 
paralyzed by fear t~e entire unit is in danger to get 
eliminated or at least the mission is not going to be 
accomplished ("1 think probably the biggest fear I have is to 
not be able to contro l fear. In the mir.ute fear control s you, 
you are done."). 
The xo mentioned he fears whether he is executing tasks in 
a pr2fessional manner. He felt responsible for the welfare of 
all peop l e in the conunand. He gave the example of a fl u 
vaccination that had to be administered to the company. He 
contacted the hospital in advance to learn abm:t the vaccine 
and t he potential problems related to the vaccination. He did 
it for two reasons. Firs t. , he war.ted to exclude all imaginable 
risks for his peopl e to the extent possible for him. This 
action originated in the fear that somebody could get hurt by 
that particular vaccine :e.g. allergic reaction with severe 
consequences). Second, he was driven by the fear of negative 
consequences for himself in the case of an accident. He was 
responsible for that vaccination and, even though the medica l 
personne l actual l y performed it, he would ultimately be held 
:cesponsible if something went wrong. Thus, he prepared the 
action as careful as possible to protect himself and his 
peop 1 e (" . .. that. fear inspires me t.o maintain a degree of 
control ... that I feel good about of what we are doing, and 
what we are doing is safe, and what we are doing is proper. "). 
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The particula:.- situat.ion in Fort Ord creates a l'.ovel type 
of fear for the XO. The fear of failing in the bandling of 
paperwork. As an infantryman his r:lain emphasis in the past bad 
been on training, on getting soldiers ready for combat 
(to ..• paper work wasn't a big deal .. " J . Arriving at Ford Ord 
he had to learn that priorities had changed. Training w"as no 
longe r important . The absolutely correct admin istration 8f the 
soldiers paperwork became the highest: priority. Negligence or 
insufficiencies in the adrdnistra':.ive process cou l d be 
disadvantageous fo r the soldier. Furthermore, these failures 
now have a high potentia l to affect the career of the officer 
negative l y. The adjustment to the new (and now crucial) 
pr':orities takes some Lime and incll:.des a longer learning 
process. During this phase 0: change fear is a constant factor 
in the dai l y work ("We have commanders who are very particular 
ab8ut the way things are done. They won't even l ook at a 
document . .. if it is not in the proper format, regardless of 
what it ha s t8 say ... YO·cl could tell them, hey, yQur house is 
on fire. If it was not in the proper fonnat they don'":. want to 
it ... tt). The problem in this situaLian seems to be that 
all echelons are confronted '.dth the dilemrna the downsizing 
agenda imposes on them. The procedures have to be fo l lowed 
meticulously, otherwise serious consequences li: ... e law suits 
may result. This sword of Damoc l es and the fact that s ome 
people are not that familiar with the red tape amount to a new 
dimension of fear of failure. The XO made clear that correct 
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paper work is essen::.ial ::'0 an organization but, at his point, 
the overemphasis of format over the content looks like a 
persona l safety device to ensure ooe' s survival in the rapidly 
changing and downsizing environment. He gave the e xampl e that 
document.s are t.ransEerred to other units by having somebody 
from that unit sign a delivery book, where each docUo"TIent is 
listed precisely I for check out. ("That' s how crazy we are 
about paperwork right now. It's just :'0 cove r your ass.") . The 
range o~ poss ible repercussions embraces a ll legal actions 
avai labl e to higher levels of the hierarchy. Additionally, it 
crea::.es the fear ::.hat a bad mark on the file has the 
threatening potential to p ut you on the termination list very 
quickly. In the XO's. view mistakes seem to become a very 
welcome selecting device used to terrninat.e soldiers careers 
early . Thus , everybody has a vital interest. to keep his 
personal records clean. This is counterproductive to 
innovation and risk taking, and raises obedience to formal 
procedures to a~ unusual high priorit.y. 
The XO stated that the leadership style creates the 
clirr.ate for t.he company and especial l y the work climate. Some 
company conunanders use the autocrat.ic style whi ch usually 
makes the subordinat.es " ... set back and turn off." Initiat. i ve 
for subordinates is either not permitted or not sought. He 
preferred a more coopera t i v e leadership style where the CO 
gives directions and allows for ample room to maneuver. In his 
op inion the best. CCs provide directions and " ... a command 
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phi:'osophy. T:'1ey recog:1:"ze t~e capabil:"ties 0:= L'1e:"r 
subord:":1ates a:1d utilize them effect::'vely ::owards the 
accomp~ishmen:: of the missior. (" ... he 1,;.ses tr.e vast bar.k of 
experience ar.d :"ntel:.iger.ce and draws from it to ::;rea::e a 
w:"nr.ing co:npa:1Y."). Furtherrr.ore, the XO mentior:ed' . that one 
of ::he best leaderst.ip traits for a cOITL"Tlander is hc;.r;Jility tCl 
rea::'ize tha~ YOl:' are not perfect ... and L'1e ab:"lity Lo say :-
made a mista:-ce. The least preferred style, and t:'1e one 
tr.a:: may create :ear it: ::he subordinates, is r-:ne whe-::e the 
au::ocratic CO (tr.e XO called some COs ::yrar:tl has no 
confidence in his subo::-:-d:"r:ates, gives no dire:::tior.s, daesn':; 
back them ir. the case of mistakes, and daesn':: encOl.:.rage or 
inspire their subordina:::es to wor:-:: with pr:'de towards a comnO:l 
goa::". T~'1e XO mentior.ed that, if :::he CO has con::ide:1ce in r.is 
people le.g. decision IT3:-:::'..ng ability) and r.e anno..J:1ces tr. back 
:::he:n in a case of a minor ::a:'1"..Jre, tr.is wO"..J::"d reduce tLe fear 
0:: fClilure and in tu::-:-n increase t~e arrcbitiO:1 of each 
individc.al to dCl t~'1e best they can, :'r. t~'1is case to make the 
bes::: decisio:l poss:'b::'e (' ... yO"..J dor.' t encourage them :'0 
taL!. ... 3ut yU..J te::Cl L'1em i: yO"..J fail, it's not :::he er.d of the 
wor::Cd. We'l::" :.ake :.::: and we'll learn from it." " ... rat~er 
than i:1spi-::-e the fea-::- in :.he s".lbordinates, he r.eeds to ir:spi-::-e 
an att:':::"..Jde of T can do anything ... to rr.a:-::e a mission go 
successf"..J::"ly. "). 
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D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Before I discuss the data I want to make a general corr.ment 
the interviews. I was surprised by the openness of both 
officers. With respect to my earlier concerns I didn't expect 
them to be so frank in providing infonnation. Neither one 
refused to answer any question and they addressed all subjects 
without hesitation. I conc l ude from their attitude that they 
didn't purposely try to hide sensitive information . For 
example, both admitted to have different types cf fear 
including the fear of failure. I attribute their openness to 
the trustful work atmosphere that was created during our 
informal meetings. 
The interviews offered a variety of infonnation that can 
be related to the preliminary model. Most of the data provided 
are attributable to their own personality (The respective 
circles in the model are: inherent in or created by the CO, 
and inherent in or created by the XO). Examples for these 
fears are: Fear of suffering an injury, fear of admitting to 
r.ave fear, fear of personal failure, and fear of the unknown. 
These fears correspond to the background of the individual. 
They are related to factors like the level of educatio!1, the 
current level of knowledge, the value system, and the 
personality. For example, the fear of admitting fear may be 
based on the educatior' .. A child, especially a boy, may have 
learned from his father that it is in general inappropriate 
for a man to show fear. The same fear can be explained by 
loo:-::i!1g at the va l ue system. The XO mentioned i:1 CUI" 
pre l imi:1ary meeting that the Army environment does not permit 
an officer to show fear. Any presenta7..ion of fear from an 
officer is deemed to have demoralizing effects on the troops. 
It is expected that an officer has his feelings under control 
permanently . Especially the fear of the unkr.own is a fear- that 
is related to the personality. People respond differently to 
situations where they are exposed to unknown factors. Some may 
have a positive fee l ing and the desire to explore whe:::-eas 
others may no7.. be delighted to enter unfarni l ia:::- ter:::-air. . 
S ome of t he fears mer.tioned are attributab l e to the fear 
that is in:'1erent or originated in the situation. Examples are 
the fear- about a presentation in fro:1t of a high ranked 
audience (the officer is well prepared and confident, b u t the 
mere presence of higher ranked peop l e stimulates fear in him) , 
fear created by circulating myths about certain affairs (the 
person fee l s capable of performing a future task and is 
ccmfident, but suspicious myths stimulate fear, because they 
introduce a distorted pictu re), and the fear of getting 
pU:1ished for a mistake a st:bordinate wakes (the superior is 
not present at the scene of act i on and :'1e i s has no chance to 
influence the outcome of an act i on a subordinate takes). 
t:'1ese circumstances ::.he individual has l itt le to zero control 
over the action that gets them into trouble. Somebody or 
something else i:1fluences the actual performance and i s 
responsible for the unp leasant and probably harmful outcome . 
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The example of the gunnery sergeant who fired outside the 
safety range clearly depicts the fact how dependent superiors 
a!'e on their subordinates. The inability to contro l everything 
personal ly or to be omnipresent leaves some superiors in a 
fearful mood. This fear is originated in the situation r.ot in 
the superior himself . 
The information collected in the interviews can be related 
to some of the basic facto rs that are associated with fear. 
First, the XO declared that his greatest fear is the fear of 
the unknown. He prefers to operate from familiar positions aed 
a situation where he is confronted with or anticipating 
obscure stimuli creates some type of fear. The second factor 
that was mentioned was uncertainty. The CO mentioned that he 
is concerned about the future of his fami ly. His des i res to 
combine his military career and a decent life for his fami l y 
ir, a pos'--tive fash i on are confronted with a lot of 
uncertainty. He knows that his career wi ll inc lude many moves 
to unpleasant locations; localities he has basically ruled out 
as places where he wants his family to live and his son to 
grow up. The biggest uncertaint ies are created by (1) the 
downsizing military environment, (2) moves that are required 
for promotion, and (3) his capabilities to exert any influence 
on decisions concerning assignments to certain areas. 
The XO mentioned that, in general, fear would be created 
if he felt that his boss had little or no confidence in h is 
abilities to handle a task. professionally. Additionally, he 
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emphasized that the same holds for a superior who wO'-lld not 
lead by giving directions or woul d not- back subordieates in a 
case of minor fail'-lres . In his opinion this would crea':e great 
ur.ce:::.-tainty about what the boss expects and what behavio:::.- to 
show as a subordinate. He also mentioned t:Jat at his present 
cQrnmand this fear does not exist. 
The factors :1ovel ty aed ambiguity are reflected in a 
situation described by t he CO. He tried to impl ement a change. 
He was conv:'nced that the new program wou l d be an enhar.cement 
over the existing one. Eut he was dO'Jbtf'-ll about his own 
abilities to p:::.-ese:1t his case to his superiors, F'Jrtherw.ore, 
he was scared to sta:::.-t fightieg :'1is proPQsal through the 
va:::.-ious laye:::.-s of the hierarchy until it wou l d be app:::'-Q'/ed 
eventually. The ambiguity of ::.he outcome finally p:::.-event.ed him 
from pursuing his char:ge. 
Eoth officers ::-epo::-:.ed that t h:::.-eat is an elerr.ent which can 
st imula te fea:::.- easily . They relat.ed their conur,ents to 
promot.ion or , as a more severe cons equence , earl y t.erw.i:1at.ion 
of their contracts. This threat had an direc t a:1d i:1direct 
notioe to it. The d irect one is that personal failure or 
insufficie:1t overall performance has the potential to affect. 
promotion negatively or may lead ':0 early terminat ion. The 
indirect one, and probably mo:::.-e fearful, is [.hat. failures 
committed by subordinates can have the same unpleasant 
effects. The downsizing si t'-lation of the Army adds to L'1e 
p:::.-obl err, , The pe:::.-soenel departments have to cut back on all 
ranks and all forces. My interview partners assumed that to 
accomplish their goal the departments are looking for military 
personnel with "had marks" on their records. These troops are 
then primarily targeted for stops of promotions or early 
te:rmination of their contracts . The fear of committing a 
failure shapes the behavior of many people in the Anny because 
the threat of getting fired due to that mistake is increasing. 
Their careers and the welfare of their families are more and 
more at stake. 
Both officers made some comments about fear in general. 
The CO is convinced that fear is related to a particular 
s:"tuation. Different situations inspire distinct feelings and 
some situation are suitable to inspire positive or peaceful 
feelings and others are :"nspiring fear. If the situation 
changes the perception changes as we l l . The XO claimed that 
fear is a natural occurrence in life. He continued to say that 
having fear should not decrease the standing or the rep'-..ltation 
of a person. In his view fear has a life saving aspect. It 
;sends early warning signals to which everybody should pay 
close attention. Igno:ring these signals may lead to severe 
consequences, in the case of a soldier probably to his death . 
He also mentioned that fear can a:1d should be controlled . 
people may loose cO:1trol over themselves al"!d react 
inappropriately, which may increase the problem. He argued 
that effective training provides the skills to cope with fear 
in most cases. The reaction is then based on acquired skills 
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and knowledge w~ich ~elps the person to regain c ont r ol over 
himself and the situation . 
FIRST ITERATION OF THE MODEL 
The data ga thered in t he first set of ir.terviews fit in 
t he preli:ninary model. Statements and examples could be 
ass i g ned t o the three basic areas representing the different 
tyres o f fear ( fear inherent in the superior, fear inherent in 
t.he s"clbordina te , fear inherent in t~e situatio:-l) . I found some 
evidence fo:c the areas I and II I ; I didn' t f i nd evidence s o 
far for the overlapping areas II and IV. 
The data cou l d be explained by five out of t h e :-line 
factors I u sed as associat i ons to describe fear. Indications 
fo!:" the last four fa ctors may be found also. The appearance of 
the t wo of:icers makes me be l ieve that i t is quest i o:lab l e if 
evidence fo r he l plessness, l oneliness, and isolation wi l l be 
discovered. Their personality and the job environ:nent are not 
suitable f8r these descriptors. Ho weve r, I wil l keep them for 
furtber investigation . If they are not usefu l they wi l l be 
e liminated fro:n t~e l ist later . 
For the second se:: of in t erviews the model wi l l be kept in 
its or::'ginal ferm. I hope to tind more evidence fo::- the single 
f ear areas and especially for the over l apping areas. 
SECOND TYPE OF THE FEAR MODEL 
The original model wil l be kept: for t: he second set of 
interviews. Addit.ionally, I wi l l provide a list of words 
the interviewees that relate to the civilian and military 
environment. My intention is to provide some expressions which 
the officers may use as l inks t. o their fears. This is not 
considered to be a limitation but an aid. During the previous 
sessions t:here were no gu i delines or hint:s. The officers were 
asked to present their views. My experience from the first 
interviews was that: the off i cers were will i ng to present and 
describe their fears wi t hout many l eading quest:ion from my 
side. The new list is meant to set a broad framework. The 
officers can use it as an orientat i on but if one interviewee 
wants to ta l k about different subject that wil l be accepted. 
I recognize that: the elements in each colullUl are not mutual l y 
exclusive. They may influence each other or bui l d on each 
other. Words from one co l ullUl could also be used in the other 
colullUl. My int:ention is not t:o provide a perfect dist i nction 
between the various terms, but to get the interview started. 
The lise. includes the following it:ems: 
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Civilian Environment Military Environment 
Society Jcb 
2. Family 2. T3.sk 
3. Va l ue System 3. Role Definition 
4. Prej udice Reward Sys~em 
5. Unemp loYIEent 5 . Conununication 
G . Neighbo~hood Inform3.tion 
Childhood Structcre 
8 . 8. Military society 
9. Education 9 . Promotion, Career 
10. SC:'1ool 1 0 . Competitior, 
1 1. Relationship 
12. Procedt:res 
G. THIRD INTERVIEW; SECOND INTERVIEW WITH CO 
FO!." this interview we me'::- again in the st:ldy room in the 
NP S library. The CO arrived after a 20 minute bike r i de and I 
had the impression he was a li t tle bit exhausted. He tried to 
combine his fit ness program with his cQf:lITlitment to the 
interview. It was not completely i n line with my intention t.O 
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have relaxed and focused :"nterv:"ew partners. FurtheIT.lore, I 
:ound out ::.r.a::. he was facing increasing diff:"cult:"es in his 
daily work. He seemed to be ,.;.nhappy of "losing" so much t:ime 
with the interview. He didn't state that directly. but: I 
concluded it froIT. his corrment:s and his nervous behavior. So I 
suggested to meet ne:x;t time in a p::'ace t:hat wou::'d be rr.ore 
convenient for him. We agreed c:.pon the confere:1ce room in his 
company, a solution that P"..Jt him imrned:"ately more at ease. I 
felt. he wa:1ted to keep h:"s promise to support my research, 
b"..lt he also wanted to keep the t:"me investmer.t as low as 
poss:"ble; which was absolutely legitimate given h:"s C"..lrrent 
problems at work. 
"Anger and fear are closely relat:ed .... Sometimes you::: 
anger produces results that make you a:raid. Yoc:. did something 
yO"..l d:"dn't wa:1t to do. And that makes yoc:. afraid." Th:"s 
statement: desc:::ibed his CO:1cern that it can be da:1gero..Js to 
express ar. opinion when you are uncontrolled, :"rr:"t:at:ed. 
angered, or even infuriated. He referred back to a college 
s:"t"..lation and talked about his view of affirmative acti~):1 
programs. In his opinion, the program should be limited to the 
extent that everybody " ... has the same chance." He also 
believed that some of t:he current prograrr.s went: ':00 :ar and 
put najorities at disadvantages. He ad:n:"tted, that he becarr.e 
very ou::.spoken in discussions sometimes w:'"licr., i:1 ::ur:1, 
brO"..lght him ,.;.nder p"..lblic scrut:"ny. Addit:"or.ally, he was 
considered to be corr.pletely aga:":1st affirmative action 
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p!."ograms aed thus a racist ( " .because whenever you say that 
you are against affirmat:"ve action ... they autorratica l ly take 
it to the fu l l extreme thaL you are a racist."). He 
genera l ized ~his example and mentioned that he sometimes tears 
t:he consequences when he sticks to his beliefs. Especially in 
certain EJositioes or at certain ranks he believed he had to ne 
:nore carefully in expressing his opinion. He further tears 
thaL his statemer. ts may be misinterpreted to the extreme he 
experier::ced in college. This would be ml:ch more dangerous in 
his curreYlt sitc;at:ion and may have a negative bea!."ing on his 
career ar.d as a consequence on his family (' ... I'm one who 
speaks out. And when you speak out in front of the crowd a 
CO:1traryopinion, no matter what it is, you are autorr.atical l y 
targeted .. . ") . 
.. Neighborhood would be another point t ha t causes fear .. . I 
fee l there is a moral decay in the states right now ." He 
related moral to words like common decer. cy and ccnstitution . 
Moral a:1d ethica l va l ues are the fo ·.mdations of a society 
altho·.lgh he made clear that he does not relate i~ to religious 
values . He men~ioned specific tears like t he impact of aids on 
the soc i ety, the increase of gang-related violence, and 
violence in school s. foe has a son and is worr i ed about his 
future . The rr.ilitary probably forces his family to move to 
places which are not in harmony with what ~'1e considers a safe 
place for his family to l ive and for ~'1is son to grow up 
(" ... and you can't shield your children, your family from the 
bad environment all the time. It). 
He went on making an inte:cesting comment about his view of 
death; " ... I'm not afraid personally of very many things ... TO 
me dying is not a big deal. When it happens it happens. I 've 
kind of blocked that out. And because I do that, I have a 
better concept of real ity ... I just don't dwell on it." He has 
a lot of fear about his family and what may happen to them. At 
the same time he puts aside all fear about himself. His fear 
is that he will not be able to act as the protector for h is 
family when a dangerous situation calls for him {" .. I can not 
a l ways be there and watch out for them ... and that creates the 
fear ... n). Thus, he suppresses concerns about himself and his 
security and concentrates on his responsibilities for his 
family. This fea::::- is also related to the before-mentioned 
decay of mora l s in society. 
He explained his concerns for the family in more detail by 
describing his wife as a fearful person. She would get anxious 
when he is leaving for a f ield trip. She would ask h im to slow 
down when she feels he is driving too fast on curvy road. He 
believes that she becomes fr i ghtened really quick. That 
behavior inspires in him the feeling that he has to provide a 
safe and secure environment f or her a ll the time. Furthermore, 
he fears r,ot being available for her at a time when she is 
fearful and may need him and his strength (H •• her personality 
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is part of the reason ... that '8 what causes the doubts and the 
fear. '0) . 
He remembered so:ne troub l e he had during school time. He 
was a skinny and tal l kid, pr-obably the largest kid in SChool. 
Furthermore, he was very quiet and shy. Being without many 
social relationships on campus, but being t he talles t boy, 
other kids targeted him frequently to fi:1d out who would be 
the strongest. Thus, he lived in the pf>rmanent [ear of getting 
beaten up . This experience did not change his at t itude towards 
seeking more social 'contacts. He developed t he physical 
capabi l ity to fight back and thus kept his position ("I played 
the quiet, tough guy image in high schoo l . "). He mentione.d 
that even today socializing is not a strong side of his 
personal icy ( " I have no problems speaking in front of a crowd 
but shaking peopl e's hands and re:nerrt::lerH'.g their 
Dirthdays .. r 'm poor at that.") . 
With respect to information, he stated that he feared to 
make decis i ons based on too little informat ion. He referred 
back to the first interview where we talked about his fear of 
making the wrong decision. Not to have info=acion ava i lable 
that he fee l s is necessary for the decision making process is 
a great concern for h':'m. He likes to investigate issues 
thoroughly be:ore making statement s. This behavior i s rooted 
in seme unpleasant experience during his mil':'tary career. \'i"hen 
he was a young Lieutenant he tended to make statements quickl y 
and, from his today 's perspect i ve, unprofessiona l . He rea l ized 
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that :.his was not career enhancing, even though the stateme:1ts 
reflected his opinion and his current s:.ate of inforr:tation. Ee 
also learned :.hat his " ... black and white. oriented 
thinkir.g was not appropriate in al:!. si:.uations. He discovered 
that differer.t a:1swers to a problem" ... can be right .. ", if 
:.he perso:1 makir.g that argument has a differen:' perspec:.ive. 
Thus, he decided to do more research before arriving at a 
decision. That, in turn, leaves him today with the dilemrra 
that he doesn't always know what the correct and sufficie:1t 
amou:1t of information is. This creates the fear of making a 
decision based on too little infor:nation (' ... I have to make 
the decision right now without all the informa:.ion and you 
have to be able to do that. .. people have to rrai<;.e 
decisions right r.ow. There wasn't time go and play courses of 
actior. and that kind of s:.uff ... "). 
When I asked him whether too much infoD:'1ation would create 
ar.y fear in the decision making process he made -:he followir.g 
"Af:.er an exhaustive investigation of a case you can 
be confident :'0 have revealed IT.ost of ::.he relevar.t 
information. Thus, you feel comfortable with the decision you 
"\'lake because you feel it is the right decision" BU:''' .. where 
::.he fear COF.les from is how many people's lives you have 
affected and how F.lany people are upset with you for making tr.e 
i:1correct decision in their mind."). This is Ule ::ear ot 
having too many people involved in the decision making process 
who may have different interests in the case. The continuous 
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revealing of new informatio!1 a l so uneart hs new stakeholde,::s. 
Sometimes, this creates more problems than it helps clarifyir.g 
the question at hand. His fear is what he may d ig up wher, he 
is diggir.g too deep. 
In a very impulsive statement he emphasized :'1is fear that 
one of his Sl:.bordinates could make a wrong decisio!1 whi l e he 
is absent. He related this t o his concern w:'1ether he trained 
h i s subordinates wel:' enough to perform tr.eir dl:.ties cor'::ectly 
during his absence ( .. and the fear is that I come to work or 
I get called ':' 1'. the middle of t he night and tr,e totally wrong 
decision has been made. Yes, tr.at is a fear.") 
At t he end of t he session the CO asked me to interview his 
XO on a particular point . He mentioned that they have very 
diffe'::ent writ ing styles. The CO was aware that h e " ... caused 
him l the XO I a lot of grief about the way he wr i tes ... very 
wordy ... uses passive tense" . I n the CO's p erception the XO 
felt .offended a lot of times when I take on something he 
has written and marl<;: allover it .". The CO made clear that the 
XO doesn't !rake errors but " .. it's his style.". He exp l ained 
the problem more precisely by saying: "He doesn't write what 
my boss wants to see, in my opinion.". I t seems that :.he CO is 
concerned about the XO's act 'clal perception at t his 
controversy. He doesn't feel comfo,::table with the situation 
and he t ries to take advantage of me t o get more i r: forma t ion. 
Perhaps, he wanted. me to build the bridge to the XO for final 
clarification. Furthe:nnore, the CO obviously has learned wh ich 
writing s~yle pleases his boss. Thus, h e makes sure that every 
document that leaves -the company has the proper style. The 
reasons for t:h is behavior is rooted in the evaluat:ion process. 
The CO will be evaluated by his superior. If he definitely 
knows the preferences of this person, it is a legitimate 
concern that the company's output has the required standard. 
Nevert:heless, it wil l be interesting ~o observe the XO's 
response to this problem. 
H. FOURTH INTERVIEW: SECOND INTERVIEW WITH XO 
This was the first meeting in the company's conference 
r oom . The new environ:nent had no apparent impact on the XO's 
behavior. He was relaxed as usua l and willing to support the 
discussion _ ':'his l'.1eeting was interrupted a COl:.pl e of times by 
people who entered the room not knowing that an interview was 
going on. The XO see:ned !:.o be used to this work style (worki:1g 
with interruptions) because he nodded his head s l ig::Jtly each 
time a person came i n and kept on talking _ It seemed to me 
that he responded to the opportunity to s~ay in the company 
positively. The fact that I moved whi le he was stay i ng i n his 
env~ronrnent may have had a benefic ial i:npact en his 
motivation. 
With respect to the term "soc i ety" the XO considered 
hir:'lself a member of different social groups like nat-=-on, city, 
ne::'ghborhood, work group. For him it is important to be 
accepted within these groups and to conform with their rules, 
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rJonns, stdr.dar-ds, and r-egulations ''' .. . you want to 1:;e a good 
citizen .. "). It seemed to be a ver-y posit i ve ::halleage to 
develop hil'1self ':.owar-ds a valuab l e g::oup member- who is capable 
of contr-ibuti!1g efEec':.ively the gr-oups m~ssion . 
Fur-thennore, he feels a high responsibility for acting as d 
cOr.ipetent grO\:p member-. He expressed fea:: about the 
possibility that his contr- ibutio!1 may not be sufficient dnd 
the group may suffer- f::orr, :l is incapabili t ies or deficlencies 
(" .. . fear of l etting t:'1ose people down . .. who riepends or: 
you . .. , .. . you want to be part of the teael. .. belp the group 
~_ o succeed .. be a va l uab le par-t of the group . ") . I gOt the 
impression t:lat his stat ements were mostly rr,ilitary based. Eis 
mil :l.tary trainiag aad especial l y the Ranger cou r-se helped to 
shape his strong group orientation. Nevertheless, he has 
developed ( 1) a strong feeling that every g::OllP member 
(military acd civilia!1) :'1as to cont::ibute to the group success 
as much as possible to be valuable to the teaf:l and (2) the 
fear not to cO:1for:n sufficien':.ly with these norms and 
standards. 
:--:ext he t alked about value systems. The various groups in 
the militar-y have different values (" ... Rangers have a :<.anger 
creed . . . officers have an officers creed.. NCOs have their 
creed .. . "). For himself he considered the officers oath the 
basis for his moral values. It is imperative [or him to adhere 
the ethical standards he accepted once he swore his oath 
{" . .. I don't have any problems with the values tha t are 
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espoused by the milita.ry . I t.hink they are very whol esome and 
lofty. That 's a good t.hing.") . He also stated that this system 
of high ideals creates some types of fear. "I guess t.he 
biggest fear in it is that you don't live up to the values 
that are espoused by it. the values that you believe in . 
'::wo differen: types of fear can be derived from this 
quotation. First, the fear tha t a group member is nOl able to 
fu l fi l the ethical standards of the value system. This 
inability may have it 's roots in a deficiency in the 
personality (bad chal:.'acter) or in a mental lirr.itation which 
may prevent the person fran ful l y understand the standards. In 
e:lther case the succes.sful rr.ission accomplishment of the tea:n 
may be endangered by this gro\.Ip membel:.'. Another aspect is that 
the group cohesiveness may be jeopardized by this 
noncompliant . Second, a person may very well comprehend all 
the values and believe strongly in them cut may not be capable 
of living up to them. I n this case the pel:.'son h ims e l f is aware 
of the discrepancy between his or hel:.' beliefs and the degree 
he or she is able to adhere to t hem. This may cause the f!:'ar 
of reprimands or in an extreme case social isolation (" . . they 
take actions against you ... ") . 
He also mentioned that values change over time when 
different positions are considered right or wrong. The change 
may occur prec ipitously and in a dramatic fashion. An example 
is the view of the military of OUI (driving under influence) . 
For a long time It was generally viewed as a manifestation of 
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foolishness but nut '",orth t o be considered for discip l inary 
action. ?ela t i.vely quick l y t:'lis attitude changed and our 
became a matter capab l e of ending a career . Today i. twil l 
.. end YO\lr military career quicker than you know. And that 
is command driven from the very c op of the Ar:ny ail the ''''ay 
do'"on to t he l o ·",esr. l evel" .". The prob l em is '",ith rapid changes 
that people are often not able t o change their entrenched 
bel iefs wi.t h the sarne speed, thus t.hey IT'.aintain their preVlOUS 
behavior and chaw:!,e only slowly. This e xposes them to the 
dang e r that their t e havior is no l or.ger acceptable under the 
new value system . As a consequence they get punished. In a 
more severe si tuat lon a person may r,ot even be aware of a 
c hang e in the values. In this case the individual wil l be 
punished for a behavior he or she sti ll assumes to be 
appropr ia te. Not to adjust ti:nely or not to t unc in at al l may 
create a fear because unacceptable behavior has negative 
cO:1sequences which everybody tries to avoid. 
He described another aspect of changes in t he value sy"tem 
w:'lich may re l ate to fear. This is eSgecially t.rue for the 
groups of officers and NCOs . During the Vi e tnam an:'a 
:'lave been a kind of a wild, rude Army... . The dut i es in 
Vietnam and the hard t raining requirements fostered the 
development of a wi l d and rude Army cul ture . ["his was 
tole!"ated during the war but became sub j ect tc increasing 
public scrutiny when the war was over. The cultu:!"e became 
questionable. Since then a dramatic change has taken place. 
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Basically, it was a move back to the standards of conduct that. 
had been in force before the war b',.lt had been ::Ieqlected 
scmewhat during wartime ("Arou ed 1980 . .. the Army real l y 
started to bring t~ings around .. . started hammerir.g people for 
not being true to the oath and the value system t~at. was i::l 
place ... st.arced to ':let rid of people . "). The top driven 
reinforcement of t:"1e vall.:.es embedded in t.he oath forced the 
officers a nd NCOs to review their behavior and rapidly adjust 
to the new land in this case t:he old) conditions . T:-.is was 
esr:ecia l ly hard for people who lived under the VietnaIT. val ue 
system for a l ong time: Thus, a great: deal of fear was created 
and people were dismissed because of misconduct. An.d even 
today the strong reenforcement of the ru:"es of condu ct places 
fear on many people because fai l ures to comply with the ru l es 
may end the career. At this point the reasons for fear become 
more complex because the strong reinforcement is perceived as 
a means for t he personnel departments t o find soldiers with 
disciplinary actions in their fi l es. These bad marks are then 
used as a crit:erion to terminate the contract of t h is so l dier 
early. Th i s particular proc edure has to be viewed in the light 
of the current downSizing process where personnel departments 
are forced to cut. And the first to cut are the people who 
have made mistakes. 
The XO was raised in the nort:h of Los Angeles. 
mentioned that Los Angeles has a lot of areas he avoids 
viSiting. He was afraid of t h e random violence that increase 
116 
in sone areas (" . the black culclre and the lower levels of 
O'clr society in genera l have a lot of pr-ob l ens · ... : :.h gangs and 
random violence . .. people become often victims of that random 
violence. He sLressed that he is not prejudiced aga:l-nst 
black peop l e bu t in 1..05 Angeles a l ot of random violence 
occurs in r-egions t:,at are predominantly b l ack . He told the 
story of a person who wa l ked c hrcugh a v iolent neighhor:'100d 
· ... earlng a red backpack . At that time ga:1gs ident i fied 
themselves by wearing certain c l o t hes and colors. I n this area 
red '"as considen>d the enemy 's co lor. A gang mernber appr8ach 
the man from the back, shot him inte his head, and k illed h im 
("Randem vio l ence is definite l y a great fear in the U .S, " 
.. people get Ling k i lled E:Jr absolu:.el y :10 reas:Jn. just 
because they were existing in t he wrong place at the wrong 
t i me. It ) • 
The childhood of the XO was overshadowed by frictions 
between his pare nts which finally lead to t heir divorce. I n a 
first s t aterr.ent he mentioned that he exper i.enced no fear 
during Lhat t i.me. He said his parents bothered r:im, at most. 
Shortly after that he admitted that he feared t ~'1e te:nper of 
his father (" ... when he [father ] was frustrate:i, he [father] 
got k ind of short and brutal. .. a small kid compared to a guy 
[fa ther] who is three feet tal ler than you, weighs a lot more 
and is intimidating to a degree, slamming doors . .. that scares 
a kid . .. I' His reaction to his father's outburs ts of temper 
was avoidance (" . . stay out of his way. ." ). Later he found 
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out that his father was an alcoholic, a fact :.hat explained 
h is temper to a certain degree. This situa:.ion has strong 
bear ing on the XO' s current feelings and concerns. The 
unpleasant pictures shape :'1is view about his ma!"riage and his 
children. He wants to avoid all the situations he had to live 
through and t he bad attitudes of his father se!"ve as a 
perl'lanent warni ng ("I have a fear ... I am getti:::lg married in 
four mO:1th ... and I have a fear to this day ... of failure in the 
marriage. I'm wondering if I blow it the way he did. 1 fear 
havi:::lg children because 1 don't .. pu t them through the 
type of growir.g up that 1 did ... 1 don't. wa:1t to be like my 
father.") . 
A point of conce!"n, in his terminology not. a real fear to 
him, is the stress put on a family by the military duties 
("I've seen it t.o be very stressful on people's relationships, 
a lot of !"elationships go down, get dissolved due to the 
stress put on them from the military due to military 
missions . "). 5e mentioned that his fiance accuses him 
constantly for putting her in second place. ;.Ie described he!" 
as very demanding. They o ften have problems sehedul ing events, 
because they interfere with his military schedule . His 
explanation is that he swore an oath and that he wi ll carry 
out his obligations as truthful ly as possible. Everything else 
has :'0 be arranged around his military mission. Nevertheless , 
he recognized that this may be a constant source for problems 
between him and his family in the futu r e. Interesting was his 
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next ccr:trr,e:1t where he stated that he does not p;Jt his milir.ary 
ca!:eer " .. . over her. .. . If it would be" ... a question of life 
and death. he would ce the re ~or her. But: in al l other 
cases he would carry out his mL.itary duty as he is supposed 
to do. It seemed to :ne that he · ... as sti 11 it: a dilemma and he 
had r.ot reso l ved the question sufficiently for himse l f. Thus, 
he was still vacillating wh ich stance to take fi nal ly . 
Next he talked about his relationship to the CO and 
sClperiors in general. He viewed the co as the role mode': f or 
everything r.e exp8ct.s ~'1il1'.self to accomplish . A CO has to be 
competent, intell igent, of ar. unquestionacle integrity, the 
OIle who sets t.he example. The XO tries to liv e up tc this vie· ... · 
because he believes thar_ is what his co expects him to 
aC:"1ieve. A good reason to st!:ive for theOle goals is the 
evaluation t hat has t o be writter, by the CO. n·.e xo seemed to 
be concerned about the evaluation . Interesting::'y, his honest 
conce::-n s eemed to be his capability to r eac h t:he standards he 
believes the CO accepts as sufficient. On the other hand, it 
seerr,ed to me that these standards were not clearly defined. 
The XO himself seemed to have very high expectations which, in 
turn, place a great burlien on him, because high standards are 
difficult to attain. And this dileuuna creates the fear about 
the evaluation and l eadS to a much more forrr.al and rigid 
appearance of the xo than he would display usually ( " I 
personally, I am more fearful than I need to be of my 
supe r iors. ", "The cOmI)lander is the commander, he is the guy 
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wr.o evaluates you, he is a l ways watching you, he is always 
judgir.g you, watching your performance. "). 
At the same time he assured me that his relationship with 
the CO was very good ( ' ... I feel he really trusts me and 
allows me to assist him ir. running the company. I fee l , he 
also has an implicit confidence in me to lead the company 1n 
his absence ... I feel rr.ore l ike a peer with him and not like r.e 
is the CO and 1'["\ the XO."). ':'he XO liked to work in this 
company. He felt that he and his work were accepted and so he 
was delibera':ely devoting a great amount of time to his job 
(" ... he treats me like his right hand man which I r eally 
appreciate ... "). Another aspect w:'1ich made the XO feel 
comfortable in his work environment was that "He is not a real 
formal type of CO." The XO appreoiated the open cortununication 
between hin, the First Sergeant, and the CO. This was 
considered the basis for a truthful and harrnonious work 
relationship as wel l as the key to successful mission 
accorr.plishrnent. Nevertheless, necessary formal and respectful 
distanc es remained. The XO mentioned another point which 
helped him improving on his self esteem. The CO viewed h im as 
his right hand and invited him to share responsibili':y for the 
company with him ("I'm the Commander of the company and ycu 
are the second leader of the company. And now let 's lead the 
company together. H) • The XO fel t honored by this 
responsibility and was eager to fu lly satisfy the CO's 
e xpectations. This paragraph described very pos itive aspects. 
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The XO lived in a pleasant envirOl'l.."TIeEt a:lo had appare nt l y not: 
experienced any fedr that was related to com..'11unicat.ion or his 
"!"clationsnip to his CO. From these data I ca:1 draw the 
following conclus ions using a tYIJe of inverse met h od: ?irst, 
the presence of good dod open cOITmunicatic.Jn provides the bas'--s 
for a harmonious work atmosphere and makes the XO work a" hard 
as b e can to contr i bute t o th e success of the company. The 
conclusion can be drawn that the absence of good and open 
cOr:ul'.unication could lead to problerr.s. As the XO stated it, 
.. if C01NFunicatian is down, the :::'-e is noth i ng l eft but 
failure. You are going to fa i l, i t's just a matter of t i rr,e." 
Workers :nay feel unsure abo"-lt the goals and L"1ey may not feel 
free to dpp!:"oach the superior to ask for clarification . 
?urthermore, their enthusiasrr, and contr i b'..ltions may decnedse 
over time. Th i s can leave subordinate.s in a fea"!"ft.:l situatio n. 
The i r uncertainty i n creases as t o how to behave dId what i s 
expected from them. Usual l y peop l e don't like a pa:!:"ticular 
level of uncertainty. They try to avoid it by see king 
inforrr.ation and claritication. I f this avenue is blocked by a 
super:ior who does not communicate very well the subordinates 
are left in an uncertain and possibly fearful environment. 
Second, the positive relationship between the CO and the XO 
provided for a harmonious work atmosphere and effective 
output. FUrthermo:!:"e, the XO was dedicated to the COIT.pany 
because he was given great responsibility and recognition by 
the CO. He felt integrated in the command structure and given 
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a challenging share of the work. Using the same approach as 
above, I can conclude that the absence of a goed relatienship 
or the presence ef a highly disturbed relationship may create 
a:l extremely undesirable situatio:l for the subordinate. Again 
this may create fear in the subordi:lat.e for various reasons. 
The communication nay be insufficient and t he subord::'nate is 
unsure abeut the expectations placed on him. Ole may be unaware 
of tasks he is supposed tc perform or the specific ';lay t" -e 
tasks are to be performed . The team feeling deteriorates ii..: 1 
may leave people with il feeling of iso l ation . 
With respect to inforrr.ation the XO mentioned that he vie'Ns 
data as the basis to make intel l igent dec::'s i ons. The sta tus of 
having too little information is of so:ne concern to him . He 
prefers t.o have sufficient. data to prepare precise dec i sions. 
1\ lack of data creates a fee l ing of uncertainty and the fear 
of making an improper decision. To have too much data is of no 
concern to him. He analyzes the available data and se l ects the 
facts which deem him appropriate to consider. Then he makes 
the decision. He mentioned that the time factor plays an 
importan t role in decision making . If a decision has to be 
made by a certain time t.he process of data gathering has t.o be 
stopped early enough t.o allow for analysis and fi nal 
conclusions. He acknowledged that. this put. him frequently in 
t.he posit.ion of not having sufficient data to make the most 
a ccurate decision. This leaves him wit.h a unsatisfactory 
feeling but on the other hand " ... if the decision has to be 
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made :by twelve 0 ' c. l o::::k- it wil l be made at t hat time re9ardless 
o f L'1e info:cmat:ion I :,ave ... if it is too l:l.t tle you do the 
h,,"st: you can. You take a calcu l ated risk." 
The ccmfrontation of mi l itary and society was ~ur next: 
subject.. The XO l'le ntioned that he tears people reactions when 
they become aware that he is in the mi li tilry. He mentior.ed 
the example of t1:"00p8 coning back from their Vietnam 
assigrJnents and were treated poorly by citizens {" ... they were 
serving t he ir country and they come off t h e p l ane and peop l e 
call them baby ki ller and spit on them. "). :lis specific fear 
was rooted in judgements made ahout hiwsel£ and ;'1i8 job by 
civilians. He d i dn't ~ear reprisals O!" physical violence but 
was scared about possible psychological distress (" ... you must 
have no l i fe, ... no good to think for yourse l f, I:hac's ''''hy you 
are in the military ."). The reaSO:1 for this r.ype of judgeme:-lts 
seems tha t " ... there are a lot of people in the society who 
d isagree with what the military does. We don't allow 
homosexuals, we are discriminatory i:-l a lot of ways. We don't 
pay people a l ot of money. We ask people to put eheir l ives on 
the line wiehout question. We treat people badly in some way." 
He des cribed a consequence flowing from this judgements. 1:-1 
his view ehe majority of tl"'.e women does noe ''''ant to get 
involved with military people. The Army seems co have a 
specifically bad image. He acknowledged :::hat some women 
" ... really get off on ehe military guys and the military 
thing ... , but mentioned also that the majority has :-Iegative 
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stereotypes about th e r:tilitary. Furthermore, he thoug::-Jt that 
this is more a probler:t of the lower ranks. OfEice:r:s rarely 
encountered this type of rejec':ion because t::-Jey enjoy a more 
Eavorab':'e judgenent. 
He comlT.ented on U',e terr:t "corrpetition" very positively. He 
viewed conpetition as 'nece ssary and challer,ging (t ••. I enjoy 
a clean conpetitive gane ... "). Wi th respect to the do· .. ms izing 
process he considered competition vital fe r the survival of a 
strong Army. He believed that only the best wi ll make it to 
the top positions and wil l renain in the systen. T::-Jis wi ll 
provide for a professional and high l y qualified organization 
that will be ready to face futu:::-e challenges. On tr.e other 
hand he I1'.entioned that he fears to loose a game. Thus, the new 
conditions impose imnense pressure on him to execute his job 
wi thout failure, because" ... when you make one mistake you are 
done, no rebound.". Another aspect he mentioned was that 
people develop a " ... check the block ... " mentality. Everybody 
is primarily concerned to reach his crucial steppingstones 
along the career path on time. Required training programs and 
positions are just checked off. People don't focus on their 
current responsibilities as much as they should but are a l ways 
planning their next career step. This decreases their 
effectiveness in their current billet, but the fear of not 
having checked off all requirements for higher billets is a 
major driving :orce for a person to be future oriented rather 
than concentr::; ; on t he :" prese nt assignment (" ... they get so 
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promoLio:1 drive:1 c hat they forget to be a g80d comrLandcr 
today , " I ' 
Fi nally, : L::: i ed c.-o find out how he perceive:! the fac t 
t.hat the CO frequently correct:.s t.he rough drafts he submits 
·:the CO asked me in the previous interv i ew to check on this 
poi:1t) , Discrete quest i ons didn't l ead to the core of the 
problem. Even d i rect questions revealed no negative perception 
of t:.hat phenomenon . The XO stated c l ea::: l y that in hi.s view it 
J.. s the fundament-al right of the CO t.o change everything that. 
he f i nal l y s i gns. I cou l d not detecc any indica tior. of fear 
wich respect:. to this issue. His answers seemed t.o ref l ect his 
honest opinion. 
After , .. e fi:1ished this session I made an observat.ion w:"1ich 
may be important to explai::l the good relationship be Lween CC 
al'.d XO. The CO's spouse arrived about. 5: J 0 pm to pick him up . 
She had their little son with her . She seemed to be fami l iar 
with the enviro nmen':. and moved straight into the CO's office , 
The chi l d played around, until he suddenl y noticed that the XO 
was in his o ffice . The XO himself interrupted his current work 
a:1d started p l aying with the child. The CO's ' .. He joined t.he 
t wo and t.hey talked for a while. It appeared to me that the 
families kr,ew each other ar.d had a good relationship. The war:,:: 
environment was not a disturbing or distor c ing factor wi t:.h 
respect to the behavior of the CO, XO, and CO's wife. They 
seemed to behave the same way they would usually do . 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Duri:1g' these interviews the CO and the XO primarily talked 
about personal fears. The following fears the CO mentioned are 
attributable to the circle A of my mode l (fea r inherent in the 
CO) : ( 1 ) The fear of getting angry (sometimes uncontrol l ed) 
and tr.en making inapp!'opriate statements. He recalled that he 
has a temper and that he sometimes has problems to control it. 
Later he regrets h is comments , but the danger of havi:1g said 
Rome thing wr.ich may af!:ect his ca!'eer is still there. (2) His 
fear of moral decay in the society. Like in the first 
ir'.terview he related t his to the question where to raise his 
son to give him a safe childhood and an good education . In the 
same context he mer:tioned the increasing violence _ He 
believed , that ethical values are eroding more and more and 
e v en the schools are no longer safe places for the kids . 
Furt r.ermo re , he was very worried about the overall safety of 
hi s family _ He expressed concern that he probably could not be 
present i:1 a case where his help would be needed. He 
ac:<;:nowledged logically that omnipresence is impossible, but, 
nevertheless, he felt constantly uncomfortable about the 
safety of h i s family_ (3) With reference to the work in the 
company the CO wa s afraid that t he XO may misinterpret the 
guidance regarding the wri t i ng s tyle . The CO was often 
changing rough drafts submitted by t he XO. He handed t h e 
papers back, but he was not sure whether he explained the 
corrections sufficiently to the XO. The XO, in turn, never 
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responded co the changes or- asked for furtr,er- clarif=-cation. 
Thus, there seem to b e a tensi.on between them that may need 
attentien . The CO felt the XO shOl,Ld have approac:"1ed h i m 
already about that matter . Furthermore, he presumed that 
nobody could bC<lr such a pe:t1'lanent correction wit hou t any 
reaction. Eut , as noted, the XO reported , t :1.a.t he fe l t 
a~solutely comfortable wit h t he situation. He acknowledged the 
ult.imate right ot the CC to change everything he l:i kes before 
he s igns it. Thus, no problem exists for the XO. 
The next fear is attri;')utab l e to tr.e area C ~fear lnherent 
i n the sit.uation). The CO mentioned aga i n the fear, that 
somebody rr,ay r.lake a wrong decis ion while h e is absent: . 
degree of uncertainty remains, neca'clse not everything can be 
totally cont r.o lled. This seems to be an importilnt factor, 
because it was reported twice. The significance is based on 
the negative consequences which may arise fer the superio r. I n 
the light of the downsizing environ.:nent. and the high 
competition it can be fata l to be held responsible for such a 
mistake. The most feared effect is any negative cormnent in the 
personal records, beca¥se this may quickly be used to retire 
an officer early . Especially the CO mentioned several times: 
.. one mistak!" and you are out." I view this fear as a 
strong determir!ant to explain behavior like the high emphasis 
on correct paper work and paper handling. 
The CO talked about two fear s which are related to area I 
(inherent in the CO and in the situation). First, he expressed 
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his concern that h~s ~nvestigations, which he had to do to 
decide legal cases in his company, had affected many people. 
These peop l e sometimes had only a peripheral link with the 
core matter. But they had to be ~"1eard for certain reasons. He 
was not sure how third parties might respond to the inqu i ry. 
It could b e that tota l ly innocent people might be brought i n 
relation w~th the issue under investigation just because of 
the inquiry. He fe l t responsible fo!" these people and tr i ed to 
limit his investigations t o the necessary minirr.um. On t h e 
other ha!"l.d, the cases were o fte!"l. so difficult and corr.plex, 
that a greater volume of information was :1.eeded for a c l ear 
picture. This l eft him with a:1. uncomfortable feeling. Seccnd, 
he mentioned L'le fear of making a decisio:1. based en not enough 
informat ion. T:'lis situation obviously i ncludes the high danger 
of making a faulty decision. The XO rr.entioned the same fear. 
Two different situations were discussed which helped me to 
assign t.he fear t o areas I (for the CO) and area III (fer t.he 
XO). One is, that the circumstances do r.ot permit the 
collection of the suff icient amount of data. There may be time 
cor.straint or the access may be impossible. In this situation 
they would know that there is more information in existence, 
but they would not be able to utilize it for thei!" decision 
making process. The second case would be individual 
negligence. The investigator just doesn't collect the 
available data and thus bases the decision on insufficient. 
information. In this case too, he may be aware of :'lis failure 
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and, as a consequence, has to live with the fear Qf probably 
having made a faulty decisiun. 
The XO talked abOl:t some feaz:-s w:"1ich can be assigned to 
area 8 (inherent in the subordinate). It was interest i ng that 
he described his childhood in some df>tail and sgecifically his 
fear of his father's temper . With the support of a 
psychologist. it mi ght have been possible to analyze the impact: 
of this fear on hi s current behavi:::Jr. Furthe r more, we might 
have been able to explain some of his curre nt fears in with 
rl."gard to this earl y e xperience s. But fr:;)m my experience and 
my management trainir.g backg r ound I am nut educated to examine 
this issue i n d professional manner . It this topic will be 
researchl'"d in more detail it would be beneficial to fo rm a 
wo rk group with different s pecial ists (e . g. psychol ogists) . I 
will talk in mar,," detail abcut t.his mat t er in th,," 
recorrunendations. The next two fears seem to be related to each 
other . Cne is the f ear of f ailing to liv e up to group 
standards . The second fear he mentioned empha s ized this point 
in a specific Manner. ' He described his fear of nut living in 
conformi ty with the va lues set fo u r t h by the o ffic,,"rs oath . fie 
considered the oath an important guide l ine for his behavior. 
It was imperative f or him to try as hard as possible to 
fu l fill this oath in every aspec t of hi s military lif,," . This 
attitude is consistent: with all his corrunents about mil itary 
duties and especially the o ffi cers behavior. My personal 
observations regard ing his conduct and my impression , obtained 
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during the interviews, support this statement. The xo 
mentioned a similar fear of violence as the CO. The XO's fear 
is shaped by his experience in Los Angeles and the random 
violenc e prevale:1.t in some districts. The fear has the same 
results as with the CO. Both officers tried to avoid regions 
which were knowr. for a certain degree of violence. The 
underlying concern i:1. both cases was t.heir own safety and the 
safety of their relatives. Next, the xo mentioned the fear of 
gettir.g a bad evaluation. This fear is closely related to the 
fear of failure. Again, in the light of the downsizing 
process, a:1.Y failure has the potential of ending a career 
early. Thus, everybody is trying hard to avoid a:1.Y r.tistake. 
The last fear that is related to area B is the fear of "losing 
a game". The XO considered himself a very competitive person 
and it seems that competition is a basic element of his 
character. He likes a "clean competitive game" in the best 
meaning of the word. It is an honest endeavor to utilize all 
his energy to achieve personal and military goals. It is a 
matter of personal honor to win and it is very unsatisfying 
for him to be the second. This has great bearing on his 
military performance. Each task is carried out under the 
assumption to reach a hundred percent accomplishment and 
nothing less. 
The XO mentioned three fears that can be assigned to area 
C (fear that is originated in the situation). One is the fear 
of rapid changes in the value system, intensified by the fear 
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t.hat: he !'lay not even be aware of t:he change at all . The Army 
has undergone SOIT.e drastic adjust-meats after the Vietna:n war 
to eLiminate behavioral deviations which were developed during 
that t:).me . : t seems, t hat th e society demanded a return to 
peacetime standards dnd the Army resp ::mded to t hat demand. The 
recollect i on was coup l ed with drastic actions against: those 
;:>eople ' .... ho did r.ot cr.ange irruned i ately ( i nc l uding l egal actions 
d:ld dismi ssal). The XO feared that: a si:ni lar char.ge 
smaller scale perhaps) cou l d occur today and he event:ua l ly 
would not recoynize it . As a possible consequence , he ',,'Quld 
make mistakes which could be held against him. It: seelns t hat 
chis is another version of the fear o f fai l ure which is based 
on the fear of getting discharged. These fears and the i r 
under l ying assl.:l'1ptions seem rrainly to be related to the 
inc~eased competi::ion whi c :'1 arose due to the downs i z i ng 
process . Fierce fights fo:!:" the top rati.ng positions are 
coupl ed with t he fear that the s l ightest mistak e has the 
po t ential to end t he c~reer ear l y. The officers are confronted 
with harsh selection processes and they are not completely 
sure of the criteria . uncerta in ty increases and the officers 
deve l op behavior that may be suitable t o ensure t heir 
surviva l . Th is behavior is shaped by fear d:1d can be 
counterproductive and less efficient. The last fea~ the XO 
mentioned was the fedr that he might get a CO who is primarily 
career or iented. He viewed the current CO as clearly mission 
o ri e nted rather than pursuing his career. But the fear seem to 
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be of a later.t :1atu:::e. To make career ar.d to make it past the 
2:) year :::etireme:1t line, ::"t ::"s reqL.::":::ed that officers have 
ce:::tair. crucial as s::"gn.rner.ts . T:'1e Commander and xo positions or. 
various levels are essent::"a:' ste.?p::"ng stO:1es on tr.e way u::? A 
widesp:::ead behavior seem to be, that career o:::ie:l.ted o:fice-:::s 
j·Jst "c:'1ecr- the block" when t:'1ey :'1ave tr.ose ass'..gnrr.e:1ts. T:'1ey 
t:::y to stay out of troub:'e a:1c. are basica:'ly preparir:g 
themse 1 ves a 1 ready :0::: the next r.ig:'1e::: ass ignmer.t. Tr.e XC · .... as 
very concerr.ed to meet those peop:'e, because :'12 assumed that 
the work c:'i:nate in S·JC~'1 a compar.y cO·Jld be unsatisfactory. _ 
got the ::"npression that he also :eared t:'1at his work load 
would increase ::"n SL.ch a case. This would autor.latically :nean, 
that his p:::obab::"l::"ty to make a mistai>:e would also increase 
And aga::"r. we are back to the feared Army procedures, t:'1at 
everybody with bad evaluations or ar.y oL'1e::: bad marks in his 
:iles may ce the first or.e to be chosen for ea:::ly retire:nent. 
:Jur::"ng this i:1terviews I got the strong impression that 
n·.any fea:::s are traceable to the current fo:::ce reductio:1 
efforts. Cnly a relatively small number of very good off::"ce:::s 
will be kept in the Army. The selection process ir.volves 
probably mechanisms that are apt to create high degrees of 
uncertainty. These, in turn, seem to stimulate various :ea.::s. 
The basic fear seem to be what exactly the criteria :or 
survival or dismissal are. Myths seem to grow, intens.'-l:ying 
the skepticism. Concerns about the future 0: the families 
i:1crease the problem. 
132 
SECOND ITERATION OF TBE MODEL 
The seco:1c set of interviews brought Il e w evidence for t he 
mode l . Several types of fea!:" were exp:'orcd and could be 
explained by the model. Findings focused on the areas A,!3,C 
and the overlap zones' I and III. No examp l es were prese:1ted 
for the zOwes I I and :V. The rr.od e l proved to be usef \l l and I 
· ... i l l lise it. for the thi r d set of interviews without :::hanges . 
My intention for the next set of interviews is to 
concentrate on Lhe military seelor and leave the civilian 
domain. Thi s step ·,.,ill bring the in t e::-view process closer to 
the u l timate focal poinL, the relationship between the CO and 
the XO. 
My inteYltion during t he final se L of interviews is t o 
foc'Js the atLent ion on the relationship of th e superior and 
the subordinate. The previous session had a broader scope and 
allowed for a mere '",idespread exploration of different types 
of fear. To keep the i:lt:erviewees foc u sed I wi l l use a more 
structured approach for the in terview. During the previous 
in t erviews I provided only rough g u idelines and a l l owed the 
officers to choose any fear r ela ted topic they want e d to talk 
about. Tr.is time a more rigid s et of quest i on wi ll serve the 
pu r pose to e xami ne the unique fears that :nay e xist between t he 
CO and r.is XO. 
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TH I RD TYPE OF THE FEAR MODEL 
For the third set of interviews I i nte::ied to narrow the 
fOCllS down to the military environment. During the first ar::d 
second set of in::.erviews I had left t he off icers the options 
to link their co=ent s eithe~ to the civiliar:: or the :nilitary 
envirorunent. 'Ne explored i:1 detail some o~ their personal 
fears and touched already on some military aspects. FollQwi:"".g 
my original inte ntions out lined in the me thodol:Jgy sectior. = 
excluded this time the civilian segment and focused the 
discussion on military aspects. The continuous increase in 
focus serves t:'1e purp,?se to have the interviewees gradual l y 
prepared to ta':":.-; during the last set of interviews more easily 
about the main target poi:1t; their own relationship between 
each other and probab l e fears involved i:1 it. Again I prepared 
a list of terms the officers could use as a guideli:1e but :;: 
did not restrict them in any way if they wa!1ted to talk about 
ano::.her topic and the fears related to that specific subject . 
The following terms were displayed at a blackboard: 
• Job 
• Ro l e 
• Or gani zationa l Structure 
• Procedures 
• Work Style 
• Tasks 




• Climate, Cu l ture, Atmosphere 
During the preparation for this interviews r rec ognized that 
the CCl was under severe stress . It ' ... a8 hard to get hi:n en the 
phone at all and even harder to schedu:'e ,m appo~ntment . 
F:'-nal l y, he had to admit: that he c::mldn't make t. i me available 
t hilt part_lcular ' ... eek. Proble:ns with soldiers in t he company 
and Cldditior.al tasks he had t o do f o r his superiors kept him 
busy. He was al ready 'N'Orking : wert i me to stay on schedu l e wi t h 
his assignments and asked me to resc!1edule our meeting. 
:-'ortunate l y, ~_he XC) was available and we agreed to cha:1ge t he 
seque n c-:e for the last !'our interviews completely. ':'0 have the 
XO first now and the CO second !'Il.ay have a favorable effect: on 
the int.erview process, especially during t.he last two 
sessions. Now I wil:' get the information fcom the subonl.inate 
!:lrst and can arrange precise ques t ions for the co to examine 
whether his answers correspond with the view of the XC. ThiO! 
wasn't. i mportant as long as we exploced fear on a broader 
basis, but wi l l be a more suitable appro ach ',.;hen we get 
focused on the twO person re::'ationship. My approach wi::'l allow 
r:1e to interview the subordinate first who is affected by the 
leadership. During the interview with the CO, who is the 
"originator or source" of the leadership. I will try to find 
out how or to what extent his explanations and perceptions are 
congruent with or diverse from the XO's answers. 
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F I FTH I NTERVI EW: THIRD INTERVIEW WI TH XO 
We met i:1 the conference room of tte company in :;'ort Ord. 
W:1en I arrived the company was currently attending an 
inspection. The only man 1eE1: in the buildings was the XO. It 
was very quiet and we expected no i!1terruptions. The XO seemed 
to very relaxed due to -:.hi8 pleasant atmos9here and aEter he 
had fin~shed an incomi ng phone ca l l he shut his office doer 
and we cOF.lffienced the in t e:::view. 
First, I tried to find ou t whether the xo preferred a very 
r i gid and struccured work environment (e . g. strong guidance, 
detailed information, meticulous task descrip t ion. tight 
contro l s) or if he was favoring more freedom and room for 
maneuvers (e.g . crea t iv i ty, more se l f control, only broad 
gu i dance, goa l s wi thout ordered detai l s how t o exactly achieve 
them) . My intent i on was to e x amine to which extent (if at all) 
a certain degree of freedom may cause fear. I suspected, 
inspired by the Phil i pp Wiesehofer [Ref . 2] art i cle, that 
people wish to : ind a certain extent of struct;ure and 
regulations in their work environment. They feel safer when 
they have orientation in some way. The absence of a:1Y 
regulatory ne twork may cause fear because the respon sibility 
0: the individual for being creative increas es proporticnal to 
the degree the regu lations decrease. The intensity of the 
expected or required network for people to feel comfortable 
depends on the individua l . wi esehofe r makes the poin t that a 
high deg r ee of uncertainty coupled with h i gh requirements for 
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in:1ividual respcns~tili:::y and (:reat~vity rr.ay cause tb", fear c: 
fai:'ure. ?urtr.ermore, r.e argues tr.at pe89:'e Cl:::e cO::1frontcd 
'II' :::r. the conflie::: wr.eL'1er L'1ei::: capa:i:Ji:.ities a:::c su;"ficie:l::: to 
f::'ll tl::~ vaCUL:.n', wit:l meGi.:lingful ar:tior.s. Fir:a:'ly, :12 :nakes t:le 
poir.t that a high degree of dout~ exis~s ~n the icj~vidua:" 
wLethe:: tr.ci r r:r.OSC1: r:ourse 0: action wi_l acceptable Lor 
others w::h :::ega:::d to ethica:' religious, ::ccial 8r ~c:cr::)r1ic 
standa::ds or vi ews. 
The nentioned L"la:' r.e likes to be" ... semewhere ir. L"le 
middLe." "!'--8 pei:lt was that d::':terent sitUClt::'0::18 requi:::e 
oit :erer.:. app::oaches. Wher. il. training program has ~c be 
carried e'-.lt, L"le on~y way to :io i~ c:orrectly is to adhere 
str::'ctly:.o exis::ing rules and :::egulations. Cn the other ha:1o, 
t:lere il.:-e nany :.asks whe::e he prefer::ed tr.at :l:11y a gOGi.l 
missio:l is give:l to him. It would be r.is own respor:s::'bil::'ty to 
figure ou~ tLe optiIT,al way ::0 achieve ::~"lis goa:". He sta:::cd 
t~'lGi.t he dislikes most w~'len ::'n the lat:.e:::- situCl.:.ion everything 
is oicta:.ed ::0 r.im. He also admitted L'1at people have 
differen-.:: personalities. Seme people' ... r.ave a :la-'::'-.lral drive 
produc:e things, ilccomplisr. things, ... atr.cr 
people ... muddle around. They would no::: produce anythi:lg or 
achieve any-.::hing unless someone is -.::here provid::'ng a structure 
Gi.:ld an envirorunen~ for them ~o follow ::'n order to be 
successful. · . For himself r.e was convinced that r.e could 
handle any si-.::uation 1" ... 1 can ~'landle ::hat ... I r.ave tr.e 
faculties about me and ~he ability to learn enough tr.at I get 
everything done I need to. I am not scared of something l ike 
that."j. As an appendum the XO admitted that h i s o pir. ion and 
his cor.fidence was based 0::1 the fact that he was operat i ng i n 
a structured environment, the ArIT.y. I got t he impression that 
it was too hard for him to inagine hiw.se:'f being in a v act.:.u:n 
type situation where he had to figure out everything hy 
himself and set sta!'ldards and regulations by himse l f a:1d for 
!',imsel:. ne was accustomed to the highly regu l ated :nili tary 
rr,ilieu. When he uses the term freedom )f choice he always 
views it within the context of an existing military structuriC . 
He could not i mag ine a very high o r the u l timate degree of 
freedom. He seemed to view this type of freedom limi ted by a 
goal or a mission that was already provided by somebody else, 
mainly some superior. He was thinking wi thin a given structure 
and :'1e enjoyed any freedom within these boundaries b ,..!t he 
could not i:nagine to be responsible for creating these 
boundaries or anything cuts ide of them. 
With respect to the points culture, climate and atmosphere 
he expressed strong concern that they may lead to problems 
within a unit. He mentioned that " ... there is a lot of 
racism ... and sexism in this country ... " and the armed forces 
0: the U.S. have different races in their un i ts as well as men 
and women. His fear was that the interactio:1 between these 
groups might become so stressful that" ... it can bring a unit 
to a halt as far as its effectiveness and its ability to 
accomplish its mission is concerned ... ". Everybody" .. has to 
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be sensitive to cultura l issues ... you need to make Sllre that 
the wor-k c1 imate is open and fair and t hat cCrrL.11unication is 
very open... . To limit the poss i bi lity [Dr negative 
siLlations to occur he gives every new soldie:::- his home phone 
nu:nber. H.lS soldiers are advised t o call him at any time and 
undf'cr al~ circumstances when they are in trouble or they fee l 
that the y need help. He considered this action 
contr-ibution to make sure that the climate and the work 
atmosphere in the company is as pleasant as possible. As an 
example how the climace could be affected negatively he 
mentioned a case of sexual harassment that happened recent l y. 
The consequence was that some soldiers approached tile xo 
requesting transfers because they did not l ike to stay in the 
:::ompany any longer (' ... that. real l y affects t.he climate 0: ':.he 
office ... peop l e are coming to the office ... they a~e fearf'..!l of 
being threatened ... They are fearfu l of the supenrisor, because 
the supenrisor is t.he one doing it [the harassrr.entJ . " 
Another way of creating fear in people would be if the CO 
.. is a tyrant.". The XO mentioned that the subordinates 
' ... ould feel i ntimidate d by this leadership style (" ... where the 
conunander ... calls people names and is condescending ... he 
belittles them."). To be a hard and demanding CO is not a 
problem for the XO but he requested a fair, intelligent, a:1d 
people oriented l eadership style (" ... there are ways t.a be a 
responsible and hard commander without slamming people.") . As 
an example :or appropriate leadership behavior he ment.ioned 
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that crit i cism s:'1ould be dO:1e in privat.e whereas praise should 
be done " ... in front of everybody... . 
Overal l, the XO reported t:'1at. he had not experienced an 
absolutely bad work environment in hi s career. :Ie considered 
himself adaptable to new circumstances, flexib l e, and 
to::'era:1t. My impression was that he l oved his jeb as an 
officer and thus willing tolerate negative 
c~rcumstances to a relatively high magnitude. en tl1e other 
hand, I also got the impression that he would f i ght !:or the 
welfare ef his subordinates as well as Ear his own in a case 
where t he CO would display very negacive behavior. The XO's 
concern seemed to be very much the we ll being of the entire 
company . To achieve this he believes that. every little element 
has to be treated carefully and respectfully. 
Next he talked about the differences in working styles. Tn 
his opinion everybody has a distinct worki::lg style, 
Furthermore, he acknowledged t.hat each organization develops 
a characteristic working style over t ime. These t wo may :1ot be 
identical or even similar. The greater the differences between 
the individual a nd the organizational mode and the greater t:'1e 
forces on the individual to adjust. to the organizatio:1's 
style , the bigger the problems. He stated his strong concern 
that resistance and ineffectiveness could be two possible 
outcomes . In both cases the c limate and the culture would be 
adversely affec ted. The XO mentioned, that great attention of 
all supervisors with respect to these issues is essential for 
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:::he ove-call pe::::-forrna:1ce 0"' t:"1e unit. Either negligence i:l 
recognizi:1g different ""'orki:1g styles or i:1ab=-lity to tolera::.e 
or :'[:tegra~_e U:ose i:1to the o-cganiza:.ional s:yle to a cer:.ai:1 
extect would lead ~_:J a rec:-1ction in ef:ectiveccss as weI::' itS 
ef:iciency " ... as a cU:llr:tander YOl: need to luo:.:;: at ~e()p:'e's 
o;tyles, how do they best p.:::-oduce. Everybody is diffe rent. 
need ... to pl:o;h people ~_o be as p rodl:c~_iv(' as possible_ 1,,, :'oeg 
as they are not hl:r::.i:1g a:lybody else, YOl: ::'et t:'1e:n do w~a~_eve I: 
tr.ey ',,·ant. · , "Everyone got his owr. style, how they wU-1::'d like 
:u wurk. And I think it ,--" inportant that, it '3 a concer:1 of 
IT.ine. to mal~e su::::-e t:'1at , as IT:-1c:'1 as possie::'e, you are try=-:1g 
:.0 ar:r:oIT1D.cda~_e peop::'e.' s desires to 'dork in -,."ha:::ever "'ashio:1 
:r.ey des:::'re, as lcng as ... what: L"1ey wan~_ does :10t harm other 
peeple. til. 3t: did not t:a::'k about a specif:'c fear wit:'1 ::::-espect 
:.0 t~:s prob::'em. On the Qtr.er hand. he clearly .::ecogn::'zed tr.at 
failure in add::::-essing the work style issue p::::-operly cculd 
resul: in seve::::-e p::::-oblems fer a unit. I n this CO:ltext it ::'s 
hard :or tr.e researc:J.er al'.d the il'.terviewee :0 distinguis~ 
exactly when a prob::'em may result in concern or when t:J.e 
border l::'ne is crossed towards fear. I gQt tLe impression 
::.hat, espec::'ally in t:J.e mi::'::'tary environment, individuals a::::-e 
much more ::::-eluctant ~_:J use the term fea::::- or (2: tr:ey label 
pheno:nena differently. This may be attrit:utable to their 
education, which emphasizes that a soldier (:) may have fear, 
but he is not supposed show it and (2) he shQuld be able tQ 
control it. This is particular:'y true for officers and NCOs in 
l eadership positions. 
The leadership style of COs in general was our subsequent 
issl:.e . The XCI explained again that every CO shapes his unit 
through his persona l styl e. Usual l y every sing l e aspect of the 
unit would be influeneed by the characteristics and va l ues of 
the CO. For the XO it was important to fit hi:nse l f into the 
CO's leadership style. The reason for exercising careful 
restraint in pursuing :!"lis own personality and trying to 
achieve a :"1igh degree of paralle l ism wit:!"l the CO's style was 
very striking and simple: " ... because obviously he rates you. 
There is a fear there, if you dcn't cond'.lct yourself in a way 
h e believes an officer should cond'.lct himself, t hat he rates 
you badl y." Interesting was the statement the XO added 
im.'llediate l y which unveiled his dilemma: "You may say as my 
ccmmander: you need to be this way as an officer. But if I 
bel ieve strongly, I ~hould not be that way as an off':cer, 
there is a give and take. Is it more important tc me to get 
your app rova l in my ratings or is it more important to me to 
have my approval of myself?". The XO never had a conur.ander who 
forced him to compromise his own beliefs, but he viewed this 
situation, should it ever occur, as very stressful and loaded 
with fear. 
Next he highlighted a disturbing aspect of leadership he 
had experienced in a previous assigrunent as a platoon leader. 
His former CO rr ... dumped ... " more work onto his XO than seemed 
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app:co!=,riate to most of the officers and NCOs III tnat: COmpany. 
The co was seemingly incapable cf carrying out hlS 
::-espo:lsibilities j,"J8 to Idck in experience and knowledge. Ee 
tried tc hush up his deficiencies oy de l egating work to the 
people who dee:ned hirr capable to handle the job. My interview 
partner related t ',;o problem areas to that type of behavior. 
First, V8r-y quickly everybody was aware of the CO's shortages . 
T:lf' respect for the supericr deer-eased drilstical l y. Second, 
the subordinates were concerned, and some afraid, that a CO 
I J..ke hill' wculd not De ab l e to provide t he expected and 
necessary guidance . Uncertainty increased aod as a consequence 
the fear of failure increased. The CO proved extremely 
incapability of guiding and supervisiIlg his personnel. The 
soldiers l earned rapidly that their CO often e x pected them to 
do their j obs differently than they ac~ually did . Their 
questicns fa!" proper and timely guidance we=-e never answered, 
but the expecta t ions of the CO remained . T!'lus, the fea!" 
increased, because the discrepancy between the CO's 
expectations and the ac t ual performance of the ~ubo!"dinates 
was not eliminated o r reduced . 
The XO briefly described the attitude he believes a good 
superior shculd have . · "A goed supervisor will tell you what 
your task is, but he wi l l not necessari l y tell yeu hew to do 
the task . He expects the CO to define undoubted l y what 
success is . Proper guidance and a certain degree of freedcm in 
executing t h e mission deemed the XO t o be crucial tc establish 
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a relations:'1ip that is low o~ fear and tense and high on trust 
and ce'Ctair,ty . 
He elaborated mere on the importance of trust as a 
counte!"pole to fear. I f a leader has no trust in hi s 
empl oyee's capabilities, the subordinate may develop the 
feeling that " ... he doesn't even trust me ... I am not trusted 
anyway, I probably c an' t get th'..s done. Th':'s person has no 
confidence in me." The fact that a super io!" has l ittle or :10 
trust and confidence in his subordinates has the potential to 
ma;-(e t he subordinates presume they are actually not capable of 
executing t. he task successfully. This may then in fact 
decrease their performance what in t.u rn would be considered 
the already expected evidence for the incompetence of the 
subo'Cdinate. This is a v icious circle which can in most cases 
only be broken by the superior. If he trusts his subordinates 
he enables them to deve l op confidence in their own 
capabilities which will lead to improved performance. In the 
latter environment the element of fear will be reduced to a 
minimum. 
In addition to the thoughts discussed previously I asked 
the XO if it would inspire fear in him if he knew that his CO 
had strong deficiencies. The answer was very impulsively: 
.. if I knew my conunander was an idiot? Yes ... he has a great 
influence en the lives of 90 to 120 men. If he is a woron he 
can screw up the lives of 120 men like that [at this moment 
the XO snapped his fingers] .". The fear is based on two facts. 
First, the XO fear s that his m·m life Day be more at risk tha:1 
it wou l d he ur.der normal cirCllmstances (a respo:1sible 
co:nmander in charge) . Second, he tears t: h at his inf l uence on 
his subordina tes may be l~mi ted by the actions of the CO. This 
wou ld probably expose his men to a greater danger than he 
wou l d ever have exposed them to. The XO hel d the Opi:lion t hat 
a l ot of superio-::s should n ot b e in the posi t ion they are 
currently HI. He v i e· .... ed their competence insufficien::. to have 
responsitl i lity over ~he l i ves of so many people { N ••• and 
because of that [ their deficiencies] they put a l ot of peop l e 
at risk. They are supposed to be pe-::focmillg at a certain leve l 
and they are not. 1i) • 
He mentioned agair. the fear of not be'--ng able co meet 
expectations . He descr ibed the following sit u ation to 
highlight the problem: "Yesterday morning. There was a captain 
who was he-:::e and being Ranger qv.alifie:i people have an 
expectatior., I guess, well, if you are Ranger quali:ied , you 
IT.uS::: be high speed, you must be perfect. And that's not the 
I'm proficient i:1 a number of tasks but I am 
unpro:icient . . . in far more tasks than I am proficient 
in ... There is this expectation put on us and thi s is 
intimidating, because if you do something and you fail, the 
first thing people tell me is; Oh, the Ranger could not do 
it . " "When you blow it, all eyes ar-e on you ." The exagger-ated 
expectations ar-e unwarr-311ted in most. cases and put a lot of 
pressure on the affected person l "Ther-e is a degree of f ear in 
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being an officer ... "). The person may become more nenrO'-lS than 
usual l y which WQuld eEfect their performance negatively . The 
fa ilu~e would then be ~iewed as the a l ready expected outcome. 
Agalo we have the vic ious circle tr.at I have described above. 
The externa l expectation has to be ad justed to e l iminate the 
Eear a nd enable the Range r to perfo~ as they have been 
trained. Otherwise, the external pressure has to be judg ed as 
the source for the fear and subsequently as a source Eo r the 
failures . 
WiUl respect to one of my research questions, I solicited 
his opinion regarding the following state ment: "?'ear can be 
completely e liminated in a peacetime work environment" His 
quick and unambiguous answer was: "That's impossible . " 
anothe r statement he remarked: H •• fear i s always there .. ". He 
was sure that t h e entire elimination of t ear is impossib l e. 
his opinion particular facets of fear are more or less 
continuously present. Some consciously others unconscious l y. 
In other cases, as he mentioned, fear wou l d be stimulated by 
the novelty of the situations. Wit h respect to the military 
environment he specified some fears to clarify his position. 
(1) The fear of failure, (2 ) the fear of not being capable o~ 
achieving the goal (not being physical ly ready for a road 
march) , (3) the fear, that sorr.ebody else may make a mistake, 
and (4) the fear that a s'Jperior may be present in a moment 
when a mistake occurs. 
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",ext 1 asked hin whetr.e::- fear ~culd be el::'n".':ndte:i by 
applyil:g the approp::-iate leadersr.ip sty~e8. For exar.1ple, wO"-1~d 
':nvo~ven".e:1t 8f ~:'le su1:;ordinates i:1 t:"le dec=-sion :n"king p r ocess 
or prnvid':ng sut£icien:: infcrmation tc al~ partic::'pcill::S of a:1 
ope-catice :'lelp t.n eli:niea::e all fear"? Aga::':l, ~e r.ae a clear 
opinion a:'ld ::-eplied: "?a'.se fer the uS"-lal mi~':::Clry. hecausto' 
leClde-cs li:..;:8 ~hat are few a:1d far Detwee:1 .. :-!o' ... ever, w=-::h ::he 
::-ight leaders J.nd ::he right env':ronoent, a good cl:"mate Clnd 
atmospLere, a great deal 0: fear cae he replaced by 
confidence ... Instead of r.1aki:1g tr.ef:l fearLll. yO"-l cae. 
prOllote the::':::- proficier.cy levels ::0 the pci:1t that, evpn tr.C're 
is stil. a degree of fea:::-, tr.ey know. :::"1<'l.t they CClr. do 
anytr.ir.g tr.at they r.ave to de. But ofte:1, we are no:: given L"le 
adequate amount of time, resou::-ces, am.""l1u:1it.ion, assets, d:ld 
~o:1duct trai:1:"ng ... to ge:: sold::'e::-s ~o have a :n::'l:iml.:.m sense of 
fear." He favored for exar:tp~e ~he cor.dt:c~ of live C.r':ng 
exercises ::0 get tr.e soldiers accustomed to the real comba:: 
3::.tuation f-com ::he beg::'nning. Otherwise, he st:;lte:::l, tr-.eY' ... oc.::'d 
1:;e trained in an environment which is very difte::-ent to what 
they had to expect in combat. The fear level cC:.Jld be 
gradc.ally lowered through training that ::'s designed to ma::ch 
the combat situation as ::close as possihle. The effect :"le was 
trying to approximate wO:.Jld be that these sol:::liers wO"-lld have 
a rr.uch lower fear level when they ha:::l to jump 0:1:: of an 
airplane ::0 go into a real combat situation. I started to draw 
a graph a~ the blackboard to depict what we discussed 
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a marker and added ~ i s thoughts graphica l ly . Tcgether we fine 
tuned the graph whic h , besides ether factors, :::-eflects the 
XO's opinion, t ha t fear can never be reduced to zero. The 
pic t ur-e shows scnematical l y the impact of (1) traini:lg with 
and without Live firing (bas e d on my theery and t he XO's 
expert ise) , (2) successfu l and u nsuccessful train i ng, and (3) 
appropriate or inappropriate . eadership on the level o[ :ea.r 
in d :l. ff e rent s ituations. In t:"1e first sectien a tra i ning 
enVirOr1ll'.el1t is assumej. Fear wi~ l be reduced over t ime, 
because t he so l d i er beco:nes skilled and bui l ds up knowledge 
about ' .... e apons, procedures, and t act ies. Furthermore, he 
contin:.lously ga i ns more co nf irience in his own abi l ities. 
Finally, he eve ntua l ly becomes integrated i nto his peer grcc:.p. 
The level of fear decreases with a s::.eeper slope when live 
firing is employed as a trainir.g met h od. The sma ':"' l middle part 
r epresents t he transit from the training condit i ons to the 
combat si::.uation. Troops a:::-e l eaving the famiL.ar e nv ironment 
and approaching the unknown. They may have theo:::-etical 
background about what is going to be happe n soon, but t he 
degree of uncertainty and novelty is very high. Consequently, 
the fear level would increase dramatically. It see:ns valid to 
assume that the apex will be at a h i gher level than at point 
zero of the picture (begin of training). The endpoint of this 
section syrrboli zes the entry of the soldier i nto the actual 
combat operation. The third segment embraces the entire combat 
period. Any forecasting in this area is every difficult if 
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possible at all. Thus ," the shape of the four graphs represer>.t 
a highly theoretical framework. My intention is to delir.eate 
the different impacts training and leadership may have or. the 
leve l of fear. The co:nbat si tuat ion itself is outside the 
scope of my study, but I woul d l ike to present the general 
trends I encOl:.ntered during my research. O:1e is t hat the 
curves with live firing training reduce the fear level at a 
quicker rate. During the transit phase this doesn't seem to be 
an advantage any more. The uncertainty and the novelty seem to 
have suer, a high impact that the difference between the curves 
is margina l . The most interesting detail is the horizcntal 
l ine representing fear of death. The XO stated clear l y, that 
in his opinion L'1is basic fear level will a l ways be existing 
and can never be further reduced. He also provided the obvious 
exemptions to this case. In extreme situatior.s people are ab l e 
to overcome this life saving barrier and do things they 
usually wO'Jld never do. He described the case of a Sergeant 
who received the Congressional Medal of Hcnor. In the Vietnam 
war thi s soldier exposed himself to enemy fire several times 
to protect his platoon during evacuation. Under normal 
circumstances nobody would show such a behavior, because the 
danger of getting killed is close to hundred percent . B'Je t he 
situation and probably the attitude and the value system of 
the soldier culminated in a way that he overcame his life-
saving fear level, went below it, and acted in a way that is 
recognized as heroic. He survived this action. A recent: 
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example for t he same phenome:1on is tr,e person who tr- i ed to 
rescue an anima l fro:n a Durn ing house. As the newspaper 
r eported the person s"clccessfu J l y saved the animal but died 
fr-om the burns he or she s"clffered . An unusual and strong 
drivi.ng fo rce must hav e allower! the person to go telaw the 
fear of d eaL'1 line a nd enter the burning bui l ding. 
Unfortunately. ir. this case the outcome ·.."as fatal . The 
hypothetical t::'ends during t he c owbat phase whic h depict 
unsuccessfll l training and t he combina tion 0;" unsuccessfu l 
training and inappropria t e l eaders h ip show L'1at t he fear lev e l 
:r,ight be increasing under these circumstances . The downward 
s l opeS o f t he other c urves corre:ate positively with the XO's 
statements dur i r.g t he inte~iews. 
The invo l verr.ent of t h e xo in t:he development of the graph 
was remarkable . The drawing wa s just meant to support my 
SUIl'.mary of the previous d i scussion. I was surpl"ised when he 
stood up and actively' took a part in the advancement of my 
rough draft. He rrade va l uab l e comments and we continued the 
interview in tront of the blackboard. It was an excit ing 
experience to see how an inte:::vie'N" partner changed from a 
basical l y passive and resp onsi.ve to a high l y active mode. 
M. SIXTH INTERVIEW: THIRD INTERVIEW WITH CO 
When I arrived at the comp ar.y tor ou r third inte~iew. the 
CO was givi.ng a safe ty brie fing. I was a dvised that it would 
take a few more minutes until r.e would be available. When we 
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r:let in the company's conference room about 10 minutes la ter, 
he seemed to be stressed. It took some more minutes to get him 
of~ his dai l y routine and adjusted to the new situation. 3e 
relaxed slowly whi le we were talking about private issues. Ee 
told me that L'1e pressure had been high du,::,ing the past two 
we eks and he would like to have some time of~ to reenergize. 
He started talkirlg about a new attitude towa:!Cds risk r.e 
had deve l oped since our first interview (" ... it oper,ed my eyes 
to some new risks."). The company had some cases of sexual 
harassment. It was the first t ime that he had to investigate 
issue l~k.e this in depth. He discovered the sensibi l ity 
ot the sClbject as well as a dangerous p otential he was not 
aware of before. The Army regulations ccncer:J.i:J.g sexual 
harassment had been drastical ly tightened ove~ time. He was 
not total l y aware of the change and admitted that sOr:le of his 
actions, under very ~igid interpre':.aticn, could have been 
construed as harassment. His actions had never been perceived 
by anybody to be wrong. Moreover, he viewed his past behavior 
as in t,me with existing regulations and, mo~e importantly, 
the value system. He mentioned the example where he was 
talking with pregnant female soldiers. His wife recently had 
given birth to a baby and so he was familiar with the 
biological and medical c ircumstances. He was uncertain whether 
his comments during the conversation with the soldiers cou l d 
be construed as harassment. His fear was that he probably 
" ... had been at risk and not even known it.". With regard ':.0 
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the findings he reviewed his own at:titude and behavior . He 
found that he hadll' t done ar:.yt:"1ing wrong. The point he wanted 
to make was, " ... that somet h ing that I do and I perceive for 
being right can be perceived totally differently hy others." 
As a ccnsequence he developed a much more caut lOUS behavior to 
avoid any i:npression of improper conduct. Furthe:rT:1ore, he heir.. 
a meeting and ta lked to blS en:: ire stafE. H~ asked everybody 
to speak up if he or s he fe lt: any resentment of his actien, so 
that t he point could be clarified. From the leadership 
perspe ct :'ve this was as a very open, risky, but responsible 
approach. The session satisfied all concerns and no ques t. ions 
were left unanswered. This specific action is .In harmony wit~ 
Deming's poi:1t nurrber eight "Dr i ve O:.lt fear" f he CO tri~d to 
es tablish an open, trustful, a nd corr.municative atmosphere in 
which everybody would fee l comfortab l e speaking about his 
He himself opened the session by stating t_he 
prob l ems and dcimit ting his cwn degree of involvement. It was 
risky, because he made himse:'f vulnerable at that moment. But 
it seems, that the trustworthy presentation achieved a 
positive effect. The people developed confidence, because he 
was honest with them, and thus used the opportunity to present 
their topics frankly. The outcome was an ove.::-all consensus and 
the el imir.ation of suspicion. 
In the same context he mentioned a fear that occurred when 
he rev:'ewed previous actions in the l ight of new knowledge 
(" . .. the more I l earn about the system .. t:he more t:imes I look 
153 
back ... [I realize) ... how stl:pid I was. "). Some of his actions 
during the past couple of years had t:.,e potential to end ;.,is 
career had they been reviewed strictly with regard to the Army 
regu l ations. Due to lack of knowledge and experien:::e at that 
time he was abso l ute l y unaware that h:"s performance 
probably improper. 
The!"! he mentioned that there is a fear about rumors. He 
described the story of another, [ligher ranked, officer . This 
officer" ... befriended one of the lower enl isted soldiers in 
one of the company's, a female ... and just gave her a few 
rides .... Both were single ; :lathing serious or ir:1prope r 
happened; but people started talking. When the CO informed the 
other officer about t.he rumor, " ... he fe l t like punohed in the 
stomach ... that his career was over, that he is going to get a 
poor efficie:lcy rating ... and it was a l l because of what people 
perceive.". Army regulations strictly forbid any relationships 
between superiors and subordinates within the sa:ne unit . 
., ... this revealed to me how muoh the people in the senior 
cOIlUl'and are walking in a mine field." "The Army today is a . 
one strike and you are out . system." "The more I learn the 
more I realize how many risks are out there." 
A change in his behavior flows from this fear. 
example, it was his previous attitude to finish jobs as quick 
as possible; if possible t.he sa.lle day. He did the best he 
oould to bring t he results as close as possible to 100% 
correctness and accuracy, but had some minor flaws in it. 
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Today, he uses all the suspension t_ ime available [0 research 
every issue thcroughly to improve h i s results even mor-e. 
Decisions are now base"d on the maximum infonnation he is able 
to gather given a certain ti:ne :rame . Jobs are now handed in 
the very last day, no work is done quic:-cer than required. This 
:l S a safety device he built in for himse l f, because loday j ust 
one mistake ca!l be the reason for dismissal (The point r:hClt 
personnel departme:1ts seem to wait for people to wake a 
mistake to have a reason for early retire:nent, has already 
been discussed several times). Thus , since :"1e realized how 
many hazards are out there ar.d since the rules of the game 
:'1ave been tigh::ened, he is less willi:lg to take personaL risks 
when administ!'ative matters are concerned. He pointed out 
clearly that he would not pursue this attitude during combat . 
Nevertheless , tile fact is. that fear can result in a less 
efficient performance. More information i s collected than 
probably needed to make a good decision. Additional ly, time is 
spent (if not was ted) which could be used mo::::-e wisely for 
solving othe::::- (and p::::-obably more relevant or pressing) 
problems. The actions of the organi zat ion a::::-e pe::::-ceived as 
intimidating and (1) forces the individual to focus p::::-imarily 
on his or her own safety and survival and (2) detracts 
attention and energy away from certain problem areas (" .. if 
something is not time sensitive, I would take a lot more time 
to make sure that I am making the right decision. " ) . 
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I asked his opinion regarding procedc.res and guide:'ines i:1 
the Army. My spec:'fic qc.estion was whether he :e:':::. com:o:::-table 
with the regu::'ations and whe:::.her he considered :::.hem 
appropriate for his tasks. H:'s answer was a cleay "I have:1't 
f01.:nd :::'00 ITany :ac;lts.". Bu:::. he crit:'cized " ... hew yoc; are 
S"J.pposed to :ind about them frOIT. exper:'er.ce instead of be::'r.g 
trained abo.,lt theIT .. ". Ee had been to different schools dc.ri:1g 
h:'s ca:::-ee:::-, b.,lt " .. all' those SChOO::'8 al:"e fecc.sed 0:1 tact:"cs.". 
:Ie was :nissing a speci:ic training prograIT. :Ol:" cempany 
comma:1ders tc get this groc.p prepared fel:" :::.he vast a:1ddiverse 
admin:'strative work load they are facing in their da:"ly 
military ::'ife. But uS1.:ally (if a:::. all) " ... a compa:1y 
cor.lITIandel:", may be, goes to a one Ol:" two day course and the:1, 
basically, leal:"ns the majority on the job. " . '"'he fear of eat 
being trained sufficiently is a subcomponent of the :ear 0: 
failure. Th:'8, in turn, is a subcomponent of the fear of 
getting a bad evaluation which, ultimately, leads to the fear 
of getting dism:'ssed as a consequence of low rating SCOl:"es. 
This :'8 an example· where fears can be displayed :"n a 
sequen:::.:'al relationship. Furthermore, we see that fear is 
often a very complex system and that different fears have 
bear:'ngs on each other. Just to take a look at the ".,l::'timate 
outcome (fear of getting fired) may nor explain the complex:'ty 
ne ither the basic underlying antecedents. 
In the context of feeling he has not been trained 
sufficiently for the ad.min:'strative functions he also 
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mentioned the heavy werk lead. The problems which tlcw from 
the · .... ork load are those of delegati::m and supervision. To 
authorize people to handle particu l ar docc:.l'1ents and oversee 
cerLain areas o[ respons i bility involves r'--sk. These personnel 
act in his name a!1d. fi nally, forward papers to him which he 
has t.o sign . Under usual circ\~mstances he wO'.lld :""!ave time to 
revie'N the papers to make sure they are correct before he 
signs them. But current cir::::umsta!1ces are different. The work 
l oad is extremely hig:""! and cases may have big impact on the 
soldier's future life (medical problems. l egal problems) 
likewise t:ime constraints are a major determinant in many 
processes (the so l diers con t:ra c ts are going to be terminated) . 
"1'':"1en I am extremely busy, I take t:he risk of not fully 
reading the paper and = sign it. And this is an example of 
where it is a land mine that can be Sitting o n your desk. An 
you don' t even know it. You sign it and one or two month 
later , you are relieved or you are out ... because you signed a 
document. t:hat was improper. ~ . This is a condition wh ich 
stimulates fear in him. He realized t.hat he has to liv e ' .... i t.h 
this fear, because he has no influence on the conditions. 
The CO made the following statement: "I like to consider 
uncertainty as a challenge not. as a handicap." What this 
uncertainty really means is the freedom he enjoys as CO of 
this company. As a contrast, he described a company he was 
heading recently where everything was meticulously regimented. 
He did not enjoy t.hat environment very much. Now his superior 
gives him just broad guide l ine;; and expects appropriate 
actions . The CO has large l at:"t·_ t.o choose his courses of 
action in order to attain the goals . He viewed that as a 
pleasa:l t c l imate and worked hard to bui l d a t-::ustfu l 
relationship with his superiors. It seened t.hat he 
successful . Ther: he used the same approach to guide his 
company. The XO mentioned that he received onl y broad 
guide l ines fr om t.he CO and he enjoyed it a l so. This atmosphere 
enhances posit ive wor:-c attitudes and improves mot.ivation. This 
leadership style may be the reason why the XO reported that 
his relationship wit h the CO was not a basis fer fear. 
He underscored the same point by stating that. he prefers 
a balance between risk (asseciated with fear) and rewa r d 
(associated with f reedom of cheice, latitude in decis ion 
making, broad goals rather than regimented orders, etc.). 
Next the CO talked about peer pressure and how fear can 
arise from it ( " .. . there is pressure on subord i nate to 
conform."). He began with the statement, that peer pressure is 
not a problem for himself. His compet i tive attitude and his 
strong self - confidence allow him to pursue his own goals and 
live his own character without heavy interferences with other 
group members . But other people are less stable and l ack his 
degree of self - assurance and self-awareness. They try to 
assimi1.ate to group norms and standards to an unhealthy 
extent _ He ment.ioned that some individuals chose their chu:-ch, 
sport activities and private orientation with regard to the 
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preferences 0: t.heir superiors (" ... tne:'e i s pressure by 
superior cfficers or:. subordinates ':.0 cor.form to thei~ 
lifestyle . " ) . Ee presumed t.hat the exp l anat i o:1 could be 
twofo l d : First, it cou l d be the fear of not being acce pted as 
a ful l group l1'.ember . Th is may preclude the individual from 
information sources or Day result in the denia l of group 
benefits . The second reason seemed to be a we l l-known old 
story . To p"Jrsue m.o goals or to display non-conformity raises 
the fear that t.~is behavior rdght have negative bearings on 
the next eva luil ticn or Fitrep . Thus, these individual s trade 
off t heir personality for the chance to influence th01r 
ratings posi.t i ve l y. The CO made clear that h e was displaying 
a very individually - orie:J.ted life styl e . Furthermore, he kept 
his personal activities and did not adjust them to the 
preferences of anybody. S·Jrprisingly, he experienced positive 
reactions from his superiors, but sometimes r:ontemptuous 
inquiries from his peers. Final l y, he mentioned t hat peel:."" 
pressure had been only moderate and did not affect h im . I wi ll 
c l ose th i s paragraph with another quotation whi ch shows what 
ef fects the fear of nonconformity may generate : " . .. and there 
are ma!1Y officers , I wou ld say 60% or more of the officers in 
the Army, who be l ieve, if you are r,ot married and entirely 
focused on your job, the!1 you are somewhat less than a good 
officer. And that is probabl y a byproduct oE the severe 
competition. " 
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He conside:::ed the next point a concern or a doubt r-ather 
thap. an explicit fear. The issue relates to communication. Se 
expressed concern abOt:t whether he was comm:.lnicating 
appropriately with his troops . The CO discovered recently that 
it was increasingly h,arder for him to communicate with his 
subordinates effectively. lY'.any messages were subject to 
interpretation. The desired or intended outcome was not 
achieved in all cases. He fot.:nd out that the distortion of his 
original messages was related to his wording. The st:bordinates 
were less and less capable of reading and understanding his 
orders and transforming them into correct a:1d u:1equivocal 
actions. He recognized that he had shifted to a terminology 
wh ich correlated with his level of education (" .. . = had spe:1t 
a lot of time away from the soldiers [in training pr:."Jgrams and 
staff positions]. And now I'm coming back to them ... n). Over 
time his level increased and the distance to his subordi:1ates 
i:1creased. It became increasingly difficult to fully 
understand his expressions. When he became aware of the 
problem he iINllediately tried to adjl<st his level downwards but 
sometimes it remains a problem (" ... and I can't think of the 
words that will make them understand."). He knew that an 
effective leader needs to cOINllunicate effectively and is thus 
concerned to find tr.e appropriate level. 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Du:-ing the interview with the CO I foc.nd that the 
interview process itself :'1ad an impact on h im. He mentioned 
the first time that he had become mere :-eflective on himself 
and watched his environment more critical since chen. 
became aware of new facec.s of his l ife which he didn' t 
recognize before . Furthermore, I got the impression that he 
had dlscussed several topics w~ t h t he XO. The CO mentioned 
that he had star t ed to i!1vo l ve the XO :I1ore in the decision 
making process. Additional l y, he had delegated more WOL< to 
him. Partially, this change may be at t ributable to the 
Hawthorne effect. Furthermore, it may influence l'.'ly research i:1 
the way that both ca.ndidates have been .l.mprcving their 
relationship over time. Thus, it rray be much ~arder during the 
fourth set of interviews to detect specific fears that are 
rooted in ~:"1eir relat.ionship . Botr. mentioned already tr:a~ they 
did not experience any major prob l ems with regard to t heir 
relationsh i p and that they respect. each other . With pronable 
further imp!"ovements they may ~ave ironed out 
obstacles and are now moving towards a more harmonious 
relationship. 
The XO elabor ated on the impossibility of elimir.at.ing 
fear . He emphasized that, in his view, a minimum level of fear 
always exists. Fear does not drop be l ow the life saving level 
(I named it fear of death line in Figure 5) under regular 
conditions . Only under unique circumstances may individuals be 
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driven to act in a much more dange~ous way than usual. For 
example, these may be a high level of anxiety, love for 
somebody who is in danger and needs help, or some life 
threate:1ing dange:c for. the individual himself. In those cases 
;;;eaple may forgo their o\oJn safety and take high risks to 
provide help for others . Examples for those d!:'iving forces are 
1 isted in Figure 5. 
During this interviews I reccgnized a trend towards ;nore 
samples for the circle C (fear originated in the situation) . 
The maj ority of findings during the previous interviews were 
fears attributable to the circles A a:1d B, which represent the 
fears inherent in the individuals . One possib l e reason could 
be that t1'.e spect!:'urn in t.te first two sets of interviews 
i ncluded the private or civilian portion of the life, whereas 
duri:1g the third s~t of interviews the officers were 
!:'estricted to the military environment. USing my model, there 
seems to be evidence that gersonal fears are more related to 
the private spectrum of life than to the work environment. On 
the other hand, fear originated in the situation seems to be 
mo:ce attributable to the work place. But there is one point 
that must be t aken into consideration. The interviewees 
mentioned that their training and education provided fo!:' 
either fear control and management mechanisms or they were 
told that it is improper for an officer to show fear at all. 
Under these premises it is amazing how many fears they 
actually admitted. Moreover, both officers showed nc 
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inhibition to u se th e word fear. Another explanation could 
relate to the l ength of the interview process. We ',"ent. through 
several we e ks of intense discussi o ns and the onl y topic was 
fear . It could be t hat they became accustomed to the issue and 
conceded to the the:ne as a niltural phenomenor, of life. I will 
try to investigate this point in more detai l duri ng the last: 
interview. 
The CO explained in detail the fear that previous mist.a:-::es 
may hunt him sti l l today Ifear is attributab l e to circle j'\,). 
1 :1 the past he judged most of his behavior proper and 
acceptable . Today. wit:"} greater knowledge and experieace his 
view about :"1i8 own ac t ions changed . Based on accumulated 
information he takes or. a more critical stance towards h i s 
previ ous p e rfOrTrd:1Ce. 
In this context he ~entioned that the typical l\!:1l1y 
t.::aini!1g attitude is apt to inspire some fear (can b e assigned 
to circle Cl. Only a limited variety of basic skills, 
abilities a!1d knowledge is provided by training programs. It 
is assumed that the job incumbent continues the learning 
process to improve his. perfonnance . But, at the same time, an 
error free performance is expected from every incwnbent. This 
discrepancy seems to leave a lot of individuals with a fear of 
fai l ure, which is high at the beginning of their tenure and 
which decreases over time, given that learning on t-he job 
takes place. 
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Another fear that is originated in the s i tuatio:1 {circ l e 
C) is the fear that rumors, true or not, may have a :1egative 
impact on the career . The fearfu:' aspect is that the 
individual usually is ' .. lOaware of the gossipi:1g a:1d thus, is 
not in a posit i on to intervene. The Army seems to be a societ.y 
governed by str:"ct ru l es and a d:"stinct culture (the way we do 
t.hings here), which cever essentially each facet of mi l itary 
and private life. Especially younger and unexper i enced 
soldiers can fall victim to Llmors, if their behavior in r::ot 
i n stric t compliar::ce with wr i tte:::J or unwritten Army 
regulac::'ons. Moreover, if people cry to pursue their elom 
perso nality o r life style, they are likely to be targeted by 
their superiors . Al or.g t:"1ose lines is the fear of pee::::-
pressure. The Army culture is often strictly enforced . 
Conformity is demanded and nonco:npl i ance colerated on l y 
marginally. Each group has its own mechanisr:ts and techniques 
to enforce standards. They may be official or unofficial. In 
one example, the CO described an officer, who was dismissed 
because he lived with a woman without being married to her . 
The dismissal was not accomplished directly, because no Army 
paragraph is applicable to this situation. But due to the 
moral standards in that particular group, the officer was 
exclu ded from getting a CO assignment. This limited his career 
and tinally lead to his dismissal. Barring is a method 
available co field grade officers in certain positions (e . g. 
battalion commander) . 
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A finding thilt cO'-lld be assigr.ed to are" I is the CO 's 
ccncer:1 abcut effective conununication with subordincttes. I did 
noc include ic. ir. :.h~ list of fears, because the CO staced 
clear1y, that it- was a conce:::-n, but, by no means, a tear. He 
becarr.e aware cf increased difficulties in t.he cCllL'11un i ca t. ion 
when suoordinac.es requested and detailed 
explanations after order:s had been issued. They simply did not 
underscand what he · .. as '::rying '::0 te:l them, The pt"oblem · .. as 
the leve l of language the CO had acqui r:ed over time d"-le t:J 
va:::-ious training programs and occupied S'::aff positions. He had 
changed his corrmuni cation style away frem the troops. Even 
though he realized t:"1e pt"oblem and took actions to ad jus t his 
sty l e appropriately, he was not e:1tirely s u re about his 
success. The fear comes in, because he exactly know;; that 
fctu l ty communication may have disastrous consequences. This i s 
especially true in light of the vast amount of his soldier's 
legal and medica l problems that the company had to deal with. 
And again, finally the consequences may have negative bearing 
on his own evaluation . 
The XO mentioned several fears that are originated in 
particul ar si t uations (circ l e C). A rerr.arkable stance is his 
fear o f getting an incompetent or tyrannic CO (he made clear 
that this is a hypothetical thought and not true for the 
current CO). He described a variety of sce:1arios that would 
inspire fear in him. First, a tyrannic CO would affect the 
company's cuI ture, climate, and atmosphere negatively. Peopl e 
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wou l d r,o:, feel happy and comfortable, work satisfaction woul d 
decrease. This stress ·would automatically lead :'0 the second 
concern, the deer-ease of the company's effectiveness. Third, 
a:1 unexperienced co would not be able to provide the company 
w~th appropriate guidance. The XO was used to have great 
l atitude in his work fie l d and favored COs who led through 
broad goals rather t:'1an meticulous orders. Finally, the XO was 
afraid t hat an incompetent CO IT.ight not be capable of 
aversee=-_l.g military operations correctly. This could l ead to 
more casualties than :1ecessary. The XO seemed '::0 be an officer 
wi th great respect for the lives of his subordinate, 
particul arly in combat. He viewed the responsibility for his 
men as one of the top priorities of his duties. Beyond the 
point, that the company's effectiveness is diminished, or that 
the number of casualties in combat. might increase, the XO was 
afraid that the consequences init.iated by an unaccept.able CO 
could have negative effects on his own evaluation. If '::he CO 
could not lead t:1.e company effectively and the overal l 
performance would decrease significantly, the xo presurned that 
everybody would be affected through negative ratings. 
A remarkable fear is stimulated by the vicious circle that 
starts with the lack of trust and confidence of t he superior 
in his subordinates. As a consequence t.he subordinate loses 
his self confidence. W.ithout '::he mental support from the boss 
a factor of high uncertainty is added to the work environment. 
The question is why the boss does withdraw his trust? The 
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s'.lbordinat.e, if cot an outstanding performe r with 8t'::00g self 
assurance, rr.ay doubt hi s own abi:.ities. The perfo~nce mdy 
decrease W:1.dt, in tu'::o, may be viewed as the forecasted and 
expected outcome. This can be viewed from the superior as the 
evidence t:hat:. his lack of trust is jus t ified ir:. retrospect. 
The XO's fear is chat this circle, once established. is very 
hard to breai<:: . The way back to normal l eve l s of mutual t rust 
and con:idence is arduous. 
Tr.e t ollowi:lg fear is !"elated t o area II I . This case 
demonstrates t he difficulty of assigning fea rs appropria tely. 
The assignment may change when the interview partner prcvides 
new material or describes a sub ject d ifferently. In t h is case 
the XO deserihed a fear from a differer,t t:erspective. I n t he 
second intervie w he mentioned the fear of getting evaluated. 
Last time , I assigned c.his fear to circle B . I :1 t he third 
interview t he xo came back to that point and e l acorated on it . 
3e descr ibed his pattern of behavior that arises from thi s 
fear and the underlyi:J.g assumptions . He presumed that every CO 
ha s certain expectat i ons of his XO . The XO is eager to revea l 
the se expectations and subsequently to adjust h i s behavio r 
according l y . 3e considered himself flexible and adaptab l e to 
a high degree. The fit between the CO's expectations ar.d his 
behavior should then ensure positive ratings . The interesting 
aspect of this assimilation proce ss is the possible loss of 
personal i ty. The contradiction that struck me was that tr.e XO 
displayed quite honorabl e characteristics (acd I still believ e 
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he is honcrable) and at the same tine admitted that he woul d 
adapt his behavicr for good evaluatior.s. We could not clarify 
this point sufficiently, because the degree of adaptation 
could not be explained clearly. I see the problem that this is 
a very subjective matter and the degrees of cr.ange are 
easily described. So it wi l l re:nain an unsolved problem. 
O. THIRD ITERATION OF THE MODEL 
My intentic' during the final set of interviews is to 
focus the arte r. _::m on the relationship of the superior and 
t:'le sl.,;bordinate. The previous sessions r.ad a broader scope and 
allowed for a more widespread exploration of different types 
of fear. To keep the interviewees focused I wi l l use a more 
structured approach for the interview. D'-.lring the previous 
interviews I provided onl y rough guideli!1es and al l owed the 
officers to choose any fear related topic they wanted to 
address. This time a more r igid set of question wi ll serve the 
purpose to examine the unique fears that may exist between the 
CO and his XO. 
The third interviews provided different insight what fears 
exist. Evidence was found for different circle and areas. For 
the first time, I experienced problems in assigning a fear to 
a certain area or circle. But the model proved !::lexible enough 
to cap ture both types ~f fear. Still no evidence was found for 
the area IV. I will use the model for t he fourth set of 
interviews wit:"lout changes. 
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FOURTH TYPE OF THE FEAR MODEL 
'l'r.~s set 8f in~erviews is the r.eart pi8ce uf the er_tire 
r;rc,~ess. The p:cev'--cus '--nterviews served t:'1e V1rp8se tu set 
stas<= fer :hese sessio:1s. My ir.:.e:1tio:1 is now to cunfror_: L'18 
o:ficers with speci:ic ques:ior_s regarding :.helr re:"atior.ship 
f::cm a ~eadersr.ip perspective. Assum'--ng that it: '--s ::lCtrd to 
f:'-:1d ar. '--dedi relationsr.ip ':wit:'1out dny pruolen-,s:' 
at.t",mpt to detect arEdS where deficie:-r::ies, fa"-l:i.ts, 
:r.is·,-mder;;:.ar.d'--ng, IT.is:'-nterpretat ion, dit te.::e:lI: percep: iens . 
imperfe>ct.ior. rr.ay r.ctve created fear. F::::om the precedinq 
i:lterv'--e' ..... s I al::eady ortai:1ed tr.E inp::ession that it wiLl. De 
difficu:"t to de::ect t~ose weakr_esses, because the re:"ationship 
between t~e ~wo officers seems to be extraordinarily posit~ve, 
Bct:'1 0: t:'1em stated several times very cleo.rly tha~ the:':::: 
combir.ed per:ornance, ar.d tr:.ls al::' ':heir acti::ms or non 
",ctioGs, has to be ber.efic:'a:' anj cO:1structive for the compar.y 
(aed :inally for the Army) ir. the firs:: place. They emphasized 
over an::i over aga:'n their cC:Tlffi:'::mer.:: :ur th8ir coc.ntry, ::heir 
dedication for the Army, a:1d their deterrr.i::Bt:'on to f'.llfi::'l 
ai:' oJ:::::'igatiolls 0: their oa~hs, = haven't fO'.l::1d any 
contradic::ion in the varioc.s sta::ements and so we can assurr.e 
thaL. these ethical values are indeed the integ1:."al essence of 
the:'r cha-:::ac~ers, 
To cover a varie::y 0: topics, to tot.:.ch on rr.any di:ferent 
aspects of thei:::- daily mi:'itary li:e, and to have a flexib:'e 
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instrument available whi ch wculd allow me to switch subjects 
quickly, I decided en the structured interview as the 
appropriate research t echnique. 
Q. SEVENTH INTERVIEW: FOURTH INTERVIEW WITH XO 
This interview was scheduled in the late afternoor. and the 
xo seemed to be eX:"1austed from a long work day. We took. a 
couple of mir.u':.es to relax and talked about private topics 
before we got into the subject. 
Oue",-ion: Do you recall a negative situation that you 
do:)' t want to happen again? ~ His answer was a very 
quick and distinct no. He explained his view on situations in 
general as follows. " ... il':! a!1y situation, whether it is good 
or bad, there is something to be learned from it. " 
~ Do you have a clear jcb description? Answer: 
"No. There is nothing published ... xo is a very fluid position. 
Basically, what you are doing is support yOl.:r 
commander .. surprisingly for me he added: . . the CO 
allowed a very large degree of flexibility ... and let me write 
my own job description.". He appreciated this degree of 
latitude and gave himself a fairly extensive jcb description. 
In hindsight, he realized, it worked out well. He never 
attempted to abuse the freedom given to him, because" ... with 
the dynamics between the two of us ... " it was clear that 
everybody was working w:::.h high dedication towards a common 
goal. Th is goal was symbolized by efficient and er;-r;-or fre. e 
output for the entire company. 
~ Are the time frames for task accomplishment 
realistical l y? ~ He expressed conce.rn, that the higher 
commands oft.e.o attach· rigid time constraints 00 tasks . The. 
l ower eche.loos o f ten face. the proble:n of i ns u ffic ient time to 
prepare the decision carefu l ly. But this does not stimulate 
fe.ar in him, it rather make:o; him angr;-y about the rigidity of 
his highE'T superiors. In the company he has adequate ti.me and 
is usual l y" . .. ahe.ad 0: the. ball gar.1e..". 
Due."tion : Eow is delegation o[ tasks handled in the 
company? ~ "Ile has never;- re.ally de l e gated rr.uch to me . I 
made up ny own joh descript.ion and I put myself into the 
matters of the company." It seemed to me that t ile t.riumvir;-ate. 
(CO, XD, First. Sergeant) consist.ed of three very strong 
characters. All t.hree ·had seemingly clear visions about their;-
specific tasks. Surprisingly, without detaile.d introduction by 
the CO. "We keep each o ther aware of what. is happe.ning , but we 
don't. tell each other necessarily what to do." The syst.em 
relies heavily on the competence of each single player. 
Int.egrating mechanisms exist in form of one scheduled meeting 
per week (" .. . where we discuss problems at hand . 1t) and a 
contin:.lous information f low between this t.hree key people on 
a fairly informal basis (oral or written comm:.lnication). The 
XO's opinion about the necessity of information flow is 
vividly depicted in the following statement: "The last thing 
you want is to have your co:nmander be asked some ql:estions by 
somebody down in the battalion and he is like: I don'':. know". 
The XO views the CO as facilitator and integrator who 
u sually appear s only on the scene in cases when (1) vital 
information has tc be dist::::-ibuted, (2) i nt::::-odl:ctions of new 
featl:res have to be presented and discussed or ( 3 ) nec e ssary 
co::::-rections, announced by the top, have to be imp lemeot.ed. The 
XO fel':. comfortable with the methods the CO applied to keep 
everybody informed. This was not even a matter of concern. 
~ How are changes implemented in the company? 
Answer ; ':'he XO focused on changes within the company. Whe:1ever 
he or the First Sergeant feel t ha t something has to be 
changed, they present their recor.1IIlendations to the CO, 
explaining in detail their approach. Pros and cons are 
discCls s ed and the CO will make the final decisio:1, wh ich is 
accepted by all parties. As long as the decision is based on 
logioal a rguments, no problem will arise. This is the 
experience of the XO in the current company. ;-Ie mentioned, 
that he would have problems accepting decisions not based on 
facts or logic. This would be contrary to his working style 
and would stimulate dissatisfaction. 
~ Do you get the credit for your share of the 
company's work or does the CO book al l the credit for himself? 
Answer' The XO fel t that he got the share of credit he 
deserved. "The CO is real good in making sure that I get the 
credit I deserve." 
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~sticn: Have you experienced a situat ion where you felt 
lone l y cr helpless? Answer: The Xc) descr:!..bed c-he !"ccent case 
of a so l dier who sexually harassed a subordinate. When the 
sol di e r :!"lad to leave the company the XC, as the senior rater, 
had not enough t ime to eva:uate him (there were more reasons 
which t h e XO did nct explain ) . He was :10 t able to rate t his 
person dS wculd nave liked ( ... the fitness report was nct 
reflect i ve of his true actions. "). He te:t ki:1d af hel p less, 
because he could do nothing about the fact that this sold ier 
wou l d ge t away with his behavior. Pclrthermore, he bel i eved 
that th i s soldier wou l d be a permanent da:1ger ~ or future 
subordinates. 
~ Have you ever been insul :::ed by you; CO? Have yOll 
ever fe lt that you were treated incorrec:. l y? Answer; The XO 
mentioned that he never f e l t insu] ted by his Cl:.rrent CO. This 
relationship is so open and trustful, that he cou l d not 
conceive any offending act ion from the CO. But the xo reca l led 
a situation where he felt his integrity and credibilit-y 
questioned by the battalion commander. On his way to the 
cattalion he had once g i ven a female soldier, who had a foot 
surgery recently, a ride in his car. For him it was a matter 
of courtesy. He emphasized that he had done, and actually did 
several times, the same for male soldiers. Thi s t ime he 
recognized that somebody in an office started a rumor I when he 
picked her up to give her a ride back to the company 
(" ... somebody somewhere down in the office said that she had 
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called me by my first name . And that was total l y untrue . Some 
insinuat i ve comme:1ts ... tha~ probably somethi:1g inappropriate 
was happen ing between her and me . "j. The dramatic escalation 
i:1 ~his scenario :1.appened when .. l ater that same day the 
battalion commander had gotten wind of this accusation . It He 
approached the company commander and asked for c l arification. 
Both co:rmanders backed the XO and accepted that it was a 
propel:."" action . But the XO fe l t insulted, because beth 
inves~igated the case, following the rumor. The XO believed 
that they shoul d have left" . .. the rumor right where it was." 
I n his opinion both co:mnanders showed a l ack of t~ust for him. 
They knew his performance, his value system, his believes, 
and, moreover, that was going to get married in the near 
future. He felt they shou l d have paid more attention to his 
character and ir.1ITlediately ccnsidel:.""ed the accl.:.sation as 
unfounded o~ irrel evant. The way the ba~talion commander 
:1.and led t:1.e inves tigation, even if it was only a brief 
inquiry, seemed to t he XO to show a lack of trust . He seemed 
very agitated when he presented this case to me . Everything 
that touche s on his honor obviously seems to have a ve~y big 
impact on him. Mor eover, I got the impression that the matter 
was still not entirely sett l ed for him (n •• • un l ess I have 
given them concrete prove of something or concrete indication 
of something I don ' t go and somebody something like that i f I 
really trust him . ", " ... I felt my chain of command owed me 
more. "). His reaction was absolutely in alignment with his 
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att itude . He went to see the battalion co:nmander the same day 
and ilsked h im : "Do I still have you:: confidence?" He wa s 
satisfied with the pos itive answe;: but was still ang;:y whe n he 
learr,ed that the batta l ion conunander had asked all people in 
that specific office abO'..lt the case. The XO was irritated 
becausc now everybody k:1ew " ... that he was checking up on me." 
~ Have you ever felt any barriers between yO"J and 
your CO? ~ He re l ated barriers to trust and confidence. 
Ee viewec. a ;:,asic leve l of those properties as a prerequisite 
fo:: eve::y h':'e;:a;:cl1ica l military relations:"lip. He e xplained in 
detai l tl1at his r espect would neve;: drop below a certain 
leve l. The functional respect, for the rank or the position, 
'''''ou ld not vanish completely. Even if the incurnbcnt would 
disp l ay unacceptable behavio!"" or pe::formancc, the XO would 
neve.::" deny him the functional ::::-espect. On the o ther hand he 
clearly mentioned that n ••• respect, trust, con.:ide11ce beyond 
that is earned." Barriers are virtually n on eXl sting in his 
!""elat ionship with :-_he CO at Fort Ord. Their work atmosphere is 
fi l led with tn.;St and confidence and thus, both respect each 
other on this basis. 
~ What type of power does the co prirr.arily use 
(legitimate, expert, reward, referent, coercive power)? 
Answer: " ... all of them. There are times where you need to be 
tr.c forceful, the coercive, there are times when you want to 
use the reward, ... there are times when you need to be 
authoritative... . . .. a good leader will possess all of these 
traits or be familiar with all of these leade:!"ship styles 
and ... use the appropriate s t y l e in a given situation.". For 
the XO it is very impo:!"tant not to pursue just one style a l l 
the time. He judges his own and the leadership quality of his 
superio!:.'s by their capabi l ity to choose the appropriate styl e. 
He was convinced that the unba l anced employmen~. of one style 
without regard to si.t_uational ci:!"cumstances would be a 
definlte indication for leade::-ship in an unmatu!:.'ed stage. The 
XO explained next that he and the CO often have different 
leadership style. But these differences never l ead to any 
crucial con!'rontation or problems in handling a situation. 
When differences occurred the XO usually held a harder ar.d 
more vigorous position . He also conside::-ed the CO to be more 
concerned with extensive data gathering before ma:~ing a 
decision than he was ("We both have different leadership 
st_yles ... sometimes we have the same reaction to a given 
problem, other times we are different. And .. when we are 
different, I am more hard ... and he is more like a 
negotiator."J. Each of them respects the others techniques and 
their goal is still to find t he optimal solution to any 
upcoming issue . Their attitudes are very supportive and both 
seem to cultivate their behavior in this learning environment. 
~ What motivates you to do your job like you do 
it? ~ "Commitment. General MacArthur said; duty, honor, 
country. He said that in a famous speech at Westpoint .... 
"The biggest thing that motivates me daily is serving the 
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COUIltry." Fc;rthermore. he was seeking a high degree of 
prOficiency i n eac~ assignment a:1G he wanted to be looked at 
as a successful leader. One of ~lis goals was to be efficient 
in the execution of his mission and so " . . . to assist our 
government in the role of a mi l itary officer." He seemed to 
be h:"ghl y rr.otivated anct I could not detec t any demotivating 
factors in h is :ni litary life. He had a pragrr,atic approach 
to' ... ards prol.;lems; they were generally assumed to be 
chal leng i ng rather thOle demotivating or frustrating. 
Last, I asked him to ma:~e a summarizing stac:.ement abcut: 
the in terview process . He stated t hat the top i c wa s 
interest ing for him. t he discussion h ad make him think more 
serio'..lsly about an issue that he t ook for grantcrl. He also 
learned t hat fear had more facets than he ilad kn8wn hefore . 
Fir.ally, he err.phasized once more his opinion, that fear is 
something that sho\.lld never get control over the individual . 
Everybody silot:ld recognize fear and ultimately l earn how to 
control it. 
R. EI GHTH INTERV IEW : FOURTH INTERVI EW WITH CO 
~ What is your leadership philosophy? ArlS ' .... er · He 
started with a twofo l d explanation: First, h e made clear, that 
"The bes t way to lead a company is to set an example." He 
want.ed to d e monstrat e to his subordinates the appropriate 
behavio::-. ;.Jis actions were meant to be the standards and the 
focal point of orientation for his soldiers. Second, he 
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cautioned, that it is also impo:::.-tal'_t to be aware of how the 
subordinates perceive those examples. In his view, any exarr.p le 
is of little value in the leadership process, if there exists 
a noticeable discrepancy between the superiors intended, and 
actClally shown, behavior and the percept '-- on 0:: this behavior 
by the subordinates. To be effective, the superior must detect 
ar.d eliminate those diffe!"ences. 
Eis next point was that he viewed a respectful distance 
essential in a military hie:::.-archy. He was v ery strict at this 
point and the quotations underscore his stance : "I don't a llow 
anybody ir:. the c:Jmpany to use first names, even whe n they are 
of equal l evel ... When people approach me and wan t to become my 
friend, I don't allow that to happen. Not inside the company." 
:,is reason was that it was crucial fa::: him to mairxa i n the 
neutral position of an unb i ased evaluator. Nobody should get 
a chance to take any advantage of a closer relationship with 
him. Hi s gQal was to avoid even the s l ightest imp:::ession of 
favoritism. It was much easier for him to lead wit h some 
distance. None of his actions , whether reward i ng or pU!1i shing 
people, were ever subj ect to widesp read dispute. Thus, he 
easily avoided the problem of being perceived biased by his 
subordinates. 
To be accepted as a " ... no nonsense Derson ... " is another 
fundamental aspect of r.is leadership theory. He placed 
emphasis on specific details and procedures which he viewed 
important and was lax on others which he vie''''~d. periphera l . 
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Ei;J inten~_ ion was to incr.ease the so l d i ers capabi l ities to 
distingu i sh between significant and less impor-tant ele:nents. 
Furthermore, he wanted all soldiers to )(no''''' exact.:"y where he 
put his main emphasis, so chat they cou l d pay cl:Jse a t tention 
to the se po:::.nts. He gave the foll::Jwing examp l es: He did no t 
want the troops being ca l led to attention when he arrived at 
the company :::. f t:"1e actua l work would be interrupted . On the 
other hand, there we re a lot Army regulatior:s and procedures 
which had to be fol l owed str i ctly t.o ensure correct and 
e:fec t ive per-forrnancO'>_ 3e expected everybody to adhere to 
tr.ose sta:1darc.s and comply with those ru l es. Ee was v ery 
strict in enforcing those part i cular regu :.ations and t he 
subordinates seemed to be aware of h i s actitude ("They have to 
know t hat, if they violate the rules, y ou will enforce the 
rul es. ") . 
Next he talked about h i s way to issue orders: " .. . I allcw 
them the maximum freedom of maneuver to accomplish their job. 
I don't tell anybody in this company how to do th i ngs. :: tel l 
them · ... hat resc.lts I want. And this is very important, I t.h':"nk , 
for me being perceived as a good leader ." He stressed tha t he 
avoided microrr.anaging, because it decreases effectiveness and 
has a negative impact on the pride of [ he subordinates. He 
believed that the leade r gains more respect by ef f ectively 
utilizing the available resources towards the articula t ed 
goals. Objectives have to be clearly and exhaustively 
described to allow subordinate to chose appropr i ate actions tc 
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achieve t.hem ( 11 I usually use a lot of words to describe tr.e 
result ... This is what I wa n t the product to look like. "J. To 
maintain some control over crucial processes and to provide 
guidance and he l p, he asked for submission of rough drafts for 
selected projects. The ideas were discussed, necessary 
corrections made and explained, so that >:.he subordina te wa s i n 
a pos i tion to continue the work intel l igent ly. These dia l ogues 
fostered the relationship between him and his soldiers and 
made sure that both sides were at the same l evel of 
information ar,d understanding about the proj eet. It was 
interesting to see how he differentiated be t ween tasks which 
h e would pay :nore attention to and others. Everything that 
stayed wi thin the company, where he was the approving 
authority, was of less concern t o him. :n this cases he 
allowed people more leeway in accomplishing their tasks. 
Everything that came exp l icitly from his boss or that wou l d 
l eave the company, he kept an eye on to make sure t:"1at the 
appropriate product was submitted. This behavior seemed to be 
consistent with the before-mentioned fea::::- of failure. In an 
earlier i n terview he admitted his fear , that every mistake, 
which would be recognized by his superiors, could have a 
negative effect on his evaluation. Thus, his behavior seemed 
partially be based on his perception of good leadership st.yle 
and partially on his fear of failure. It is not possible at 
this point to distinguish what was the major driving force. 
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surprisingly, r,e admitted freely t_~at he viewed fear as a:1 
appropriate managel'1ent tool. To illustrat.e his opinion, he 
started ot.;t with L"1e descript ion of a pattern he used 
frequently. If an en l ist ed soldier did no:: per f orm to 
standard, he had the First Sergeant come to his office and 
then he cal led t.he enl isted person in . Next he would explain 
the failure to the seldier: " ... you failed to provide me w~th 
what I ' .... anted. Let me tell yo;.) one more time what I want . 
He talked " ... in a matter of fact way, ::lever raising rry 
voice. and dismissed him. "The soldier wil:" be t.;oder 
=-mmense presst:re, because he knows tlla:: h::'s real boss i s right 
there. He is going to knm., what will happen :"ater. The 
First Sergeant, as t.:,e first rater for al l enlisted personne l , 
would thus be made aware of the mi sta:.ce. The CO hall discovered 
earlier, that. the First Sergeant used to cal l these soldiers 
into his office short.ly after the CO had dismissed the:n . He 
would then c;se very harsh words to demand a higher level of 
perforrr.ance. Furthermore, he would also explain clearly t.he 
possible consequences for the soldier. The CO purposely 
applied this double confrontation method . His intention was, 
to demonstrate the soldier t h e significa:1ce of his 
misbehavior. To get the soldier's full attention, he 
deliberately puts him in a fearful situation. He described a 
different scenario, where he informed a senior eelis t ed 
soldier about failures. Even though he f i rst explained t.he 
mistakes objectively, he subsequently resorted to explanations 
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w:-!ic h were apt to stimulate fear: " ... if I was going to give 
you your eva l uation today ... this is how I would rate 
you ... this is what your points woul d be and you would not get 
promoted t.oday.". He believed, t.hat. this was a good and 
successful method to educate subordinat.es. I asked hin, i.f 
could think of any other techn i que, one without f e ar, to 
achieve the sarr.e resul t s. He was convinced, that his meL-lOd 
was appropriate in cert.ain cases a:ld he saw no need to apply 
any other. I f a soldier would fail t o improve perform:ince, the 
CO would mcve on and use a written counse l ing stateme:o.t, which 
lists all the :nisconduct, as the next step. This stat.e:nent 
would go to the sol dier's file and could have significant 
impact on his career. The CO mentioned, that. he used this 
st.atement regardless of the rank of the soldier. He was very 
strict in app l ying these techniques which made h i m h i ghly 
predictabl e for his subordinates. On the o ther hand, his 
strictness was intended, and actual l y seemed, t.o stimulate 
fear in the soldiers. I felt, he created an atmosphere where 
a mixture of compliance and loyalty were the driving forces 
for performance. 
"I think it is important, that I never show anxiety, 
weakness, stress, anger. It is very important, I think, to my 
position, that I maintain an even keel." He mentioned, that he 
preferred a very calm and factual appearance when dealing with 
his subordinates (" ... I am not good in yell ing at. peopl e ... ") . 
This is consistent with my own ::bservations. His interaction 
wit.h r:o:npany personnel was polite and factual and he was 
patient in explaining p:coblet:1s. The reason behind this 
behavio!" was his bel i ef, that he had t o dem:lnstrate, t hat r.e 
was a l ways in centrel of r.imself, calm but a l so correct, 
strict, demanding, and enforc ing. Partia l ly. this was a l ready 
part of his character. He added the rest to co:np l ete the 
image, he thought wou l d match the expectat i ons of his so l diers 
best . He was a l so convinced that this was t he mose su i table 
way for him to act as a CO. 
~ Do you eyoke fear to make people comply? Answer; 
"'/'Je u,;e that a lot wi th the legal casE':s. The chapter cases 
[disc:'large], the cQurt -r:1a rtials, the rapists , the OUI [drivi:lg 
unde.:: lnf l uence] cases, ar:d the drug users. We use f ear a lot 
and ir.. a few cases I have raised my voice a:J.d slamrr..ed my hands 
or.. ny desk.", " ... they have already screwed up the':r lives and 
screwed up their careers to a point, t hey can't be damaged any 
more. You car.. no lor.ger appeal to their fear of failure. They 
already are a failure ... it's a fine line betwee!1 t:hreat and 
instil l ing fear to get t heir attentio:J..". Ee to l d me, how he 
handled a soldier who had attempted to strar..gle his wife. This 
so l dier was very inactencive to him when they started the 
inve stigation. To get the persons attention, the CO told him 
" ... you know as well as I know what I can do and what I ca:1' t 
do. But let me remind you of a couple of things you migr.t net 
know what I can do .. ". The CO would list actions available to 
him to restrict the freedom of the soldier dramatically in 
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o::-der to discipline him. So far, this was within the l.;.su:;!.l 
procedure of i l lustrating to the person the variety of 
applicable and possib l e actions. But in addicion, the CO 
referred to some details regarding another invescigation. He 
assumed, ':.he soldier would not expect, thac he had this 
information. This comment did not fai l to generate the desired 
result. The so l dier was shoci<;:ed and fearfc:l. :lis attention 
went up and he was cooperative. The CO believed that it is 
sorr.etimes necessary and useful to stimulate fear by painting 
drarr.atic pictures. To show people the maxi:num pena.:..ty they may 
get like discharge with no medical or retirement benefits, 
seemed to be an app!'"opriate instrument fo::- him to get people's 
atcen-cion or >p ••• to upset their self confidence .. \ .. itho ut 
:-J.esitation he applied this technique especially to people who 
are impudent, unruly, or rebellious ("I have used fear before 
to gain attention. Also to make people remember things. "). 
With regard to his las-c quo-cation, he mentioned the following 
example. 6e chose a very dramatic approach to make the 
routinely administered safety briefing more interesting and to 
improve people's memory and retention. He created a le-cter, 
which he read to the company during a formation. T:'le letter 
described the story of a soldier (married with a two year old 
daugr.ter) who was driving under alcohol and caused an 
accident. He himself and two teenagers were killed. The 
parents of the teenagers were sending this let ter -co the 
company commander. -ceIling him that they · ... ere suing the widow 
of ~his soldier. The crucial p:Jinc was, that t he s o l dier had 
not only caused thz:-ee fatalities, but that :"1e also ruined :"115 
family. because of the pending lawsuic. The CO's intentil.l:1 was 
to stimul ace concern in his sold iers for 11) tile people who 
had been killed, (2) the daughter who lost her Eathe r, (3) t~e 
' .... :taow who lost he r hJ..;. sba:1d, (4) the other family wh o lost 
their :-::id5, ar.d (5) the family who had to suffer fron the 
pending lawsuit . Ee created what he called a worst cas,," 
9c,",:1ario, co scimulate a vivid and l ong lasting memory . After 
the CO had read the letter to the cQIl'.!;lany. he tuld theIl', it was 
a fake and what his ince:1tions ' .... ere ("This is al l a l ie. 1 
just: made this let ::: er and it is fake . But I could j ust as 
easily change the names on this. The names could be yours. ") . 
Then he left the formation before anybody was able to co:nment 
on th is action. The soldiers were veyy angry and u?se::: that 
day, be:::ause they fel t fooled, but the story was alive for a 
long cime. The fear of provoking a s ::'mila r situation kept the 
discussion going. The CO used a negative stimulus in an 
attempt to facilitate learning. It would be ir.teresting to 
check wit h the soldiers, to what extent he was successful and 
how they perceived his action. 
~ Have you ever used fear to guide the XO or the 
Fiyst Sergeant? ~ "Yes. Not the Firsc Se rgeant. It's hard 
to rattle his cage.". He admitted to have used feay in a 
specific case wi th the XO. The incident was identical to the 
one the XO had reported before . The XO had given a female 
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soldier, who had a surgery, a ride to the battalion and back: 
to the company. Thi s had lead to some rumor about improper 
CO!1G.uct. The rumor created the impression t:hat the xo might 
have a relationship with a subordinate. The CO reported that 
the batta l ion COnulla:1c.er approached him with the crder to 
investigate this issl:.e. He ca l led the XO into his office ar.d 
.withO'..lt any warning.. confrcnted :"1im with the prob l em . 
Even though h e spoke with a rr.oderate voice and j ust sta':.ec. the 
facts, t.he XO was shocked. And this was the CO's intention. 
The XO quickly realized that his senior rater, the battalicn 
commander, had started an informal investigation. He cC'.Jld 
easily imagine t:"1e possible link to his next evaluation and 
thus was getting afraid. After this harsh intrcductio:1, the CO 
spent nearly an hO'.lr " ... explaining to him that eve:1 though 
h::"s actions were innocent people perceived otherwise .". He 
used fear to underscore the importance of the issue and to 
demonstrate to the XO the various cO:1sequences of his 
behavior. He also tried to make him think about iJehaviora l 
changes so that he would fit better this specific military 
mould and thus, woul d be not in danger any more. I asked the 
CO, if he could think of a different method to corrununicate 
this issue to the XO. He repl ied , that he considered his way 
appropriate and effective. He was convinced that the use of 
fear under certain conditions is justi fiabl e (" ... the reason 
why I used fear for that is because. he did not rea lize that 
people's perceptions sometimes can have a larger impact on 
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your career and your pers::m than ... What the implied threat 
was , is , t ha t if the senior rater is askir:g que sticns about 
you and this fema l e , he i s upset '",ith you . And he i s going to 
rate Y8U accordingly ... I ',;anted to stimu l ate rr.ore ar.d that i s 
wh y I put the li ttle thr eat i n the!'e. And it was not my 
t hreat. It wa s the threat t o hi s professionalism and his 
.. Al l of a sudden his self·esteem and h is competence i s 
at s t ake. It real l y get's his attention when y ou do that . "), 
Ar. important factor, to e x p lain the CO's positiv e attit ude 
towards :: h e us e cf fear as an educational element may be, that 
he was educated the same wa y . He reported a s ituat i on where he 
wa s a young Lieu t.enant and " ... made some durr.b mistakes. 
His CO then used the same technique to make him aware of 
mis takes and consequences . Moreover, " ... he did r:ot speak to 
me for a we e : ...... ". Thus, the u s e of fear was e xperienced by 
him intensively and had the b l essing of :1.is superiors. The 
me thod '",as considered appropriate, and today he is just 
applying those methods he learned over time. He never had the 
feel i ng of doing s omethi ng wrong. 
~ Do you think, is i t possible to eliminate fear 
complete l y from the work plac e and use a leadership style 
wi thout any element of f ea r? ~ "I t's cont r a ry to 
military d i sc i pline, I think.", .. r don't have the 
t ime ... and r don't t hink it is appropriate.", " ... 1 don't lead 
through c oercion a nd I don't lead L1.rough menta ring 
either .. it varies wi t h the situation.", " ... r don't think a 
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leader could be an effective leade:::-, if he did not use some 
sort of negative reinforcenent along with the positive.". I n 
the military, the word counseling is used fo!:' a negative 
wr i':ten statement that goes to the soldier's file. We found, 
that the word mentoring is a more appropriate descr ip tion to 
characterize a guiding and supporting l eadership style. It is 
ir,terestiIlg to see, that the time e l ement is of iF.lportance for 
t:'18 CO. A l eadership style that goes towards coach i ng was 
considered '::.00 tirr.e consuming . He had so many duties and was 
so ',mder pressure that he d id not have time availab l e for this 
type of leadership. He also believed that negative 
reinforcement should be a constant element in the military 
leadership process. He combined discipline automa':.ically with 
some type of punishment . It would be interesting to see, 
whethe~ this attitude ·is limited to him or if it is a general 
trend in the Army. Furthermore, one could hypothes ize, tr.at 
the e lement o f fear is taught in Army schools, and thus 
considered appropriate or even necessary for military leaders . 
.o~ If you realize that your subordinates are afraid 
of you, how would you r espond? ~ He mentioned t h at. he 
would try to defuse the fear, if their behavior would be 
counterproductive. He described the situation where he got the 
impression that the XO was afraid of him. He viewed the XO's 
position cru cial to the company's success and immediately 
approached the XO. e xplained to him his view of an 
effective XO and added; H ••• to me the XO is more than the 
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adr.1inistrator af the 8ompany . He is anoth e r set of eyes . A set 
of eyes that I need to look a t me and my j ob performance ... At 
any point in time you may pick up or perceive from 
subordina t es or- however, that I'm doing something wrong, it is 
your d '.1ty to come and tel l me ." " 1 am n Ot per-fect. I wdnt you 
to help :TIe to succeed . " This explanations relaxed 1::"1e xo to 
a r.ertain degree and helped both p e rsons to understand each 
other ::Jetter. Most :'-mp:Jrtant for t he CO was the fdct that t he 
xo ' ... as gaining more se l f :-;onf i dence and establish ed a 
permanent communicatior. to him. In another sc:enar-io, the CO 
des:-:ribed a soldier wh o did not perform to standar-d and who 
caused problems. The CO was investigating this person about 
misconduct. As a reaction , this sold ie:- avoided contact with 
:'1il'1 dnd thus e lil'1inated a line of communication which the CO 
needed to do his job. "He was afraid of me to the point where 
he approached my wife when -= wasn't here ... and he asked her in 
a pleading t.one , don't. let your husba:J.d end my career . " In 
this case the CO did not t ry to restor e the cornmunication, but 
chose a drastic action: he transferred the s u bordinate and 
solved the problem this way. In general , the CO would defuse 
fear , i f it would be s,":pportive for the co:npany's perfor7l1ance. 
Otherwise, he would allow t he fear to CO:ltinue. I got t he 
impression, he did not care about :ear, as long as it would 
not inter:ere with t he overall atmosphere in the company . 
~ What type of power do YO'J use (legitirr.ate, 
reward, r eferent, expert, coercive )? ~ He preferred the 
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reEere:1t and the expert power. He favored leading by exa:nple 
to gain the respect of his subordinates. Those examples 
embraced the rr,ilitary and civilia:1 li fe, so that a homogeneous 
picture of his character was disp l ayed . He be l ieved that 
:rictions between military and civilian life, in te:rms of his 
basic character i stics, wou ld be detected easi l y and could 
deteriorate the basis of respect. He did r.ot use 
power very often, because he considered himsel: " ... net very 
gcod at that." . But on the oL'1er hand, he used the harsh 
leadership s tyle of the First Sergeant purpose l y, to make up 
for :'1i8 own deficiency (" .. he is a l so good at yelling at 
people ... so I use al l his positive l eadership traits to my 
advantage. "). His corrur.e::lts seemed to be consistent with his 
earl ie r statements. I recognized him as a very quiet persor, 
with a low voice. He appeared to be patient and balanced every 
time I met him. In a smart approach, :'1e used t h e First 
Sergea::l t as a complementary component to have all different 
powers available and play with them according to the 
sit·e1at i on. It seemed to be a nearly perfect rol e 
discrimination between them II remember the same pattern from 
the companies I have served in). The First Sergeant is the 
tcugh and loud guy and the CO is the smart, quiet, and 
overlooking manager. Nevertheless, the CO is the one who 
finally enforces regulations strictly and has the ultimate 
power t.o affect the career of every soldier directly. The 
subordinates have a clear pict.ure of these two superiors. 
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Moreover, they are made aware of Lhe avai l able instruments 
(rcgulaL':'ons, rewards, punishments, etc) and can exactly 
ant i cipate reactions to certain events (e.g. outstandlng 
performance will result in positive reward and negative 
performance wi l l be punished). The element of fear exists ir:. 
this scenario in terms of the fear of fai l ure and the 
merciless enforcement of the consequences. The CO stror.gly 
believed that his open interaction and -:he ongoing 
confrontation of the subordinates with their arhievements 
(good or bad) prevented him from being viewed as the bad, 
al:thoritarian guy, " ... because then it becomes their fear of 
failure and no-: the fear of my authority and tha t I might give 
them a bad rctting.". The soldiers would recognize, that 
" ... I 'm only voicing their failures.". 
~ How do you motivate the XO? Answer' "That goes 
back to our competi tion and the personal p:dde. If I real l y 
want to get hi s attenticn, I question his competence. I don't 
do it directly, I do it indirectly. If I real ly want him to 
show more performance, I compete with him." Both seemed to 
compete physically and on the mental level. The CO mentioned 
a situation where he wanted safety regulations posted in a way 
so that every soldier could see and read them easi l y. The 
current arrangement considered inappropriate. He 
instructed the XO to improve the display of the papers. When 
the xc asked for the standards as a guideline for him, the CO 
r eplied; "Do you want me to do your job?". Two aspects of this 
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conversation a r e i n teresting to me. The first one is, that the 
CO really did nct exp l ain i n detail, h ow somebody had to 
perform a job. He was consis t ent with his prior statements, by 
just asking for a res u lt regardless of t h e way t o aC:'1ieve it . 
Cn the other :'1and, not to provide the standards (Standards 
we:ce no t explic itly distributed throughout the battalion. Eac:'1 
company set it's own standards.) chal lenged the xo t o come up 
wi th a solution, which he thou ght wo u l d be a good company 
standard . The CO kept the XO in a permanent search fo r the 
appropr iate standard, which required c onstant obs e rvat i on of 
t he CO and paying close attention to the ongoing co:r·municatior. 
to find out w~at a good standard would be. The XO liked 
cr.all enges and h ':'s solution to this problem resulted in a muc:'1 
higher standard than the CO had expected. From the interviews 
with the XO it was not clear to me whe the r such a challenge 
wou l d c on tain any fear, which would serve as a drivi ng force 
for h is performance. He always emphasized that :'1e viewed 
chal l enge as a positive stimulus. If that is true, the CO 
found a good way of leading this spec ific XO. 
~ Do you believe that fear can be eliminate d from 
t he work place ? ~ "It shouldn' t be.". He gave an 
interesting explanation why he thought, fear should prevai l in 
the work place. .. I align fear with competition . It '8 
parallel. It's no t quite the same. It's a stimulus . . To me, 
taking all the fea r away from work means, ever ybo dy is the 
same . I don't need to try, because nothing will happen to me 
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if I tail . . . To me, not: everybody can succeed." . For the CO , 
fear is a motivator- tc .increase performance . He exp l ained that 
r.e doesn't r.ave to apply fear intentionally. ':'he permanent 
feedback, · ... hieh the subordir,ates get from hi:n, would al l ow 
them to assess their pos i tion on L"1€ racing scale 
cont i nuously. T:"1e sol diers at the lower end would be motivated 
by the fear of failure and the associated fear of getr:ing a 
bad rating to improve their performance . Hi s earlier 
statement, that: he views fear close to competition, may shed 
some light on h i s attitude. He rild no~_ seem co make a clear 
dist:inction between fear and competit i on. T:"1ese two tenns 
seemed to be intert.wined or substit.utabl e tor him. This :nade 
it hard for me to tel~ clearly , ... hen he was act"Jally ta l'-dng 
about fear in the sense of :ny definition. Nevert.heless, tr.e 
interesting observation was t:tlat somebody used tr.ese two terms 
quasi synonymous. 
In another statement, he related fear to the need 
hierarchy of Mas l ow. He used this hierarchy to explain his 
theory, that people in different l evels 0: the pyrami d feel 
different tears. Moreover , his action would instill different 
tears in them . To illustrate his thoughts, he gave two 
examples. A person on the top of the pyramid (self 
actualization) would, if threatened , teel the fear of losing 
status, rank , money, position in society, etc. A person on the 
l owest level is, in the eyes of the ca, already so way down 
and s o desperate, that he would not be able to i. nstill much 
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additional fear in them. Thus, the highe~ a person en the 
scale, the more sensitive he is to fea~. The CO would chose 
different approaches to instill a fear, suitabl e for the 
particula!:" person, to aC:'1ieve performance improvements. He 
also made clear that he used fea~ only for 10% of his people 
. fo~ ten percent of the soldiers you have to get into 
their face and say: I do not think you have been _istening to 
the training we have been g i ving you. If you fail to 
qua l ify ... you wi ll conduct extra training for such and ~uch 
n'J..'l\ber of days ... " J. He mentioned i n another example how he 
used fear in a ve~y matter-of - fact way: "Most of the negative 
I do, I do with the platoon sergeants. I tell them: You can't 
w~ite. How do you expect to be promoted to Sergeant First 
Class, if you can't write?.It is definitely negative 
reinforcement. embarrass them. emba~rass their 
p~ofessional pride and their competence." For the other 9 0%- ;'1e 
used rewards and positive reinforcement of various kinds 
(" ... you make me succeed, so you will succeed."). He could not 
i magine any other ways to get the lOt low performe~ to higher 
degrees of performanc~ than applying some kind of fear. 
Finally, the CO admitted another fear, his fear of looking 
bad in front of his First Sergeant. These persons are usual l y 
very experienced soldiers, much older than the COs, and 
selected for this assignment. The competence and knowledge is 
high and the CO was frightened to look dumb by asking foolish 
quest ions or showing lack of knowledge. Thus, every time, he 
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ha.d to discuss a subjec t wi t h his Fi-::st Sergeant, he went to 
another sergeant first and t alked to him abo"Jt the lssue. He 
dlscussed the ma t. ter in detail '",ith thi s man and buil t up his 
own :Cncwledge, so that he was prepared, when r,e ' ... ent into the 
discussion with the First Se-::gea:l t. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
One of the most striking findings was the extraord i na::-y 
harmonious atmosphere bet'N'een the two officers. Eoth 
e~,pha. sized repeatedly their positive relationship and 
deliberately offered a plenitude of evidence as documentation. 
None of the exa.:nples were ccntradictory, so we can assume that 
the statements were true and honest. 
Some key e l ements for this unique situatLms can be found 
in their characters, ?-ttitudes, and p:cefe:cences. Roth share 
the cO:nr:lonality for exceptional interests. The CO likes snow 
boa!:'di:lg, mountain biking, and wi ndsurfing whereas the xo' s 
... u l timate thing ... " is frisbi . These spo=-t ac t ivit i es are 
far beyolld what would be considered appropriate or officer 
1 ike i n Lle Army . Both are not engaged in golf or tennis, 
activities with the highest deg=-ee of acceptallce in the Army 
officer corps. Thus, both pursue their persoEal preferences 
and incur the risk: of running counter t o t he stream. 7ill now 
their star.ce is very successful. This seem to be based on the 
favorable conbination of their unusual personal interests ar.d 
their successful military performance . Furthermore, both 
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display an extraordinary dedica t ion for their country and 
their mission, seemi:1gly two fa c tors which are highl y 
recognized by their superiors. This combination may stabil i ze 
and protect their niche within the organization a :ld a l low them 
to pursue their own way of doing business. Moreover, this 
generates a unifying continuum f o r their re l ationship. This 
two people share bas i c values and have thus a solid CO::lIrDn 
ground to base their respectful relationship O!l . 
Their mCltua l understanding a nd courteous interactio!l are 
the basis fer their' fru itfu l work Pr. --,.te and persona l 
con gruer.ce in fundamental areas does not cOl:flict with 
military requirements or obl igatio!ls. In an harmonious 
atncsphere like this we wou l d not expec t to fir.d disti:1ct i v e 
or stro!'lg fears. This is typica l ly the situation where we 
would expect effectiveness and ef f icien cy combi:1ed with high 
work sat i sfaction. Wit h regard to Demir.g's point "Drive out 
fear " we can state, that hi s requirements have been realized 
to a h i gh degree in this relationship. 
T. FINAL ITERATION OF THE FEAR MODEL 
The mode l proved t hrough the intervie w sessions it's 
capability and flexibility to c apture various manifestatioI'.s 
of fear. For the final meeting I will keep the model 
unchanged. One intention will be to f ind evidence for area IV , 
t he only area wi thout any finding so far. 
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FINAL MEETING 
This was the first time 8i,1:::e the introductory meeting 
that I had both officers toget h e:: in a mee t i~g. My intent-ions 
were to give t h em feedbac:-:: on our previous inte:::view sessions 
and to 2:1gage i nto a discussion about leadership and fear-. The 
feedback had to be kept i n a more general style, because I 
' ... 'ante.d to maintain their ~ntegrity and not discuss sensit~ve 
informatio:1 i n fro n t of each ether. I ant i cipated a l ively 
discuss i on, hecause bet:'} o fficers had strong char-aeters and 
solid opin i ons. But I was also aware, that they probab l y wou l d 
r.ot argue too forcefully against each other. because of their 
superior - subordinate re l ationship. In particular, : expected 
that the XC would be very careLl i and respectful in d8bat i ng 
with his CO. I hoped that the CO would make so:ne statements to 
which the XO could respond. 
The arrangeIT.ent of the meeting was very difficul:: because 
both we::-e preparing for the change of command. The CO was ::0 
leave in the middle of December and the XO would take over. 
Expectations and requirements from higher levels of the 
echelon increased dramatically during the last two weeks of 
November. Especially the CO was req'J.ired to finis:'} certain 
jobs like evaluations before he could leave. ':'his hectic 
environment shaped the timing of our meeting and finally had 
an impact on the meeting itself. When I arrived at the company 
building bot h officers were very active and mentioned that it 
woc:ld take some time before we could start the discussion. 
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When we fina l ly sta~t.ed, we were i:1terrupted severa l t i mes and 
one of the office!:s had to leave. I got t:1.e imp!:ession that 
both were wi lling to give me ':.his last chance t o gather data 
for my t hesis, but on the other hand their t:1.oug:1.ts were 
somewhere else. After 30 r:tinutes people were crowding in front 
of the CO's office waiting for signatures or guidance. He r.ad 
to l eave and a few minutes later the XO r.ad t.o l eave also. 
One interesting po:'..nt was a sudden a n d not anticipated 
change i n the attitude of the batta l ion conurcander (BC) 
" ... someth i ng is aggravating him ... HJ. Since a couple of days 
he showed a diffe~ent behavior and both officers we-::e t -::yin g 
to find out what t:1.e possible reasons could be. They suspected 
that the reasons were re l ated ':.0 the departure of the CO, but 
they were not sure. Currently they were in a stage of 
unce~tainty, not knowing whether they we~e targeted directly 
Th e CO gave a simple example for the new behavior of 
the BC. The CO submitted on a constant basis a prese l ected 
volume of information to the BC. In the past, the 3C was 
pleased with the amount, the accuracy, and the value of those 
data. Suddenly, the same process made him angry and the CO was 
':.old: "Get out of my office. Don't waste my time. " . The CO 
offered a possible explanation: "He [the 3C] finally came to 
real ize that I'm leaving. And so, he is being hard on me to 
get all the business finished before I leave. And he is beir.g 
hard on him [the XO], so he can establ ish a different. kind of 
relationship with the XO, because he is going to be tr.e 
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cOnL'11a:1der w:'len .:.. leave." The CO rnen:::io:1ed, :::r.at every ;::irr,e a 
comrr.a:lcer cha:1ges. there is a b:::eak in the :::e~a::ionsr_ip 
hetween :::11e r.ew CJ iiod ::.he Be. This has t::l be reestan1 ~ sr.ed, 
w:'licr. -neludes tr.E fact :::hat " ... yot.:. :'1ilVe t8 j8ckcy :or 
pcsitio:1, figure O"J;:: h:y"", each otr.er ;::r.ir:ks, a:1d it's 
di::e:::e:1;:.". A-,othcr factor wh~c:'1 :nay aCCC".m:: for t.he 5e's 
dit:e::::-e,,:: a::titude is tha:: t:1.e ccmpa:1y waC' to he closed down 
two :n::>:lth ~ater. ,:,r.c XC would be ::I"'.e final CO a:1d he woc.ld be 
in office for Q:11y two mentl:. T:'1e m~ssion of ::l-.i8 company, to 
assist: soldiers ':'r. L'1e':'r :::::a:1sition fro:n the nilitayy t.c the 
c~vilian er.v=-ronnent, '""as nearly completed. The IT,aj::>.::' f:Jrce 
reduc::icn prcgrarr,g at Fcrt::Jrd were tJasit:ill'_y conplel:ed a:1d 
~r.e n-.l!T'.ber of soldiers le:t was too sma.~l to ~.ls:::i:y the 
cxisLence of tr.e co:npany any longer. I get the inpression tt:at 
tr.e Be ~ost tr.e inte:!:est ::'n tr.is cOffi5Jany, because with the 
dcpar:::u.::e of ~he C:O, mest ef the wor;';: was :i:1::'shed. ":'t:e XO's 
duty seemed to be :TIore focused on the tcrmi:1at::'on 0: the 
c::>mpar.y. 
,:,r.e perception of Lhe officers is another examp-_e, how 
they dealt with uncertainty. :t didn't seem to create fear. 
They were just worried what was going on, and they were 
interested to identify t~e underlying reaSO:1s. I got the 
i:npression that they strove for clarification to get :cid of an 
unnerving uncertainty rather than to overcome a fear" They did 
n8t ".lse the word fear at all in their description of L'le 
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sit-uation. They just mentioned t hat they were unsure about the 
c irc·Jmstances. 
Another point worth ment.ioning is that. the relationship 
bet.ween CO a:ld XO didn't seem to be effec':.ed r.egatively by 
these events. Eoth radiated a high level of agreeme:lt. over the 
phenomenon and felt t.argeted corrmonly. They viewed it 
problem and searching co l lectlve l y for 
e xplanati ons. 
Next I presented briefly Deming's TQM phi l osophy, 
including his ~4 points. I solicited their com.-nents on point 
number eight "Drive out fear". ':'h e XO mentioned that he had 
experienced company clinates where the CO put enphasis on 
" .. giving it [ the job] your best shot .... ;-Ie was aware that 
the fear of fai l ure could pa::::-alyze people aad decrease 
performance substantially. Even though he was never exposed to 
TQL theorie s before, his thoughts were along the same lines 
wi th TOM . 
The CO rrade an interestJ.-ng comment about using fea::::- in 
l eadership. "You use fear sonetimes t-o motivate the 
knucklehead type sOl.diers who don't understand anything 
else.". He preferred the positive motivation to make soldiers 
perform well, but, if necessary, he was will ing to use fear to 
convince people to accomplish a task in a certain way. He did 
not perceive the use of fear as something negative. In his 
view it was one available t ool for him as a l eader. He also 
mentioned that it was one he used least frequently. 
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1: asked the XO ' .... hether he vie' .... ed fear as a usefu::" 
management tool . "Depends on the people you are dealing wi th. 
Some people are intell-igent and you don't need that ... i':.' s an 
cption in any situation ... The most exper i enced leader know how 
employ that . It mentio ned three (actors w:1 ich 
characterize the use of fear : (1) the situation, !2) the 
person/group you are dea l ir:g with, and (31 che leader and h:'s 
l eadership abilit:.es. The XO stated, t:lat, depending on a 
single factor or any combination of them , the use 0 : fear 
would be legit i:nate. He also made clear that he preferred to 
start wi th a trust build i l:g lead ershi p styl e . In his view, a 
persor.'s ab i lities should be explored and tested first, and 
L'1e perforTI'ance measured against those abilities. I f the 
performance was be l ow _the gerson's capab:'lit:'es or below any 
basic standard, he would use some type of escalating procedure 
to motivate the individual . This procedure would incl':.lde fear 
or threat , if necessary. The dominant driv::'ng fo rce behind his 
and the CO's thoughts was the accomplishment of their mission. 
I got the impression that accomplishment has a very high 
priority and the various tools (positiv e or negative 
motivato~) were employed consequently to achieve the goa l s. 
When the aforementioned factors were posit ive , positive 
motivator would be used. When they were unfavorable, negative 
motivator including fear and threat were used. Both see:ned to 
have very pragmatic at.titudes towards leading t heir un::'ts . On 
the other hand, three other factors seemed to influence their 
attitudes. First, the time pressure ar.d the work l oad for theIr, 
was apparently very :'1igh, wh~ch did not a l low for very 
sophisticated leadership practices . Second, the turnove!: in 
thelr company was extreme l y high. This was part of their 
mission and not avoidabl e. But it limited the deve l oprr.ent of 
personal relationships and forced the superiors to employ 
rigid leadership methods sometimes to accomplish their 
mission. Third, they had to deal with soldiers who were bO'.lr.d 
to leav"! the Army, The interest ar.d the willingness of those 
people ~ comply with orders in a highl y motivated fashion was 
limi ted. Thus, the uniqueness of this situation contributed to 
the pOSitive attit'"lde of the two off.'-cers towards the 
employment of fear as a l eade!:ship tool. Nevertheless, t heir 
basis tendency was already favoring fear under certain 
conditions . 
The XO mentioned final l y, that he viewed a flexil:.: l e 
leadership styl e the most effective. This styi e wou l d include 
the entire spectrum of positive and negative reinforcements 
which would be chosen by the leader in accordance with the 
si tuation and the people he had to deal wi th . (" ... there are 
soldiers who need very little guidance, they just do the right 
things, they do their jobs ... Other guys, you have to give them 
painstaking details, because they are stupid or they don't 
care . A leader who uses one set of leadership principles al l 
the time is going to find himself in trouble ... If you have a 
leader who is flexible, who can see the techniques that must 
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be used with each of the people u:lder his corrma:ld, thiln he 
will be much more successful"}. 
203 
VII. DATA ANALYSIS 
OBSERVED PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERVIEWEES 
For the i :1 terpretation and a better understandi:1g o f the 
p::::-esented materia l , i t is helpful to have some. information 
available about t he personalit i es of the two office rs. They 
shared many traits, habits, attitudes, ar..d behaviors, b ut 
the::::-e were a l so some remarkable differences. They had the 
followi n g cba~acter '; stics i n corwon: 
• Open and honest in the presentation of the data. 
• Hig h ly specia l ized i n f a n try officers with Rang e r 
qualif i cation. 
• Ve::::-y knowledgeable abo:1t their current jobs. 
• Eloquent i n discussions and monologues. 
• Extremely focused and concentrated during the inte rviews. 
The CO remembered in the last meeting exactly what he had 
said du::::-ing previous sessions. 
• Extraordinary high work ethic. They wo::::-ked overtime 
whenever necessary (as was very o:'ten the case). T:"1eir 
attitude was, tr.a·t an officer has to work as l ong the 
mission requires his presence. 
• Dedicated to the company, the battalio n, the division, the 
AlT.ly, and their country. They stressed frequently, that 
they loved to serve their country. This was apparent l y one 
vital source of motivation for both. 
• Both officers were facing maj or changes in the very next 
future. The CO was to be transferred very soon and the XO 
had to take over the company. The XO himself was ending 
his military career a few month later. Hi s last assignment 
was the dismissal of the c ompany. The "power curves" of 
both officers were still displaying a steep upward slope. 
Their deeply internalized work ethics required that they 
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worked "at a 150t l eve l " till the very last day of t h eir 
duties. 
emphasized over the entire time period again and 
their will ingness to cooperate for t.he benefi t a t 
project. They were eager to provide al l information 
necessary, or requested, and they were also eager to 
exp l ore the subject in depth . Both mentioned an increasing 
degree o f sel f interest, which ffiily e xplain their high 
de9.::-ee of involvewent (XC assisted in the deve lopment of 
figure 4) . 
• Interest ~n spOrt act i vities which were either risky 
outside prevalent military acceptance parameters. The 
was enjoying every type of ski activities and 
biking. The XO loved to play frisDee and tl:l.k:e 
with mili1:a ry regulations, procedures, 
e!1fo:rced adherence rigorous l y. 
The CO was married wi:.h a your.g chi l d. The XO was planning his 
marriage right after his military career. BOth discussed 
~ami l y issues very ofte:1 a:1d exchanged view pcints on various 
subjects like education or areas where to live and raif;c a 
~ami ly . Both had plenty of topics to discuss when they were 
off duty and d i d so frequently . Thus, their rela:' i onship was 
not restricted to their daily :nilitary routine. 
There were also some apparent d j fierences. The CO 
i:npressed me, because he was extremely ca l m and of balanced 
He never raised his voice, unless he did it on 
purpose. In that instance, he control led his appearance and 
motions perfect l y and perfonned like an actor on stage. We had 
situations in the interviews, where he underscored his 
co=ents by slamming his hands on the tab l e or even j umping 
up. But he explained repeatedly, that he would use this 
behavior only in rare instances . The XO was much more 
205 
energetic and spon:.aneous. His voice was usually louder ar.d 
more :o~ce:ul. This corres!Jonded per:ectly w:'..tt·. his overa:"l 
military attitude. He was a per:ect'..onist, who put extreme 
er:tpr.as:'..s on r..ilitary cou-:::.esy a:1d forms. He viewed this as a 
prerequis'..te for successfu:" r:JL:.itary pe~forrnance. T:'1e co had 
a slightly diffe-::ent attitude towards forms. He was not as 
str:::'ct as his Xo in enforcing them. He pu:. l":tore weig:'1t on the 
suecessfu:" ope~ation '..:.self ~at:'1e~ t:'1an wr.ether it was 
aC:'1ieved under absolu::ely correct for:nal cond'..t'..ons. 7h'..s 
discrepancy ':'ed to some rcinor problems between the:n, but. :.h2 
CO mentioned t:'1a:: he never stop!Jed the XO. This poir.t 
contc::asts a little bit witt: ::.he str:'..ct compl:'..ance with 
r:Jilitary regulations, bu::. the CO admitted that r.e was 
"sligh:'ly more ':'enien:. in this regard than the XO". 
Overal:", the~e we~e no significant dispa~ities. Tl:eic:: 
r.ig:'11y cong:::.-uent military attitudes and the':'r hor:est 
mot':'vation to serve tr.eir country were the major determ'..nants 
in their behavioral spec::.rum. An interesting difference · .. ·as, 
that both officers {::.his li::.tle homogeneous group) favored and 
pursued sport activ'..ties, which were not aligned witr. 
"generally accepted" behavior for Army officers. 80th differed 
:rom "Army standards" and were thus outsiders in this respec::.. 
B. ANALYSIS OF EXPRESSED FEARS 
During the entire interview process consist':'ng of a series 
0: 8 in-depth ar:.d lengthy in::erviews the two officers spoke 70 
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times about t.heir var-iot:s 'Cypes of fear. These expressed fears 
are presented in appendices A t hro ugh 0 '-- 0 Var lO".lS 
arrangements for ease of viewing. 
Appendix A displays a l l expressed feCl.rs in chronolog i ca l 
orde r and assigns a number to eac:'l fear . 
Appendix B disp lays the fears ir. descending order of 
persona l import_ance. I assigned importance factors {high, 
medium, low) to each fear according to how the CO and Xc) fe l t 
abo;l!:. each fear. All the fears are l isted in descending order 
of i mportance, beginning with the fears expressed by the CO 
and con tinu i ng wiL'l those expressed by the xo. 
Appendix C shows t.he fears whi ch have been expressed more 
than once. They are arranged in descending order of frequency . 
A9pendix 0 relates all fears to t:1.e fear mode l . Each fear 
has been assigned to a particl;la~ circle (A, B, 0::- C) or area 
(:, II, I II, or IV) of the model. 
The t otal number of expressed fears was 70 , the numbe r of 
different fea rs was 51. The t otal number uf 70 fears was 
nearly equal l y distributed between the two officers: the CO 
discussed 34 points and the XO 36. Some fears were repeatedly 
reported, a fact which is reflected in the Appendices in the 
column labeled "Frequency". Sometimes the fears reoccu::-red in 
t:he same context, sometimes they were used in a different 
framework. 
For the analysis I focused on the most significan";'; f ears. 
As selection criteria I chose two factors. .Ei.r..§.t., the 
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Fr._'\ler.cy of repo~t (Frequer.cy of occu:!:"rer.ce) must ce two or 
:'1igher. ~, the Pe-::-so.!!al :mcortance nust be rr.edium or 
hig:'1. To be inc:'uded in the analysis, a fea:c has to meet eoth 
c-::-iteria s:'..rr.ulta:1ecusly. A graph:'c dis:play of al:' fears (by 
thei-::- Ch:!:"one:'og:'..ca:' r.:umber frorr. Apper.dix A) in relatio" to 
thei:c Frequency of report (i"requency 0: occu:!:":!:"ence) ar.d their 
Perser.al =nportance is provided :'..n Figu:::-es 6a and 6b. I am 
part:'..cularly interested i:l those fea:!:"s expressed two 
tirr.es ~ that have a degree of Perscea:' =mpc:!:"ta:lce uf 
:nedium 0:::- high. The boxes ar-ea cO:1tain those :ear-s wr.ic:'1 crreet 
both cr-'..ter-ia at the sat':le time. 
The following two exarr.ples example how to :::-ead Figu:::-es 6a 
and 6b. F:'..rst examp:'e: for the CO, the fear "Getti:lg 
Phys:'..ca:'ly :njured" is displayed in l"igure 6a as fear 01 witI'. 
a f:::-equency of 1 and a PI of low. This falls outside tr.e area 
:'..r-.dicating fears con~idered important as defined 'oy L'1e 
:'..r:terviewer for the puqose of this analysis. Second examp:'e: 
l::y contrast, the CO's fear "Personal failure" occurs three 
tir:tes (:)5, 62, 69) and has each time a PI of h'..gh. The :lumber 
OS (frequency 1) fall outs:'..de the box. T:'le numbers 62 
(frequency 2) and 69 (frequency 3) fall within the box, t:'1US 
the "Fear of failure~ fulfills the requirements of being 
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Append i x C disp l ays the tota l number- of ten fear-s that 
ful!'i ll the t wo se l ection cr- i teria and have thus been selec ted 
to serv e as the basis tor further- a:1alysis. A.'1 abbreviated 
forn of Appendix C is prov::'ded for conve:lience. 
Expressed fears in descending order of fr-eguency 
Tc,e abbreviated l al::e l ing at ti:.e col umns is as fol l ows : 
Ex = Expressed by CO o~ XO 
.~ Ci:.rono l ogical number of the expressed fear 
Freq = Frequency of repor t (number of occurre:lces: 
Descrip t ion of fear Ereq 
XO No t me et i ng expectations/ Not liv::'ng up 
to standards 
XO Getting negat i ve evaluations 












co Personal failure/Failu re in executing his 05,62 3x 
tasks 69 
CO Getting punished for mistakes, the 10 ,37 2x 
subordinates make 
2n 
co j Looking foolish i n front of other 
soldiers 
xo Making wrong decisions 
XO Personal failure 
Xo CO an idiot/CO incapable of leading the 
unit 







':'hese significant fears will be ana:yzed as follows: Fears 
the CO and XO had i n conunon, :ears the CO and the XO had not 
'..n COITL'Tlon, fears re:ated to the workplace, fears not related 
to the workplace, and fears that stand out . 
Fears the CO and the XO have in conunon . 
The follo, .... ing two fears were reported by both officers: 
• Fear of personal failure 
• Fear of making wrong decisions 
Both fears seem to have their roots in the downsizing 
environment. The fear of personal fai lure relates to the fact 
that failures of any kind are apt to put the individual on the 
termination l ist or may result in negative eva:uations. The 
danger that even small mistakes or failures may result i n 





fear of making wrong decisions can be expla:'-ned basically the 
same way . The CO stated that "This is a zero defect Arrr.y" and 
refer!'ed to the possioility that w!'ong decis ions have the 
dangerous potential of affectieg the career negatively . In 
accordance with the downsizing efforts, tighter s e lecting 
criter i a for t he promotion boards have been established. One 
criterion is presumed -to be "zero mistakes". Mistakes Seem to 
place the 5:-11dier in an unfavorable position on the board. 
Everybody below a certain position will not be p:::-omoted . Not 
being promoted t ',o/ ice almost !'eS',llts in ea!' l y retirement . ':!'hus, 
as long as the reduction process is pursued under those 
conditions, t he soldiers l ive in the pe:t:1!1anent :ear ~_hat a 
mistake r:lay end their careers early. 
?!"ars the CC ar.d the XQ do not have incom:non 
The follow~ng list displays the significant fears of t he 
CO which he does not have inconunon with ~be XQ· 
• Fear of getting p u nished for mistaices the subordinates 
make 
• Fear of looking foolish in front of other soldiers 
with regard to the CO's pOSition and the responsibilities 
assigned to him , it appears reasonable for me t hat he 
expressed the fear of getting punished for mistakes his 
subordinates make . 7he concept that the mi l itary leader is 
entirely responsible for all activities in his unit can 
inspire that particular fear . Under this concept, a mistake of 
a subordinate has the same effect as if the mistake was made 
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by the CO. This, in turn, is the same as a persona:" failure, 
which inspi!:es the fear mentioned above. 
n·.e fear of l ooking foolish in front of other soldiers 
seem to be related to the fact that the CO wants to keep a 
perfect super~o!: appearance. He even developed a special 
technique to avo i d l apses in front of his First Sergeant . tie 
discussed each topic prior to the conversation with t:'1e First 
Sergeant with one other enlisted soldier to prepa!:e himself. 
:t seems he fears that any damage to his perfect superior 
i mage may undermine his authority. 
The following list disp l ays the significant fears of the 
XQ which he does not have j ncomrncn wi t:'1 the CO, 
• Fear of not meeting expectations/Fear of not living up to 
standards 
• Fear of getting nega::ive evaluations 
• Fear of having an idiot CO or a CO incapable of leading 
the unit 
• Fear of failure in the marriage or in educating the 
children 
The observation that stands out is the attitude of the XO 
towards meeting the ethical standards of the officer's eath 
and the expectations placed upon him. He expressed the fea!: of 
failing to comply with the standards eight times, which is the 
highest recorded value for frequency of occurrence. This 
demonstrates clearl y that this is an area of major concern to 
him . The e::hical values of the officer's oath are ::he 
fundamental basis for his behavior and work attitude. He wants 
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to satisfy t hos e values to the :Jighesr. extePot possible . 
t-lorcover, to serve his ~ountry hy serving in t. he A~y is his 
perso:lal cootribut.ion to robe democratic system of r.be United 
Stat es . In order to make a highly valuahle contribution he 
strives constantly tor a high level of perfection . He pursues 
an lr:morable system, but it poses appa:::ently a l ot of stress 
upon h "- rn, wh ich ultimat.ely stirr.ulau~ s t he fear of ta i ling to 
carr.ply wit-.n the standards . 
The reasons for the tea!: of gett i ng negative evaluat ion 
see:n to b e c l osely r-e l at:ed to his value system. A negative 
eval uation would be contrary to his constant endeavors to 
i mprove upon h is performance and indicate a f ai lure 1:1 
aC:"1 i ev i ng :"1i 5 high goals. A remarkable a"pcct i s fa!' me t::Je 
fact that the XO expressed that fear even though he '""a s in the 
process of :eavi:1g the Army soon. He did not need an 
evaluat i on for further caree:::: advancements i n the mil ita::::y. 
Nevertheless, it appears that his high ethical value system 
requires a cO:1stantly high performance. 
The fear of getting an idiot CO was a hig:'lly hypothetica l 
discussion and the XO emphasized that he was current l y very 
happy with the CO. This fear was generated by the possil.:i l ity 
that an incompetent CO :night take over command and endanger 
the l ives of t:'le so l diers. The fear originates in the XO' s 
strong feeling of responsibility for hi s subo rdinates. 
The fear of failure in the marriage or in educating the 
children clearly reflects his own chi l dhood experience . The 
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negative memory of his own education and the unpleasant family 
life shape his wishes to provide his childre:1 a better 
atmosphere to grow up and to be a better husband to his wife. 
Fears related to the worknlace 
Out of the ten fears nine are re l ated to t:!1e workplace. 
On l y the XO' s fear of faill:re in the marriage or in educatir.g 
the chi l dren is related to the private er.vironroent . This 
indicates that the workp l ace somehow produces a relativ ely 
high fear potential or can be viewed as the ori',jin of 
significant fears, An explanation can be found in the pressure 
and the Llncertainty the downsizing procedures place on the 
soldiers , The ~ollowing ~ears are direct l y or indirect::'y 
related to t he downsizing environment: 
• Making wrong decisions 
• Personal failure 
• Getting punished for mistakes the subordinates ma:<;e 
• Not meeting expectations 
• Getting negative evaLlations 
From the table above (the abbreviation of Appendix C) 
see that s even out of ten fears are related to the downsizing 
environment. This is a significant proportion that clearly 
identifies the source 'for the fears as being the uncertainty 
embedded in the current reduction program. 
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Fear~ot related to th~ 
The oely fear that is re l ated to another environment than 
t :'le work: environment is the XO' s fea::: of failure in the 
marriage 0::" i:1 educating the cbi l dren . The orig'--n of this fear 
18 his unpleasant childhood exper.::.ence as discussed above. The 
CO expressed not one significant fear that is not related to 
the wor.Lcplace . 
5'ears that stand out 
The !'ear that stands out '--8 the XO's fear of not meeting 
e xpectations. ':'he Frequency va lue is eight and thus the 
highest one recorded. This d emonstrates clea:d y the extreme 
importance this fear r.as to the XO. He [nentioned frequent l y 
that. wit:'! regarrl. to the execution of his job, strict 
adherence to the value system is a "conditio sine qua non" for 
him. To strive permanently for such a pe!:'fect level of 
performance inheres th? potentia l for fai l ures which , in turn, 
can st imulate the fear of those failures. 
Another point that stands out. is the total number of 
expressed fears; 70. Even the reduced number of different 
fears (51) appears stil l to be high. From those data it would 
appear that these two peopl e are far from the optima l 
situation described and required by Deming's TQL philosophy. 
To clarify this point, it is necessary to dist inguish between 
Deming' 8 request to eliminate the "fear of speaking up" and 
the entire array of fears whic~ may be present in a workplace . 
TQL concentrates on a single type of fear, while my !:'esearch 
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is geared towards discovering al l possible fears present i:1 ar. 
indi vidual wo::::k:.er. T:'1e TQL theory ::'mpl ies that the "fear of 
speaking up" is rooted in bad management practices originated 
i n the act i vities which govern the ope:::-ation of an 
o::cganization. The fears I have detected may also originate 
somep l ace else. 
C. EXPRESSED FEARS IN RELATION TO THE FEAR MODEL 
In Appendix D, I present the 70 fears and their relation 
to the fear model. I added a col ur:u1., labe l ed "model '0, wh i ch 
reflects the assignment of al l 70 fears to O!le ci:::-c l e or area 
of the fear model w:'1ich : introduced i r. the cr.apt.er 
methodology. The mode l allows for i nteresting findings, which 
I will present in this paragraph. The fo l lowing list 
summarizes the resu l ts numerically. 
Expressed fears -' n rel a'" ion t o the fear model 
The abbreviated labe l ing in t:he columns is as fo l lows; 
Model = Circ l e or area of the fear model 
Co - Number of fears expressed by the CO which relate to a 
particular circle or area of the fear model 
XO _ Number of fears expressed by the XO which re l ate to a 
particula!' circle or area of the fear model 
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Total 34 36 
The xo repcrted 23 fears which origi!'lated in himself, five 
mere than the CO. T:lis h':'gher number seem to be related to the 
XO's fear of !'lot living up to e xpec taticns which he mentioned 
eight times. T:'le repetition of this important. fear may be the 
reason for the high n·.l!l1ber of reports for circle B. 
The numbers of entries for the circle C (fear inherent in 
the situaticn) is nearly equally distributed between bcth 
officers. The difference is only two entries, which is 
insignificant. 
If we corr.pare the entries for all three circles we see 
that the !1wnbers of entries for each circle are ve:::y close. We 
got 18 for A, 23 for E, and 20 for C. Thus, most of t he fears 
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reported by the individuals allowed for a c l ear ass~gn.:nent to 
just one origin. Th ey were either originated in the person 
himself or t~e situation. In each case, it was possibl e to 
dist i nguish c l early. 
The nurr.bers of entries for the over l ap areas are very low. 
For the areas I and III and they are five and four 
respective l y. 
Tying the previous :indings for the circles a n d t h e two 
overlap and I II together, the :ollo· ... ing 
interpretations can be made: 
f-i rst· Pot h officers assign distinct orioins t o tt:eir 
Both officers are individuals with strong characters. They 
are confident about their skills and abilities, they are 
competent in their professions, and they take on new 
ass i gnments more as a challenge than a threat. Their abilities 
to distinguish relatively clearly between their own strengths 
and weaknesses and problems originated somewhere else (in the 
situation) allow them to assign the origin of fears clearly to 
their own person or to outside circumstances. They seem to 
know with a high degr~e of certainty, whet:,er the prob l em is 
originated in themselves or whet her the reason is or i ginated 
in another person, a regulation, a procedure, or any other 
type of situation outside themselves or their direct control. 
This abi l ity to dis::.inguish objectively reduc,=s the number of 
fears assigned to areas of overlap. Those areas represent 
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fears which have dual origins. The l ow numbers in the overlap 
areas and the high number of entries in the circles indica t e , 
t hat this two interviewees are hig:'11y professio::lill in :he':'r 
jobs and have bot:'1 il strong abi l ity to identify the S8urces Qf 
problerr,s which stimul ate their fears. 
Se.cond: The relat ' onshin petween the CO and the XQ aopears 
to bp harmonious arid tu a high decrree free of 
During the interview process I didn't fi::ld any fears 
attributable to t~e areas II and IV. These an' as ref lect f ears 
which are inherent in the CO ~ the XO. Area IV also includes 
the fear originated in the situation , but for simplicity I 
exclude that particular factor :or this part of the analysis. 
For now it is important that the overl ap areas I I and I V 
include the fears inherent in QQ.t.h individuals. NQne of the 
officers expressed fear which disp l ayed ~he 
characteristics of those t wo areas . A variety 0: factors can 
be employed to interpret this phenorr.enon: .Ei.l::..§.t, no ma j or, 
unsolved conflicts exist between thos e two pecple. Second , 
their c:1.aracters are similar to a h igh degree. Ihi.rQ, t~eir 
individual interests and active engagement in conflict so l ving 
i s high. E..m1.tlh, their conflict solving skills are well 
developed. tillh , both favor open communication. 
The reasons why no fears for areas I I and IV 
expressed , can be examined by taking a closer l ook at their 
characters, attitudes, and work styles. Their most important 
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asset is their extremely high dedication to their count ry and 
their jobs. This is the majo:::- reason for L"1eir r err,arkably 
motivation and is also :::-eflected in their positive wo r k 
eth i cs . They work overtime w:"1enever it seems necessary. Their 
focus i s clearl y on their mission and the r elated tasks . Eoth 
persons confron t upcoming tasks ar.d problems i=edia t ely. The y 
address each issue in an ob j ective and factual way with the 
c l ear de t ermination of fi::1ding tr.e most appropriate so l uti o n 
as soon as poss i ble. Both seemed to be willing and able to 
work thro ugh conf licts and solve d i sagreements for the benefit 
of the entire company . Nothing is swept under the carpet or 
delayed more t han necessary. This work style avoids the 
accumulation of long-term problems. 
A:10ther remarkable factor is their concern for their 
subordinates. Both agreed t r,at t heir COITL"1'.on focus was 
provide optimal service and assistance for the soldiers il"!. 
trans i t to their civilian destinations. The amount of 
paperwork and red tape was quite unusual for these two Rangers 
who were trained t o serve in combat units . Nevertr.eless, both 
qu ickly acquired t he new skills necessary to handle t he 
uncommon assignments properly. 
Al l these factors combined provide for a solid basis for 
t;he ir work in the compa ny . In a ddi t i o n, the y are o pen tor 
interpers onal communicat ion and invi te t heir subordinates to 
cooperate i n a system wh i ch is geared towards creative problem 
solving. Th i s is especially true for the interac t ion of CO, 
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XO, and First Sergeant . Rya:l and Oestreich [Ref . 15 ] mentioned 
t.."lat open co:nnunication is a crucial prerequisite for t!1e 
e l imir.ation of fear in the workp l ace. This status of open 
commu::lication is present i n the interaction of the CO and XO . 
For example, t he CO asked the XO frequently to submit 
suggestions for improvements whenever he might encounter 
problems in the company . The CO went on to include his own 
person into his otfer, inviting the XO for criticism about t he 
CO's behavior. This proves that the CO knows how to appl y the 
concep t of open com.L1unication i n an effort to arri ve at a 
fea r les s work atmosphere. From the XO's comments we know tha:: 
t.."le co responded in general posi tively to his suggestions. No 
case has been reported where the XO tell victim to the "kill 
the r:tessenger" syndrome. The personalities, characters, work 
style, and specifically the interaction of these two officers 
provide the ground for a harmonious work atmosphere . 
Compete:1ce, mutual trust and acceptance, respect for each 
other and other individuals, and dedica c ion for the common 
mission are vital ingredients for harmonious and fearless 
workplace. Those elements are present in this cor:tpany to a 
high degree. This is the reason why CO and XO are not fearful 
of each other and thus, why no fears have been reported, which 
related to the overlap areas II a n d IV . 
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D. VARIATIONS IN TERMINOLOGY 
Both officers admitted a va1:"iecy of fears. I:1 most of 
thei~ desc:::-iptior.s they used the word fear wi':.hout hesitation . 
But at some points t hey refused to use the word fear at all. 
Two variants or substitutes were used nost :=requently for the 
word fear to characterize a particul ar situation, behavior or 
individual fee l ing: the first group consisted of the words 
~, ~, ~,' or~. The meanings of those words 
are c l ose to t he meani:1g of the ter:n fear, but they are l ess 
intensive. The other group was comprised of the :.erns ~, 
Q~, 9..Q.il, ~, competition, or ~. Those 
terms are neutral and have no direct l ink to the word fear. 
One question was, why they used other terms fo!" situations 
usua l ly considered or apt to stimul ate fear? Another questio:l 
was if it was their intention to disgu i se that they were 
fearful in that particular situation? 
For example, they were talking about c hall enges rather 
than threats. The CO as well as the XO characterized new 
orders or changes of old directions as a positive stimulus. 
Even a high frequency of changes o~ a high degree o~ 
difficulty included did not lead to a negative attitude . Their 
professional attitude and their pride of their skills, 
abi l ities and knowledge determines their positiv" ;;I. t ti.tud~ 
towards new situations. The CO described a case where he 
forced the XO to improve the display of the safety regulations 
in the company buildings. He asked for improvements without 
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clea:::ly speci :ying the end product or the desi:::ed way t.O 
achieve the re:::r-l::"~. W:len tr.e XO requested more s;uidance, t~'1e 
Clsked hirr.: "Do you '...-ant me t::; do your job?" Lack of 
g',lidiince i" ger.erdlly considered t-o be J.p:: to creott-e fear ir. 
a ""'orker, becClu"e t_he degree of uncerta:'..nt.y is :'..ncreii,,:'r.g. Clut 
the XO viewed t-he requi:::ement. as a cr.all'O':lge, rdther L'1an 
d ::r.r'O'at. The r.igr. degree Qf l:.r.certair.ty did r.ct "C'l.re him. In 
h:'.." op:'..r.ion, he wO'-l::"d be "a:e, if r.e ~d\re :'..t ' ... r.:'..s beC't 
shot." Ee expected the to accept ~'1is result:o;, if he offer'O'd 
a ~hO·.l~httu::" dnd tr.oroughly carried QU~ sol·,ltior., or tQ 
specify clear::"y the desired cor-::-ectiQ:1s Qr rr.od:'..f:'..catin"", 
L'1:'..s inst<:tnce, L'1e s::;luti::m was of mc:.ch higher qc:.a::..ity tr.a:1 
L'1e CO r.ad expected. 
The next two exa:nples are closely re::"ated tn each nt:'1er. 
Both Qfficers men':ioned L'1eir concerns about :'..n,,·-lffic:'..en:. 
co:-rmunicat:'..Qn. They we-::-e also concerned about having tec 
~i:.tle i:1fonnation to prepare dec:'..sior.s. Corrrnun:'..ca::ion 
problems of various types are genera::"ly considered a poss:'ble 
source for fear and dissatisfaction. T::; be disconr.ec':ed :rom 
major info:::::nation flows 0-::- to be dependent on preselected ::;r 
:Ltered data feelings of ',mcertainty, 
h e l p l e ssness, o r isolation. If intonnation is considered a 
vi~al part of their daily lives and t~'1US an i!llpor:'ant 
determinan:: for success or failure, those feelings can 
stimulate fear. 80th officers were reluctant to use the te.!:IT. 
tear in L'1is context. They viewed intonnation p="oblems 
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challenge. They saw themselves in the positlon to solve the 
prob l e:r. in one of two possible ways: first, they wO·.lld try to 
regain access to the info:!:1l1ation source or to get the needed 
information th:::,ough different cha:1nels. Seco:1d, if the 
p!'evious methods did not yield any acceptab l e results. they 
wO'.lld just work with the information at hand. They recognized, 
that their decisions. mig:"1t be less accu:::,ate under such 
conditions. Both stressed they would not feel any kind of 
fea!'. They would be, at most, concerned about the deficiency 
and would t:::'y hard to overcome it as soon as possible. They 
viewed this problem as "kind of usual" in the world; something 
they have to l ive wi th and to cope with. 
I want to apply two different approaches in an attempt to 
explain this differences in terminology, the substitution of 
:1eutral terms Ear the emotion loaded word fear. Both ideas 
will be explained in the next two paragraphs. 
The first approach: These observations can be explained by 
l ooking at the relat .ionship between the intensity of the 
stimulus, the level of fear sensed by the individual, and the 
subj ect, which evokes fear. The intensity of the stimulus 
reflects the strength of the impact, the stimulus r.as on the 
person. The level of fear sensed by the individual describes 
the minimum intensity. a st i mu l us mus t havQ to 6!v okco f eo .. ", i.n 
a particu1ar individual. Moreover, it displ ays the increase in 
fear, if the intensity of the stimulus escalates. People 
differ from each other with respect 'ir individual 
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emot'--onal sensitivity. They will :,espond differently to the 
saIT,e stimuli. One person may be sca:'ed very soon, wh i le 
another persa:!. will disp l ay no s igns of fear at all i n the 
same situation. Subjects wh ich evoke fear are the description 
of the various mental themes an individual ha s developed over 
time, a:J.U tr.eir capabi l ities to initiate a fearful response i n 
that particu l ar person. One person may be scared by the h ig;'1 
t-:::-affic intensi:.y in c::.tics, whi l e ano t her individua l enjoys 
driving in overcrowded st:-eets. Unce:::tainty may be a serious 
fear st i mu l us for somebody who has experienced dangerous 
s ituat ions re::"ated to uncertainty in the past . Uncertainty may 
be a neutra l or even" positive (cha ll enginq?) stimulus fa-=: 
s omebody e l se . ':'he subje::t and the l eve l of fear, can be 
positive as well as negative. «or a certai:J. set of conditions 
people react differently. This means, t hat for a give::! 
s ubject, under a given stimulus intensi ty, cne person may 
e xperience a posit:ive feeli:J. g l ike excitement , JOY , or 
pl easure. An exa.ll1ple would be ho-=:seback riding. The first 
person may be scared to death, sitting on a herse, which moves 
fast. &""1other person enjcys this situation as very exciting. 
The" individual fear constr-Jct" reflects the individual l evel 
of teartul response to a given intensity at a stimulus i n a 
certain subject area. · With regard to t he two officers this 
would mean, t hat they probably need very intensive stimuli t o 
react with fearful emotions. Their thresholds may have been 
raised to relatively high l eve l s through the trainin<,j programs 
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and their specific experiences in the Army. Their individual 
percep tions of their competence and their self confidence t:1ay 
g i ve them very strong feelings of security with respect of 
their abi li ties to execu::e their tasks successfully. In this 
case, every st'--muli b.:; l ow this threshold would not be viewed 
as a fear stimu':'i. The officers ',;auld perce:"ve the stimuli as 
sornethir.g neutral and respond accordingly. Certain subJects 
don't seem to stimulate fear in this t wo ir.divid'..lals. Agair., 
I assume that their training programs and their past 
experiences provided a very comprehensive basis of knowledge 
to draw from. 30th have deve loped a hug:'! variety of response 
patterns app l icable to <.lpcoming situations. They are trained 
co use ::heir knowledge to confront probl ems and challenges and 
generate thorough so l utions. The combination of available 
knowledge, their feelings "we can do it", and their positive 
att'..tude towards new situations seems to be one reason why 
they don't experience fear so early. The fol:'owing quotation 
supports my idea. The CO stated: "r like to consider 
uncertainty as a c hallenge not as a handicap." He e n joyed che 
freedom he had as CO and experimented with his '..deas and his 
knowledge to solve problems. His successes, in turn, 
encouraged him in continuing to pursue this at ti tude. 
The second apprOgeb· This is a hypothesis and may lead to 
further research in this field. Based on the interview data 
gathered during the third interview sessions, I assume that 
the Army educates ::.heir soldiers not ::0 show fear in front of 
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o::r.2r soldi~rs. T!iis is espcci3.~ly true for s-.lperio:::-s when 
s·~bo.::d::la:_F;s are present. Bo::-.h :ntervie· .... ees rnentiollej tr.at 
tr.ey were tra:ned to cO:lt-:-ol tr.eir t~ars. Fear- wanagement was 
ar. important elerr,e::1t ~n t:'1eir Ra::1ger training p.::ograms. For 
situations w:'1ere tr.e fear centre: r.lechar.isf':l wight no:: work 
sc.ft~ciently they were told ::0 s\~pp:::-ess that fear. The :"d.ea 
tehind t:'1~S iestruction was the ass-1:nption tr_a:: if the leac.er 
shews fear I the s'~!bordinates cou:d easily se:"zed by fear. ':'his 
e==ect was assumed to be cl:Du:"ative and may f'.x.a:"ly rf'S-.l:"t ill 
pa::1:"c, because thr= treops lese cor.:idence in their leade::::-s. 
T:'1us, tr.t-' appearance of a leader :'1a5 to be fearl",ss all the 
t:"me when he is ' .... itr. his :.::::oops" This theo::::y was s:.atF;d very 
dras:.ically by Genera:" Pa:.ton in r.is pri:lcip:"es tor :n:..l::'tary 
:"eaders:"1':'p rRet. ~odern leadersr.ip t:"18criF;s '::ave-:- the 
posi.tion that leaders should be mere open ar.d even sha:::e 
weak:1esses, perhaps including his :ears, ' .... .:.:.:"1 their 
subordina:.es. Today it ::'s considered cruc':'al :or leade-:-ship 
success :.hat :.he relationship be:.' .... een superior and subordinate 
':'8 based on elements like mutual trus:: and understanding and 
"::open cOrnr:lunication. A future research qc;.estion night be te 
w:"1at extent "Patton's Rule" is still shaping today's Arr:ty 
otticer's education? 
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E. THE ROLE OF FEAR. I N MANAGEMENT 
In their bock "Driving Fear out of the Workplace", Ryaw 
and Oestreich made the rerr.arkable observation, that managers 
view fear as an a?propriate managerr.ent tool. The utilization 
of fear is considered helpful in supporting productioll al".d 
performance improvements . Those managers ho l d the opinion, 
t hat the individual worker could be driver. towards h'--gher 
production goals by applying the correct "fear evoking method" 
and administer it in exact doses [Ref. 15:p. xv l . This 
at t itude is in sharp contrast to Deming's requirement to 
eliminate fear from the workplace . His theory is supported by 
the research of Ryan and Oestreich, who proved the .-tegative 
impac t of fear on factors l ike productivity, satisfaction, 
quality, and overall performance. One of their research 
question was, whether people believed that fear wou l d have 
positive aspects. The vast majori t y of responses were 
negative. Some people agreed in general, but limited the 
usefulness to self-imposed fear. In this case, fear could be 
a positive motivat or. Sununarizing can be said, that a:1 
overwhelming agreement was, that ro •• • externally imposed fear 
is a negative force with destruct i ve long-tenn consequences." 
[Ref . 15:p. 681. 
I n the fourth interview, as well as in the final meet ing, 
the CO admitted that he used fear in guiding !'lis subordinates. 
He made clear tha t the general application of fear as a 
management tool was unacceptable for h im and t hat he wou ld use 
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positive r e ip. torcemeGts in 90% of d ll cases. He favored 
positive ma:1agemen t tools like rewards to guide sol diers. But 
he made the observation, t hat 1:1 certain silua:::ions ar-d fo:::-
certain soldiers (the ca. 10%, " ... who don't understa:1d 
anything else.") t he use of fea:::- was apt:ropriate. It was his 
Ot:i:lion that, in those situations , the lise of fear r.ad been 
the only ~romising method to accomplish his goa l s. He provided 
a var ie ty of examples, where he described i:1 detail his 
techniques (see fourth interview and final meeting) . He a l so 
offered exact reasons why he used fear under specif ic 
circurr,stances. He n ever used fear for its own sake. Unde:::- edch 
condition he had a sfJecific goal in mind, and applied fear 
techniques purpOsef'Jlly and wel l staged . Some of his goals 
• to get pecple's attention, 
• to educate subordinates, 
• to ma:<;:e individuals remember things better, 
• to emphasize the importance of a n issue, 
• to demonstrate possible (negative) consequences, 
• to discipline subordinates, and 
• to motivate the "knucklehead type so:'dier". 
H.is inter.tior.s were always positive and that made him believe 
that the application 0: fear was justifiable and legitimate. 
Apparently, he never experienced any notable set-backs tha t 
may have made him review his opinion. Even my ques t ion, 
whether he could imagine any other approaches to substitute 
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for fear in the future, did no':. yield a shift in thinking. I n 
his belief system, the lim~ted use of fear see:ns to be 
generally :'egitimized . It would be an interest'--ng future 
research question to find out if the use of fear is widely 
accepted practice in the Anny cul ture (possibly preserved 
through training , education, general ly acceptable behavior 
codes, etc. 1 . 
Even though the CO favored positive reinforcements for the 
majority of his soldiers and was successful in app l ying it, 
t his approach did not seem to work for a pa!'ticuldr group o f 
soldiers. It seems that the general requirement of Deming' s 
poi!'.t number eight "Drive out fear" has some limi tations in 
its real world application which should be investigated more 
thoroughly in the future. In this environment the idea worked 
for ca. 90\ of the sol diers, which is a remarkab l y high 
number. The comment of the CO that the negative reinforcements 
had to be used for the remaining 10\, " ... who don't understand 
dnything else", indicates those limi tat ions . In the resea::ched 
environment, obedience and strict compliance with rul es and 
regulations were vital requirements to sustain the required 
l evel of l aw and order in the company. The system was built 
upon those requirements and derived its strength from them. 
Thus, the tolerance level for noncompliants was extremely low. 
The leaders were forced by their missions, their superiors dnd 
by regulations to assure compl iance of their troops. The tools 
which were made available to them to attain this goal included 
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a variet_y of pos i tive dnd negative re int orcement s. The 
application of the nesati v e i:1struments was necessary in some 
instances to achieve the mission. I t seems that the 
presenrat i on o f la',o/ and order is of such ~i'Jh priority in t he 
A.::TI1y that the u se of negative management tools includ ing fear 
is viewe d as a ppro?riate. 
F. DOES THE CO'S LEADERSHIP STYLE FOSTER A FEARLESS SUPERIOR 
- SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP? 
I extracte d f rom the intervie· ... inf:~)):matio:1 which re la ted 
the CO' s l eadership styLe . The focus of t h e fo l lowing 
ana lys is will be on the quest ion how the lear..ers h ip sty l e 
affects tbe relationsr,ip of the CO and t he XO . The data :nay 
allow some analysis for the company as well, bu t t h is portion 
is excluded from my analysis . Tr.e subsequent l ist displays the 
fi:1di:1gS: 
• CO created an atmosphere of mutua l trust through ope:1 
communicat ion., extensive informat.ion !:low upwards and 
downwards, a:1d ope:1 door policy . 
• :-Ie conveyed the company's mission: We assist soldiers in 
their transit process from t he mi litary to the civi l i an 
life. 
• He stated goals and ob j ectives l i ke: provide maximum 
administrative support to the soldiers or do all t he 
paperwork correct the first time. 
• CO communicated his requirements: correct :nilitary 
a t titude and behavior , strict adherence to all regulat ions 
and proc Pcdures. 
• He al:'owed amp l e freedom for organizing work and arrang i ng 
work flows. 
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• He encot:raged innovation and process improvements. 
• He gave a "fair second chance" when a r:1istake was rr.ade. 
• CO solicit-ed crit icism about his own behavior from the XO. 
These actions created an atmosphere in w:1. i ch tr,e XO felt 
comfortable to war.';:, The XO mentioned frequent l y that t:'1e CO's 
leadership sty l e did not stimul ate any fear in him. The CO 
created a culture where the XO exactly understood the 
company's mission and could der::ve his own tasks and du t ies. 
The CO specified the cormnon goals and ir.vited the XO to 
participate to a h igh degree in leading :.he cOr:1pany (" .. . let 
us lead this company as a team."j. The XO felt free co 
experiment and to provide inputs for changes or improvements . 
The overall organizational setting is characterized by the 
c l arity of the mission as well as the subsequent goals and 
objectives, involvement of subordinates in the improvement o~ 
the work process, and the freedom to experiment wit:1.in the 
Army limitations (regulations and procedures) . This l eadership 
style clearly eliminates fear and is the basis for beneficial 
team endeavors. This behavior of the CO is in line with 
Aguayo's view of a fearless workplace: "Management may not be 
able to eliminate all fear from the lives of it's employees 
but it can eliminate the sources of fear bui lt into the 
management structures .[Ref. 3:p. 1B91. A comment of the CO is 
worth mentioning at this point. He was aware of the f ive 
different c.ype s of power (re:::erent , pOSition, reward, 
coercive, expert) and difi"rent leadership styles. He stated 
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tha:: he preferred::o cr,()ose the leadership style in a::cordance 
wit:"1 ::he requi::::enents for a pa::::::::'c.l:ar s::'::"Jaticn. 3E" did not 
app 1 Y aee style al: tr.e ti:ne. He favored the refere:lt and tr.e 
expert power, becauo;e he viewed those as ::hc DOSt eftect::'ve 
Tn cer::ai:1 instances he w()"Jld resort te positioc, 
::::eward, and coercive pu .... er, if :::"1e circuIT_stances requirec. i::. 
'T'hls was lirr.i::ec. sitl:atL~ns where law aej orjcr ::he 
disclpline ha:1 vic 1 ated and needed to be enfo:-ccc 
stric::ly. 
G. THE INFLUENCE OF THE DOWNSIZING ENVIRONMENT ON THE 
I l.'"TERV IEWEES 
The G.ownsizicg enGeavor e: :::"1e US gove:-nmer.:: :"1ac. an irrpact 
0:1 t~e two ottice::::s. 30th me:1tioned tr.e fear of getting en t:"1e 
ter:ninaticn list. The prOCed"~lreS e: tr.e personnel departmen::s 
::0 n-'(!"Jce t:"1e armed :orces was perceived as too :l::::astic. :,r.e 
"zero defect Army" as tr.e CO named it, c::::ea::es a lot 0: 
l.:ncertair.::y a:ld fear 'in t~e individual seldiers. ':'r.ey fea:::: 
t:"1at t.te slightest mistake :"1as the petential to bri:1g them on 
the termi:latien list, which would res"~llt in an early 
retirement. T:"1is prccedl.:re can, l.:nder some cor.ditions, include 
financial lesses. The officers adjusted thei:::: behavior tc get 
as close as possible to the • zero defect cOITpany" and avoid 
any mistake. Even the XO, who was in the process of leaving 
the Army soon, mentioned that he felt affected by the climate 
of the downsizing envirorunent. The data base (2 office:::-si is 
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teo small co generalize these findings for t~e entire Army or 
all services. It may be an interesting future researc!1 topic 
to study t::-Je impact of the downsizir-g on the individc:al 
so':'diers on a broader basis. 
H. NINTH INTERVIEW: THE VIEW OF DAVID WILLARD, PH. D., 
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST 
Duri!1g the interview process I felt that it. :nig:'1t be 
interesting and beneficial for the study to have the data 
analyzed from a psychological point of view. My approach is 
almost entirely basE7d on my manager i al and behavioral 
knowledge. As pointed out in the chapcer about the conceptual 
basis of fear, psychology is a maj or element necessary for o:.he 
comprehensive understanding and explanation of different 
fears. In an attempt to integrate the psychological part to 
some extent i!1to this study, I asked Dr. David Willard, former 
Chief of Psychology Services of Fort. Ord, to review the 
interview data and record whatever appeared interesting or 
surpriSing to him. Willard was a "neutral observer" of the 
data who didn't know the two officers personally. Later I 
conducted an interview with him. In this paragraph I present 
the major findings from this interview session. 
In his introductory statement Willard stated that, based 
on the data, he felt he knew the XO very well but the CO less 
well. From a psychological standpoint, the data provided by 
the XO were much more descriptive of his own person and his 
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pers~.mality than ~_hose of the CO. Tr.e CO t alked mue:'"! more 
about his mi litary r elated fears and concerns whereas the XO 
included more data about his private li fe. 
From ~lillard' s c ommentaries, I selected several points for 
p r esentation here. 
His first comment was about the fact that the CO attempted 
twice to use the researcher for investigatio:1s. He was as 
surprised as I was, when the CO ilsked me to clarify two 
problems for him. Willard stated that this ' .. 'as an unusual case 
for h im.' 
I':. , ... as interesting t:'1at the CO would use the researcher 
to his advantage. For exanple , the CO had asked the XO to 
cffer suggestions for- improvements in the CO's behav i or 
and his 'Jlay of doing business. The XO was never 
forthcoming with comments . The CO requested the researche!' 
t.o inves t igat-e this Ear him. In anot-her instance the CO 
wade many corrections to papers the XO hild submitted to 
him. The XO never responded t- o this. The CO wa s '..,ondering 
how the XO felt about ~hese correc~ions. He asked the 
int.e~iewer t o try :'0 find out hew the XO fe l t about t.his 
My analysis showed tha.c: the downS i zing endeavors of the Army 
have some i mpact on the twc officers. ':'heir fear of fail u re 
seemed to be increased , because failures have il much higher 
harmLll poten::ial under those conditions than ever before. 
willard made t'..,o corrunents on that issue and goes actually 
beyond r:ly findings and interpretation. His comments underscore 
the dimension, the downsizing may have on these two officers. 
He goes on to presume that simi l ar effects may be obseD/ed 
wit.h other military personnel and even in the other seD/ices: 
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I was surprised at how frequently the fear of downsiz i ng 
and possible loss of career were me n tioned throug:"lOu t Lle 
interviews by both the CO and the xo. Considerin g t he 
chain of command, I wO:1der how t his influences t h e 
performance and mora l e of the NCOs and enl isted men i n 
this company, and perhaps t h e entire Army and other 
branches of the military. 
As the Army undergoes the process of downsiz i ng, it does 
sound as if considerable fear :'s unavoidably created. ?or 
example, b o t h the CO and XO repeat e dly expre sse d fears 
pertaining t o the:' r careers. The CO expressed a 
considerable concern t hat paperwork had t o be submit ted 
with no errors. The f ear was e xpressed that even one bad 
mark against an off i cer could be reason to have h is career 
termi nated. These fears dot.:btless refl",::t the ct.:rren t 
situation wiL'lin the Army, i.e., tne downs i zJ..ng. 
Nonet heless there seem t o be fears "from above " wh ich 
c ause subordinates to approac:'1 the i r work with a large 
e l e ment of uncertainty. Once again, I would wonder abou t 
the effect t h is has on job performance and on morale. I 
a l so wonder if the Army is prov i ding adequate guidance 
about :'10W to perform ones j ob in the face of very real 
t h reats to care ers. An i mportant issue for me ::' s whethe r 
or not the Army is perhaps risking losing high quality 
soldiers by failing to provide reassurance and guidance 
where it might be possible for the Army t o do so. 
In another conunent Wi llard related the atypica l high 
awareness of the decision-making proc ess which the 
officers mentioned to the downsizing environment and 
ultimately to their fears of fa i lure: 
I was surprised that these two officers were aware of 
the decision - making process to such a hig:'1 degree. Each 
officer, but particularly the XO, seemed quite concerned 
with having the proper amount of data before making 
decisions, and both were concerned that their decision-
making result in decisions that were fair to the sol diers 
in question. Decision making clearly requires reviewi ng 
data and an active decision -making process, but it also 
requires an intuitive step. These officers seemed less 
inc l ined toward use of intuition. Perhaps because t h ey 
were aware that they might be cal l ed upon to justify any 
given decision, both off i cers had formulated their own 
method for maki ng each decision based on presentab l e data. 
This would serve the purpose of protecting the individual 
soldier's career (about whom the decision was being made ) . 
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This ol::servati..::m 1S very simi~ar :::0 Dy find~ngs. ',hl~ard gOES 
ace step :urLher in asking what effect L'1=-s =-ncreao;ed fear 
level :n::'gh::: have ':JIl job perfO:::1llar.ce and morale. rr.e 
;JerforDance of these two officers d'--d:1' t seerr. to r.e affecLed 
negaLi..ve~y. 50th reported cO:1s:::a:1tly l".ig:'1 dedica:::io:1 a:1G. 
· ... ill:'..ngness to E,)<,;,:::forrt'. well. : relaLe t:'1:'..s to :::heir extrerr.ely 
strong c:'1a:::o.o:::er8. Di:fe r",nt pl';'r"CIlS, with ' ... eaker cr.arac:::e r ~, 
y-:'e~d redLc:::ions i:1 performance coder such fea r:u:'-
::::onditi:Jos. 
I recog:lized ar. ,i..n:::e:::es:::ing deve~oprr.e:1t in I'l"illa rd ';; 
opini..on about the XC. H::'s view of the XO changed while he was 
reading the ::'nterviews, based on the presentation 0: new daLa. 
While he sta:::ted out with the -opinion that :he XO seemed to be 
a fearful :gersor., wr.ic~ was contrary to my op:"nion, r.is :inal 
sLaLe:nent revealed tr.e same finding. We bot:'! formed Lhe 
impression :hat the XO was somebody whe beoame increas:'ngly 
interested in discussing the fear topic rather than be ing a 
fearful man: 
In reading from the first interview, it sounded as if he 
was afraid, i.e., he states in general that people ~now 
fear on a dai~y basis. I wondered what effect this migh:. 
have on his work? On his self esteem? I s he ge:t i ng enough 
guidance? Reassurance? However, as I cont i nued to read the 
XO's interviews, I formed the opinion that the XO is not 
a fear:ul man, but rather someone willing to d i scuss :ear, 
but who -:'s not particularly affected by fear. 
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willard made a similar observation as I did with regard te 
the willingness of both officers to present thei,::, thoc:ghts to 
a "stranger" 
80th office'::'s we~e quite open about aspects of their 
personal lives. The CO talked about the importance of h~s 
family relative to the milita~y and his career. The XO 
ta l ked aDo'-1t being engaged and shared the feelings his 
fiance has about his involvement in the military. Also 
Doth officers were quite open about their working 
r e l aticnship wi th each other, and both clearly respected 
and wo'::'ked well with each otr.er. It seemed as if both 
officers four.d that the inte::view provided an opportunity 
to discuss important topics, a:1d it s u rprised me that the' 
wO'-1ld do so to sor:teone who would be putting thei 
"thcug:'1ts 11 en paper. 
'di l lard and I agreed that t:'1e introductory mee ting was very 
helpful to establish trustfc: l relationships between the two 
interviewees and me. We also discussed the fact that the 
researche r was an international student and I asked him to 
comment on that. He mentioned that t he topic was not 
particula~ly sensitive in a national or mil i tary sense. Thus, 
the differences in nationality didn't seem to have much impact 
en the research and especially on the interpersonal 
relationships. Mr. willard assumed that tr.is differences r:tight 
:"1ave Deen a positive stimulus for the two officers making the 
interview process more interesting for them. 
An i nteresting remark was related to the XO' s fear of the 
public reaction when somebody discovered that h e was in the 
military. Willard was skeptical about this conunent: 
I was surprised that the XO stated that he fears public 
reaction. He apparently believes that the public looks 
unfavorably upon men in the Army and seems to base th i s 
belief on how the public reacted to soldiers dur ing and 
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after the Vietr.am war. I am of the 001nion that. this 
b e lief is no longer valid. Fer one thing'- th e Vi etnam war, 
wh i ch was so very unpopular .. ended twenty yea!:"" ago. Young 
people nave grawn up wlth no memory of that war. 
Additionally, the events ir. the Gulf Wa!' appear to have 
renewed a sense of pride on the part of the civilian 
popu l ation t.oward the Arr:ty in particular. and the military 
in general. 
This point wi l l remain unc l ear, b"..lt, despite Wil l ard's doubts. 
it is my impression t hat the fear of the XO was substantiat e d 
by real occurrences. M01:"eover , it seems to me that ever. if L'1e 
young generatio!1 was brought up without direct influence of 
the war, there are still many aged people around who may carry 
hostile or an i mosity feel1ngs or attitudes with the:n. The XO 
IT,ay fear the confrontat~on with this type of individual. 
',ol'i l larc. expressed' a contrary opinion regarding the XC:' s 
state:nent t.hat Eear can never be reduced to zero. Ee comIEented 
that fear can be e liminated. Wil l ard has been with the Army 
for a long time and knows the t.raining envi ronment as weI:.. as 
the combat situation. He mentioned that 
... according to the interview, the XO seer:1ed of th e 
opinion that fear can never be reduced to zero. 'L'1is 
attitude .surprised me. The XO appeared to take pride in 
being a n Anr.y Ranger, and as a psycho l ogist, I would 
expect that a person trained as a Ranger would also be 
taught that proper training can eliminate c e rtain types of 
fear. I ndeed it would seem a highl y desirable goal of 
certain military training to "fine tune" soldiers such 
that they would approach situations free of fear, i.e., 
situations normally conducive to the production of fear. 
From my point of view his statement that fear can be entirely 
e1 iminated through proper training methods is surprising. I 
got the impression from the literature study that individuals 
!:lay learn to control fear to a certain extent, but that the 
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entire elimination is not possible, not. even through special 
t.raining met.bods. This is anot.her i::1st.ance which suppo::-ts my 
suggestion that future research might be conduct.ed as a joint 
ventl:re between students in the fie':'d of ma!'lagement and 
psychology. 
One fea::- of the CO was related to a currently "hot topic" 
in the armed forces; sexua l harassment. The analysis :Jf 
willard supports my opinion that the perception of be:'1avior 
can be very different from the actual conduct. I n this case 
the actual behavior appeared to be proper, but, in tbe light 
of the current aftermath of the tai':' :'1ook sca::1dal, the CO's 
discussion with his female subordir.ates bea::- the dangerous 
potential tbat somebody may construe them as sexl:al 
harassment. The lack of guidance seemed to be one reason for 
the fear of the CC. Willard made the following conunel'.t; 
At the risk of ove::-using the word "surprised," I was 
ql:ite surprised that the CO expressed fear that some of 
:"1.is past actions ij'l working with his female soldiers 
might, i::1 today's environment. be construed as sexual 
harassme:1t. Judging from the ir.:ormation provided by the 
CO, and fonning an opinion of the CO from this 
information, which I acknowledge is a b i t of a risky thi:1g 
to do, the CO does not sound like someone who would engage 
in behavior that could constitute sexual harassment. 
Therefore in what appears to be a recurring theme, I 
wO!'lder if the CO is cO!'lcerned with perception rather tha:1 
actual behavior. That is, that some actions from the CO's 
past might be construed as sexual harassment and thereby 
create a problem for the CO vis'a'vis his career. 
Willard discovered a risky contradiction i::1 the CO's 
attitude. The CO was concerned about his career and mentioned 
the highly competitive environment in the Anny. Nevertheless, 
242 
he refused t o parti c ipate i n "career enhancing activit i es" 
l i ke g a lf or tennis. R.ather he pursue d h is own sport i ng 
activ i ti e s lik e mountain biking or run:1 i ng, which are n o t on 
the list of the "soc i a l izing activit ies" which are favored by 
many of the off~cers, espec i al l y t he h i gh e r ranke d of f icers . 
I n another com.'llen t, ',.;ri l lard referre d to the fear of t he CO 
of looking fo01i5 :"1 in Eront of his First Sergeant. Eased o n a 
10r:9 mili t ary career and experi e nces wit h differe:1t First 
Sergeants, 'dillard related the CO's fear to a persona:' i ty 
It st.:rprised IT.e that the CO was afraid of the 1st Sgt, 
and that he would admit it . The CO sounded like an 
experie:1ced Army officer and part of his job is to be the 
"Commanding Officer" for the 1st Sgt as well as ~or the 
rest of the company . He ha s all the l egal mi l itary 
authority over the 1st Sgt. Yet he acknowledged being 
fearfu l of him. I could only presume tha t the CO's fear 
rr,ight be based on personality styl es, and that the 1st 
Sgt' s more forceful personality was difficult. for the CO 
to deal with. Add itionally, the 1st Sgt may chose to 
affect a strong dominant personality as a means of 
maintaining control not only ov er the men but indirec tly, 
over the officers as well. It is s-oecula t ive, but this 
could be somewhat of a source of pride among 1st sergeants 
in general . 
We both agreed that the ad:nission of this fear was t.he most 
striking fact. This detail caught Willard' a intereat more than 
mine. !n :"1is opi nion, those fears are usually very secret 
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fears and not. easi l y sha:::ed wit.h outsiders. The acimissiol'. 
yields a high l evel of confidence and trust between the CO and 
t.he researcher. The fact. that the fear was mentioned at the 
end of the interview p:::ocess support.s this opinion. The fact 
that this fear exists opens a new field of :::esearch. It may be 
suspected that a particular relationship exist.s between COs 
and their First Sergeants which may deserve more attention 
with respect to the e l ement of fear in this :::e:ationship. 
We ta l ked a lo t about the va l ue of fear as a positive 
motivator. Mr. Wil lard's opinion was definite l y c l ear abou t 
t his point: in milit:ary management fear is not a positive 
mo t ivator. The destruct.ive forces of fear outweigh the 
possib l e positive effects. Fear stimul ates oorrpliance ra:her 
than dedicat:ion. He was surprised that the CO used fear in a 
"staged fashion". Willard's concern was again what effect this 
behavior might. have on the overall morale of t.he company. 
During much of the interviews with the CO he described 
his methods of relating to his XO and to the men as being 
fairly easy going. He seemed to take pride in t:h i s. Yet at 
one point he described a scene in which he was quite harsh 
with one enlisted man and told him, "if I was going to 
give you your evaluation today ... this is how I wou ld rate 
you ... this is what your points would be and you would not 
get promoted today.· Clearly the CO was using fear as a 
motivator in this case . His method included having the 1st 
Sgt present. The CO knew that the 1st Sgt would then take 
any individual "spoken t.o" by the CO and proceed t.o be 
even harder on the EM than the CO had been. I felt such a 
met.hod was using fear in a fashion that. rr,ight demoralize 
the individual and perhaps use fear in a fashion that 
could have some demoralizing effect on the entire company. 
Putting it differently, I wonder what effect it would have 
on the CO if his Brigade Coromander used such tactics wi th 
him. At another point in the interview the CO discussed 
talking for an hour with the XO basically reprimanding him 
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incident.. Once agai~, the CO was 
and I question the value at 
CO cited an incidep.t earlier in 
such a tactic had been used wit h 
tea!' as a 
so, even 
career 
?inal l y, I asked Wi l lard's opinion whe tt>.er t>.e v iews fear 
as an appropriate r:tanagement tool under certain conditions, in 
certain instances, a!' f a!' certair, people? His immediate answer 
was yes. He went on to explain that every s i tuation is 
corr.p!'ised ot various corr.ponents such as the management 
objectives or the type ot task to be accomplished. 
Additionally, each situation has certain constraints and is 
defined by a variety of parameters such as time or location 
factors. Finally, individuals responsible for actual ly doing 
a task wil l differ from each other, sometimes substantially. 
He s::ated that under particular arrangements of those 
conditions, fear '"",auld be one, if not the on l y, appropriate 
managenent tool . For example, an important and c l early de:ined 
task has to be finist":ed by a given deadline ap.d a person 
cannot be positively mo::ivated to meet that tirr:e limit. In 
that. ins::ance the use of fear in order to obtain conpliance 
would be acceptable for him. 
Ee presented an example based on his experience work ing 
with patients in an inpatient drug and a l cohol treatment 
program. Discipline in this program was crucial for the 
conduct of the programs and subsequently fa!' their successful 
application. Patients who violated the rules were first asked 
to comply with the regulations. I f compliance could not be 
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achie\2d this way, a stricter counseling procedure was used to 
explain the reasons for corcp liance and the consequences in the 
case of further non-compl ianc e . If a patient would not adjust 
:'1is ber,avior accordingl y, he would be inforrr,ed that he would 
be dismissed if he viola ted the ru les one more time. Any 
future violation would then automatically res'.llt: in a 
dlsmissal. This escalat:ion included a t.hreat:, in e xtreme . 
cases of cal l ing t:he po':'ice to ensure that: the individual 
would leave the hospital grounds. Individua ':'s who required 
such extreme use of " fo rce" often do not respond to positiv"," 
reinforcements and wil l only respond to the use :Jf fear 
tact ic. in t:his case the use of po l ice. This was not 
hypothetica l i n t:hat Willard found it necessary t:o employ this 
tac':ic. The point is, certain situations may require the use 
of fea r (in this case for the prot:ection of ot.her patient:s) 
and certain individuals wi':'l only respond to the use of fear 
as a motivator, such as individuals who care l itt:le for t:he 
opinions of others. In his experience, the use of threat. or 
fear is sometimes the only way t:o accomplish t:he desired goal. 
Finally, he made clear that: for perhaps 99% of all peopl e the 
positive reinforcement wou':'d bring the desired results. But 
the remaining 1\ sometimes only respond t:o fear. 
The interview with Dr. Willard showed that he anal yzed the 
data somet:imes differently from me. Nevertheless, we agreed on 
many findings and interpretations. The maj or value of his 
contribut:ion was t:he presentation of different perspectives. 
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He cper:ed cli[ferE"nt avenues to lcuk at the :.iaea anJ brought in 
his ex[.e:::-ier.c:e dO; Army psyc:hc=-oqise. I fO"-.l:1d :,io; CCli"Ll1er.ts ve:::y 
inc:Llde psychclcg:J:a"-
ao;pecls of tCl~ ::::ea:::- analysis il: my seedy was ':::l~lf::'lled to a 
c;a'_::.s[ying ·jegree. Tr.e :::-eader ar.j pctential fut·-.lre resea:::-cher 
may W::',";:l lC i:1clude psycholcgica=- assis'_a:1ce i:1 Lilt:' conduct of 
:'1.::'s or r.er study to a higr.er liegree tr.an d::'d. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this cl'.apter I :;J::.-esent my cenc l usiens fer the three 
research questions. The three research question", will be 
answered in relaticn to the analyzed ir.tervie"", data. 
THE FIRST RESEARCH QUESTION: DO THE TWO OFFICERS FEEL ANY 
FEARS AND IF SO, WHAT ARE THEY? 
Yes, the two officers expressed a variety of fea::.-s. 
This part of the thesis is the desc::.-iptive portio:l 
intended to discover and :' ist the largest possible number of 
expressed fears which might have any re l ationship to 0:::-
influence on the persons and their workplaces. I recorded 70 
instances where the officers talked about their fears. The CO 
addressed 34 different types of fear and the XO 36. Several 
fears were ::.-eported more than once, the total number of 
different fears is 51. The types of fear covered the private 
life as well as the military environment. Some were :::-elated t o 
the private environment others to current activities in the 
workplace. The spectrum was wide and multi '--aye:::-eli, 
demonstrating clearly that fear is a very complex construct. 
With respect to Deming's requirement "Drive out fear" tl'.e 
interview data show that "the fear of speaking up" was not 
prevalent in this particular workplace. Both officers were 
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apparently :1U~_ aira:'d to air thei::- coeceres o r nak., 
s'~lggC's~_ions. Tr.ey we-::-e p;::'oies;sional , competeet, and han a t.igh 
levc~ of sf'lf confidence. Their pride a:1C thei::- dec.icatio:1 
we:::e the rr.a:or d::-:'vi:1g forces fo:::- :.he::'r activ:':::ies. ·~mer: the 
XO assurr.ec. dut~es. the inv:'terl. :"1im instanta.:leously to chec:~ 
~_he company and tt.c way tr.c company did i:"8 busi:12SS. 'rLe 
c:ncO'Jraged tr.e XO to s'J.brnit sugo:::estior.s for cr.a:1gC's and 
improvements. The CO's actio:1 i s pC'rfect l y in line w::'th :.he 
T0L philosophy. The XO Eel t free to r epo::"t m::'st a kf's, 
deficiencies, ir.effic i enc i es, or c;.Ilclear ::-egulati::ms :::0 the CO 
w:'tr. t:le request for clar:'fica ::i:J:l 0::: change. Mo reover, he 
E:1:oyed being :=-n a position ::.0 p:::ovide t~"1e CO with sugSTest i ons 
W~"1.iC:l :.a.rgf>ted the =-mprove:TIer_~_ 0: thf> ove r all compa:ly 
perfOrr:1ance. The open leade:::,s:l~p style 0: :he CO seelEed to 
empower the XO. Fo:::' example, when :he CO ir.:.roduced the XO t:) 
his r:ew ass.ignement, he a.ddressed tr.eir rf'lationship by say ing 
that they both had s i g:li: i cant posit i ons i n :.his company a:1d 
that t:le best results would be achieved if both '""ou~d lead the 
company as a teaIT .. He wan:ed the XO :'0 look c:c=-t=-ca~ at t:"1e 
company and even at the CO" T:"1e CO asked the XC, at the 
beginning of the ir relationS:"1ip, to check the behavior and :he 
activities of :'he CO to detect weaknesses and bring then to 
tr.e CO's a:tention. This behavio:::, provided a sol::d and 
tr.lstful COITUl'.on gro".lnd for a fearless atmosphere in the sense 
of Deming's TQL philosophy. 
249 
B. THE SECOND RESEARCH QUESTION: IS IT POSSIBLE TO ELIMINATE 
FEAR ENTIRELY FROM THE MILITARY WORKPLACE? 
T:'1e results o~ my study allow me to draw two conclus ions 
~egarding t he question. whet her fear can be eliminated 
er.tirely. One is closely related to Deming's point number 
eight and the otr.er has a broader scope, includi:1g the 
workplace and L'1e private e:1vironment as we l l as the 
personalities of the superior and t:'1e subordinate. 
First conc l l1 s jon : The fear of not speaking up 
prevelant in the relationsr.ip between t he CO and t he XO; t~e 
XO felt free to approach the CO without the fear of 
repercussions. Thus, it is possible to reduce t:'1is particular 
fear in the workplace substantially. 
At this point, I'd like to refer the reader again to 
reference IS (The Army Officer as Performance :.1anager). The 
battalion commander mentioned in that document created a work 
environment which was considered relatively "fearless" by the 
subordi nates. This documentation is good evidence of "what is 
possible" . 
Deming requi::::-es in his point number eight "Drive out fear" 
that the fear of speaking up in the workplace has to be 
eliminated entirely improve performance, enhanc e 
productivity, increase job satiSfaction, and have the workers 
consider themselves integral part of the whole 
organization, whose inputs and suggestions are appreciated by 
management. Deming chose a very sharp foCUS on one specific 
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fear. Ee described the negat.ive COl:s€q"..lences if this fear is 
pl::-evelant in the 'NQ!'k eIlvironment; "The eccno;nic loss of fear 
is appalling." [Re!:. 4:p. 72]. Productivity goes down, the 
failure rate increases , the cost for rework escalates, j ob 
satisfaction decreases, the employee's identification with the 
company a:1d it' 5 goals diminishes, and a vast amount: of energy 
is sidetrac: ... ed into defense strategies rather than used for 
the prmiolction process itself or the improvement of processes, 
to name a few factors. Deming as -Nel l as Ryan and Oes::reicr. 
suggest manageme:J.t styles to overcome this fear and create a 
fearless work atm::lspnere, like open commun~ca::: ~ on, 
solicitation of proposals and suggestions f o r changes a:1c 
imprQvements, reward systems fo"!:" "!:"epo"!:"t il'.g defects and faulty 
p!"o cedures, frequent interact ion of managers and workers, and 
coaching subordina~e l eaders, to give a few examples. 
In t he ccmpany in Fort Ord I found al: .. o f t hose factors in 
t he re l atio:1ship between t~e CO and ~he XO. The CO applied 
managerial tools wh ich add to the posi~ive climate in this 
particular workp l ace. 
Second conclusion; It seems that ~he entire elimination o[ 
fea"!:" in the workplace is not practicable. 
The individual worke"!:"s carry fea"!:"s wi~h them which are 
completely seperated from the work environrr.ent, but which have 
a potential to restrain their abilities and capablities in the 
workplace. For example, the fear about the safety of the 
fami ly may distract the worker f"!:"om the actual work and lead 
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to failures or inefficiencies. That fear can probably not be 
eliminated from the workplace by means usually available to 
managers or peers. I asssume that supervisors frequent l y are 
not even aware of L"1e existence of those fears . Thus. even if 
we were able to eliminate all fears which are under the 
centrol of management, a res '--dual capacity of "private fears " 
the individua l and restricts his or her 
performa!1ce. 
My study had a much broader scope tha::! the research of 
Ryan and Oestreich. Their investigation was based precisely on 
Deming's requirement of e l ininating the fear of not speaking 
up i n the workplace. I incorporated in my study a w'--der range 
and complexity of the construct of fear. The interviewees were 
asked ::: 0 talk about a wide variety 0:" fears, their poss'--ble 
origins, causes, and rela:::ionships. Beyond my intention to 
i dentify and list: the fears, that were related t.o the two 
off i cers and/or present in their workplace, I ::ried ::0 f i nd an 
answer to the question, whether those fears could possibly be 
eliminated from the workplace. Each interviewee reported six 
fears which were not directly related to the work envi!"onment 
but had the ir origin in the private environment. The existence 
of those fears have a dominant impact on my second conclus'--on. 
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C. THE THIRD RESEARCH QUESTION: DO THE INTERVIEWED OFFICERS 
BELIEVE THAT FEAR IS AN APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT TOOL? 
The answer to tr.is q uest io:l is a no, :Out. 
Both officers reported that they favored positive 
reinforce ments to lead the rr.a j or i ty of their so l diers. The co 
~:\entioned t.hat this t e chnique y i elds pos i tive resu l ts i n 95 
out of 1 00 instance s. Wi l lard suppo rted those oilta and offered 
an even more> favorable ratio. I n his opinion, 99 out o f 10D 
persons respond posit i vely to positive reinforcements. For the 
rel:lai n ing percentages. t.he two officers as well as '.1illard 
agreed that negat i ve reinforcenents, inclu ding the appl i cation 
of f ear dud threat, are the appropriate :na:1agement tool s. All 
interviewees stated clearly, that they wculd use posit i ve 
reinfo!:"cements first to achieve the desi'::"ed resu lts. I: the 
sol die'::" did :lot respond to that technique ~ law ar.d order or 
disc':'pline are endangered by the sold':'ers behavior, they wou l d 
resort to negative re inforcements . Thus, two conditjQ:1.s must 
b e present for the three inte~iewees to switch from positive 
to :legat ive reinforcements: ~, the appl ication o f positive 
methods was Llnsuccessful, ~, law and orde:!: or 
discipline are at risk:. Furthermore, the negative approach is 
needed only for a very small number of individuals. 
Included in the term discipli:1.e is the correctness of 
carrying out orders properly. All three interviewees 
comrr.ented, that they would use escalating enfo!:"cement me thods, 
which include threat a:1.d fear, to a ccomplish ccmpliance with 
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standards and regulations. If an individua l demonstrated 
apparent disObed i ence, he or she would be treated with the 
same methods as mentioned above . 
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The f cllowlr.g comments reflect my accumu l ated experience 
relat:ed to t l"'.is study and are int.ended to ass i st :uture 
researchers in designing and conducting the:tJ:: prcj e ccs. 
Moreover, I will outline some ques~ions whi c h came to mind 
dur ing t:he study. These :nay serve as a basis for fur t her 
research. 
The introducto r y mee':: ing was of crucial importa!l.ce for the 
success of ~_he data gaL'1ering. We establ i shed an at:ncsphere of 
mut~a l trust and und e rstanding. The i ntervi e wees were. f amiliar 
with t h e topic before we started t he actua l work. The meeti r.g 
gave t hem some lead time for mental preparation and avoided 
the danger of misunderstandings or confrontation. W"n f> O 'oN e 
started the interviews t he t'No o:ficer-s wer-e ver-y e ager- to 
ccntr-ibute tc the success of ::he study by pr-ovi d ing a maximum 
o~ input. I sugges,: using a similar- approach whenever- a 
longitudinal in':erview prcgram like thi s is requ i red. 
The interview method proved ':0 be an apprcpr i ate ::001 for-
this particular study. The topic was covered sufficien:: l y and 
the data gathered a l lowed an in':ensive analysis . Neverti'.ele33, 
t.he extent to which information wi ll be prcvided by 
interviewees is highly dependent on the relationship between 
the inte:::viewer a:ld his interviewees. I could establ ish a 
255 
positive re l ationship whi ch supported my er.deavor 0:" data 
collection . I recornrr.end that researc~ers devot2 sufficien r. 
t ~me and energy to ensure t:'1at t he ir-terv~ew atmosp~ere is 
characterized by trust and sympat~y. 
One at my intent'--ons to c onduct this in depth stl<.dy was t 8 
c reate a basis fo::.- future research projects. During my 
interviews ar-d t:'1e to l lowing analys i s a variety of questions 
arose w:'1ich cou l d not be answered by my data and wh i ch might 
s timulate other researche::.-s to cont i nue this work. In this 
chapte r I will briefly p:-esent my thoughts to introduce 
possible areas of further research; 
1. 1 selected Ule in-depth, repeated interview of one pair 
of off i cers to explo::.-e the question of fear i n t he workplac e . 
Whi le broad generalization and conclusions can not be drawn 
from studying one part i cular subordinate-superior dyad, such 
an approach leads to a deeper understanding of the dynamics 
involved. Another, more convenient, approach would be tc lse 
a large r sample size and administer a questionnaire to c.=ck 
if my findings are also valid for a l arger population like a 
brigade, a division, or an army. 
2. I am a Navy officer and I found it exciting to conduct 
the study in the Army environment. From my a l most 20 years of 
service I remember, that the various services have different 
cultures, which influence the general leadership approaches in 
each service. Thus, another .:. '-- rection for research would be to 
explore the element of fear different services and compare 
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the outcomes . The ow specific questions, which came to mind 
du ring my study, were; Does one cc.lture favor the deve::'opment 
of fear more than another? To ..... hi ch ext e nt do the c.u lture s 
requ i r e t he J.ndividuals to suppress their :ears 7 
3. The sample fo r my study '"",as comprised of t. '""'O mi;i l e 
o f fic.ers. Th is is only one possible combination for a superior 
subordinate pair . Further studies may investigate other 
combinations invol ving females and/or members of minority 
groups. ':'he point o f intere st could be '"",hethcr other 
combinations of individuals yield c.i ff ere!1t f ear patterns. Tr-.e 
same s t.udy may also be ext.ended to the question what. J.mpact 
L"le SOC i ologica l backg round or the heri tage may have on the 
development of t ea r s. 
4. -: chose the company level for my study. This i s a l e vel 
of respons ibility in the middl e sect i on o[ tr.e mi lit ary 
hierarchy. I '"",as wonder ir:g whether people on othe r l evel s of 
the hierarchy have different fears or whet her t h e fear 
intensity may change. In particular, i t may be interesting to 
explore whether a re lationship exists bet 'Neen the position of 
an individual in the need hie rarchy of Maslew and the tears 
they e xperience or the intensity of the fears they experience. 
APPENDIX A: EXPRESSED FEARS LISTED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF 
EXPRESSION 
The list sum.:narizes a l l fears, expressed by the o~ficers 
during L1.e interviews. They are l is~ed in chroQological order. 
Eve!:y time, a fea!: was reported , an entry in the list was 
made. Thus , the same fear may appea r several times . 
Fo::- purposes of late!" analysis I have added three columns. 
In the first column, labeled "expressed" it is spec i fied who 
mentioned this fear. The possible entries are XO or co. The 
second column, l abeled 11 frequency", !"eflects how often a fear 
was reported . The numbers are cumulative for each type of 
fear. In the third column, labeled "PI" (Personal Importance), 
an entry for the degree of personal importance is made. Each 
expression of fear is recorded and each has it's unique level 
of importance for the individual. Th is classification sys terr. 
i ncludes the element of subjective assessment. The importance 
was not always explicitly stated by the particular officer, 
but i ndicators like raised voice, impulsive gestures, or 
exc itement, signaled to me tha t the fear was af some 
significance to him. Whenever I could reasonabl y assume, that 
the reported fear seemed of impartance for the interviewee, I 
registered that impression. The ranking sys tem I used for 
classification consiseed of three ca tegories. I assigned the 
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letter E (highl for a :ear which seer.1ed to be of great 
importance, the letter t1 {medium) for O:1e w:"1ich seemed to be 
of some importance, and the letter L (10''':) far a fear tha t 
appeared to be a: less or lit-tle importance. 
Expressed fears listed in chrono l ogical ord!"r of ""xpression 
Th!" abbreviated labeli:1g of t-he calu:nns is as foll ows: 
No ~ Chro:1ological o rder in which :ears we-::e expressed 
Expr - Expressed by CO or XO 
~'req = Frequency of report (number of occurre:1ces; 
P I Personal i:nportance {H,M, L) 
No Description of fea::: Expr Freq 
01 Getting physically injured CO 
02 Admitting '0 have fear CO 
03 Selecting ,he correct course of CO 
action. Making wrong decisions 
To :::eceive negative evaluat i on CO 
05 Personal failure CO 
06 C"Iak i ng wrong decisions CO 





08 Looking foolish in f:-on:: of CO 
subordinates or other soldiers 
09 Implementing necessary changes, when CO 
doubtful of own abilities 
10 Getting punished for mistakes, the CO 
subordinates ~ke 
Interference of military and private CO 
environment 
12 The unknown XO 
13 The inability '0 assess what might xo 
happen after death 
14 :::xpeccations placed on him by others XO 
15 No' meet~ng expectations and being xo 
looked ar a, less of a ~n, or less 
of an officer 
16 Personal fa i lure XO 
17 Making wrong decisions XO H , 
18 Failure ro comply wi th group norms XO 
and values 
Looking foolish ,n front of xo 
subordinates or other sold iers 
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Getting punished for mi s t.akes xo 
subordir:.ates make 
21 Negative myths about future xc 
situat~ons l ike training programs 
So:nebody else may screw up his l ife . xo 
Fear of getting a faulty pac:-ced 
parachute 
23 :-:aking wron g dec i sions. Execut.ing xo 
tasks in an unprofes s ional manr.er 
24 Negative conseq'.lences in the case of XO 
wrong decisions (negative evaluac i on) 
25 Fa:'lir.g in t:'1e handling of excess:'ve XO 
and unfamil iar paperwork 
Getting on the termination list xo 
27 Uncontrolled actions due to anger, CO 
fury, or irritation 
28 Mi sinterp:retat{on of his statements CO 
by other people 
Moral decay in the US society co 
) 0 Impac t of aids on the society co 
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~ 1 Increase of gang-related vio l ence aod CO 
violence 
'0 schoo l s 
32 Any type of threat or da!1ger for his CO 
family. :-lis limited ability to 
provide a safe environment for ~he 
family 
33 Getting beater. up (only during r,igh CO 
scho:)l) 
34 3 eing for ,od to wa:-::e decisions based CO 
on too little inforrnati:)!1. Mak '.. ng 
wrong dec i sions 
35 Affect.ing many ·people's lives through CO 
tr,orough investigations 
36 Upsetting people, because his CO 
I 
decision was incorrect in thei r minds 
37 Getting punished for mistakes, the ce 
" 
II 
subordinates =ke (i n his absence) 
38 Not living up to group standards XO M 
'I 
39 Not contributing sufficiently to XO 
group per f ormance 
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Not living up :::0 the vdlues of the I xo 
military, t.he val ues of the officer's 
oi;ith 
Not rea l iz i ng changes in the vaLle 
s yste:n (related to 10) 
42 Get:::ir.g disr:lissed due to miscon::iuct xo 
(rela ted to 40 and 41) 
43 I:1crease in random violence in some x o 
Temper of his father (only during Xo 
c:"1ildhood: 
45 Pailure in the marriage Xo 
16 Failure in educati!1g his children xc 
correctly (re l ated to 45) 
Net living up to t.he expectations, he XO 
bel ieves, the CO has of him 
48 I Negative evaluation (as a consequence 
of 47) 
Forced to make decisions based on too 




50 fsychological distress, as a 
consequence of people's reactio!l.s, 
when they r ecognize, he is i!l. the 
l:'li l itary 
51 To l oose in a competition. Downsizi!l.g XO 
creates a highly competitive Army 
environment. Related to the fear of 
failure. 
I 
52 Stressful interaction between xo 
cultural ly different groups hampers 
effectiveness and mission 
accomplishInent of uni t 
5-' CO is a tyrant (hypothetical, because xo 
actua l relationship is ok) 
54 Getting negative evaluations, if XO 
conduct is not appropriate 
55 Fear of failing to execute tasks as xo 
desired by CO 
56 CO is not capable of leading the unit XO 
and providing appropriate guidance. 








58 ;.Jot be i ng able '0 meet e xpectations XC 
Whether c omments o f b i o l og ieal or 
medical :1ature ·in a d iscussion ' .... ith 
fe:na l es cou l d be construed as sexu a l 
ha r assment 
60 :?robable l.mproper behavior and CO 
i:1appropriate performance ,n the past 
6 1 Rumors about his person CO 
" 
Personal failure CO 
63 No':. bei:1g train ed sufficien tly '0 CO 
perfo.:::n correctly '0 a j ob 
I 64 Fai l u re i n t he executio:1 o f duti e s as CO 
a consequence of 63 
65 Getting a n e gative eva l uation as a CO :0 
I consequence o f 6 4 
66 Get ting d i smissed as a consequence of CO 
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I' 67 Signir.g paper-s ·under time pressure or CO 
extremely high work load. Not enough 
time fo r effective checks 
58 Pressure from superiors a.nd peers to CO 
I 
conform to certain group norms which 
he does not accept: 
69 Failure w e x ecut::'ng his tasks CO 
70 Looking bad in front of rhe First CO 
Sergeant 
266 
APPEND IX B: EXPRESSED FEARS LISTED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF 
APPARENT IMPORTANCE TO THE CO/XO 
':'Oi5 list SUITmarizes all fears expres s~d by t he officers 
dULl.ng t nc interviews. ':'he fears are arranged wit h reqa~d to 
r- he' r aonarent personal importance level (s e e co l l ' m-' 2I1 
rather than cr.ro::lOlogt~ll. I s t ar t ed with the tears of the CO, 
ranking them from r.igh to lew importance . The fears of the XO 
come next fol l owing the same pattern. 
For purposes of later analysis I have added t h ree colullli1s . 
I n the first column , l a beled "expressed" it is specif i ed who 
mentioned this fear. The possible e nLr ies are XO or ::0, The 
second ~Q:um.l·l, labeled "frequency", reflects, how eften a fear 
was report ed. The n:.lmbers are cumulative for each type of 
f ear. In t he third coll'!Nl, l abeled " PI", aI', entry for the 
degree of personal impo!' t ance is made. Each fea!' has it's 
unique leve l of i rr,portance for the individual. The importar.ce 
was r.ot always explicitly stated by t he pa!'ticular officer, 
but indicators like raised voice, impulsive gestu res, or 
excitement, signaled to me, that the fear was of some 
significance to him. Whenever I could reasonably assume t hal 
the reported fear seemed of importance for the interviewee, I 
r egistered that impression. The rank i ng system I used for 
classification consisted of three categories. I assigned the 
267 
letter H (high) fa!:" a fear whi ch seemed to l:;e of gre::l.t 
importance , t he letter M (medium ) for O:le wh ich seemed to ~;~ 
of some importance , and the le t_te r L (low) for a f ear tr.at 
appeared to be o f less or little impo!:" tap..ce . 
Expressed fea:cs l isted in descepding 8rder of" importance t8 
The abbreviated label i ng of the columns is as fo l l ows; 
EX!lr .. Expres sed b y CO 
Fr eq '" Frequency of report (number o f occur:cences) 
Persona l impor t ance (H, M, L) 
Descript ion of fear 
03 Selecting the correct course of 
action. Maki ng wrong decisions 
06 Maki:lg w:CO:lg decisions 
34 Bei:lg forced to rnake decisions based 
on too little informa tion . Making 
wrong decisions 
04 To receive negative eva luation 
05 Personal failure 
62 Personal fai lure 














,--,--- - -------------------.----,----,-- -
07 Give presentat:'ons to high ranked E 
audience s 
10 Geeting punished fo:::- mistakes, the CO 
subordinates rr.ake 
37 Gettlng punisr.ed for mistak es, the CO 
subordinates make (in h.ls absence) 
Geeting beaten up (only du:::-ing hig h co I H 
school) 
63 Not beiog trained sufficiently to CO 
perform correctly in a joh 
64 FailClre in t he execution of duties as 
a consequence of 63 
65 Getting a negat ive evaluation as a 
consequence o f 64 
66 Getting dismissed as a consequence of CO 
65 
31 Increase of gang -related violence and CO 
violence in schools 
32 Any type of threat or danger for his 
family. His limited ability co 
provide a safe envi:::-onment for the 
:amily 
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-59 Whether com:nents of biological or CO M 
med i cal nature rn a discussion with 
fe males could be construed a, sext.:al 
harassment 
60 Probable improper behavior and CO 
inappropriate perfo~nce in the past 
6 1 Rumors about h i s person CO 
67 Signing papers under ::~me uressure or CO 
extreme l y high work l oad. Not enough 
';::1-ffi8 for effective checks 
70 Looking bad in ~ront of :.he First CO 
Sergeant 
01 Getting physically injured CO L 
I. 
02 Aclmitting to have fear CO 
08 Looking foo l ish in front of CO 
subordinates or other soldiers 
09 Imp l ementing necessary changes, when CO 
dcubtful of O~ abilities 
In terference o f military and private CO 
environment 
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-27 Uncontrolled actions due t o anger, 
tury, or irritation 
213 Misinterpre:ation of his statements co 
by other peop l e 
Moral decay in the US society CO 
Irr,pact of aids on the society CO 
Affecting rr.any people's lives through CO 
chorough i nvestisacions 
36 Upsetting people, because r. is CO 
ciecis ion was incorrect in their minds 
68 ?ressure from superiors and peers to CO 
cor.form to cereai::! group norms which 
he does not accept 
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Expressed fears listed in descer.dbg order of' importance 
The abbreviated l abeli:1g of :he columns is as fo l lows: 
Expr .. Expressed by XO 
?reg ~ Frequency of report. (number of occurrences ) 
Personal importance (H,M, L) 
No Description of fear Expr 
The unknown XO 
" 
The inability to assess wr.at might XO 
happen after death 
16 Personal failure xo 
51 To loose in a competition . Downsizing XO 
creates a hig:'l.ly compet i tive Army 
environment . Related to the fear of 
failure. 
Maki:1g wrong decisions xo 
23 Making wrong decisions . Execu t ing XO 
ta s ks in an unprofessional manner 





22 SOmebQ~Y e lS ~ may screw up his life. I XO 
Fear of gett~ng a fa'.llty packed 
parachute 
Negative c.onsequences in c h i:' case of XO 
wrong decisions {negative evaluatio:1) 
4 8 Negative evaluation (as a consequence XC 
of 47) 
5 4. Getting negative eva! uatiO:1s, if XO 
conduct is not ap~ropriate 
26 Getting on the terr.1ination list 
39 Not contributing sl,;,fficiently to Xo 
group perfonnance 
40 Not living up to the val",es of the XO 
military, the values of the officer's 
oat:J. 
Not real izing changes in the value XO 
system (related to 40) 
Getting dismissed due to misconduct xo 
(related to 40 and 41) 
47 Not living up to the expectations, he XO 
bel ieves, the CO has of him 
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14 I Expectations placed on him by others xo I 1 
II 
15 I Not meeting e xpectat ion, and being XO 
looked at as l ess of a man, or l ess 
I at an officer 
2 1 Negative myths about future xo 
situations lik e training programs 
25 Failing in the handling of excess~ve XC 
I 
~ 
I and ctn!:amiliar paperwork 
38 Not living up to group standards XC 
" :1 
I ncrease ~n random viol ence ~n some XO 
45 Failure in the marriage XO 
46 Failure in educat ing his children XO 
correctly (related to 45) 




55 Fear of f ailing to execute tasks as xo 
I 
M 
desired b y CO 
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56 CO is not capable of leadir.g the unit XO 
ar,d providing apprcpriate guidance. 
This will l ead to feelings like 
uncertain t y, l:e l plessr.ess. 
J d;..ssatisfact i on 
5 7 CO is an idiot or moron (::.-elated to Xo 
5G) 
58 Not being able to meet expectations xo 
19 Looking foolish in f::.-ont of XO 
subordinates or other soldiers 
Temper of :'1is fat.her (only during XO 
childhood ) 
49 Forced to Il'.ake decisions based on too XO 
little information 
50 f'sychologica l distress, xo 
consequence of people's ::.-eactiO!1S, 
·,.;her, they recognize, he is in t.he 
mil itary 
52 St.::.-essful interaction bet· .... een xo 
cult.urally diffe!:"ent groups hampers 
effectiveness and mission 
accomplishment of unit 
275 
Failure to corr.ply with group :lO~.S 
and values 
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APPENDIX C: EXPRESSED FEARS LISTED IN DESCENDING ORD ER OF 
FREQUENCY 
The fol l o wing liSt. sununarizes particular fears which were 
~::?ressed two or more t-=--mes and appeared ::'0 be of some 
i mnortanc:'e to ::.he sgeaker. 
For pUrpos!"S of later analysis I have added three COlUlfJ:1S. 
The tJ.~ is labeled "expressed" and contains the 
"nwrber" , ';Ie find the chronol ogically a ssigned nUInne:::- for the 
fears. Those nurnD er-s r efer back to Appendix A. The t1liI:..d 
~, labeled trfrequency~, ref l ects the t otal number of 
recordings for that particu l ar fear. 
Expressed fears in descending orde"'- of frequency 
The abbreviated labeling of the columns is as fo l lows: 
Ex '" Expressed by CO or XO 
NO = Chronological number of the expressed fear 
Freq = Frequency of report (::lumber of occurrences) 
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3x Description of fear 
xo I Not meeting expectations/ Not living up 
to standards 
XO Getting negative evaluations 







03 06 'x 
co Personal failure/Failure in executing his 05,62 ]x 
tasks 





Looking foolish in front of other 
soldiers 
Making wrong decisions 
Personal failure 
CO an idiot/CO incapable of leading the 
unit 
Failure in the marriage or in educating 









APPENDIX D: EXPRESSED FEARS IN RELATION 
TO THE 3 - CIRCLE MODEL OF FEAR 
The list summarizes a l l fears, p:cesented by the off ice rs 
during the in te rvi ews. Each expression of' fear j;.; assigned to 
a pan.icu.lar circle or area of t.he fear moCel . They are also 
listed in chronologica1 order . Every time, a Eear was 
reported, an en~_ry in the l i st was made. Th us, t.:,e Beirne fea.r 
may appear several times. For purposes of late r analysis I 
have added t:"1ree co l umns. In the first co i llmn, labe l ed 
"expressed", it is specifies who mentioned this fear. The 
possible entries are xo :Jr CO. The second col Umn, labeled 
"mod e l", ref l ects the assignment of a fear to a certain circle 
or area 1D the fear model. The t hird colurrD, l abeled 
"freq'-lency", reflects, how often a fear is reported. 
Expressed fears in relation to the 3-circle model of fear 
The abbreviated labeling of the columns is as fol l ows; 
Expr ~ Expressed by CO or XO 
Mod - Assignment of a fear to a circle or area in the fear 
mOdel. The possible entries are A, 8, and C for the 
circles and I, II, III, and IV for the areas. 
Freq _ ?requency of report (number of occurrences) 
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No Descrip'::.ion of fear Expr Mod ?c:cc,: 
01 Ge'::.ting physically ir.j'..u:-ed CO 
Admitting to have fear CO 
Selecting L'18 correct COl:.rse of CO 
action. Making wrar.g decisior.s 
C1 To receive negative evaluat:"on CO 
C5 Personal fail'.lre CO 
Makir.g wro::1g dec:"sio:1s 
C7 Give prese:1tatio:1s to high ranked CO 
al:.die:1ces 
08 Looking foolish ,n front of CO 
subordinates or o'::.her soldiers 
Implementing necessary changes, when CO 
doubtful of own abilities 
Getting p'.mished for mis'::.akes, the CO 
subordinates make 
Interference of military and private 
environment 
12 The unknown XO 
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13 The inabili::y '0 assess what :nigh:' XO 
:lappen after death 
14 I Expectations placed on him oy others I XO 
15 Not meeting expectations and being XO 
l ooked ao as less of a man, or l ess 
of an off ice r 
16 Personal :ailure 
Making wrong dec i sions 
18 Fai l ure '0 ccmply with group norms 
and values 
1 9 Looking foolish in front of 
subordinat es cr other soldiers 
20 Getting punished for mistakes XO 
suDo::.-dir.at es ~ke 
" 
Nega:.ive myths about future xo 
situations like training programs 
22 Somebody else may s crew up his life. XO 
Fear of getting a fau l ty packed 
parachute 
23 Making wrong de c isions. Executing XO 







24 Nega:ive consequences in the case 0: XO 
wrong decisions (negative 
eva l uation) 
25 Failing in the handling of excessive X8 
and unfa'1\il iar paperwork 
26 Getting on the termination list XO 
His own l,;.ncontrol l ed actions due to CO 
a nge:- , fury, or i:-ritation 
28 Misinterpretation of h i s statements CO 
by othe:- people 
29 Mora l decay in t he US society CO 
30 Impact of aids on the socieo:.y CO 
31 Increase of gang-related violence CO 
and viol ence in schools 
32 Any type of threat or danger for his CO 
family. His limited ability to 
provide a safe environment for the 
family 




34 Being fo~ced to make deCiSions, based I CO 
on too l~ttle i:1Eormatlor. . Maklng 
wrong decisions 
3 5 AfEect~ng many people's lives CO 
through thorough i nvestigations 
36 upsett i ng people, b e cause his 
decislon was incorrect in their 
minds 
37 Getting punished for mistakes, the ::0 
subordinac::es IT·.ake ( in his absence) 
38 Not living up to group standards 
39 Not cont ributing sufficient l y to xo 
group performar:ce 
Not living up to the values of the 
military, t he values of the 
officer's oath 
Not realizing changes in the value XO 
system (re l ated t o 40) 
42 Getting dismissed due to misconduct Xo 
(relat ed t.o 40 and 41) 
Increase in random violence in some 
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44 Terr-.per of his father (or.ly during Xo 
childhood) 
45 Failure i r. the marriage xo 
4 6 Failure in educati:1g his childre:1 XO 
correct l y (related to 45) 
47 Not living up to '-he expectations, xo 
he believes, the CO has of him 
45 Negative evaluation (as a xo 
consequence of 47) 
49 Forced to make decis ions based on xc III 
too litt l e information 
50 Psychological distress, xo 
consequence of peopl e's reactions, 
when they recognize, he is in the 
military 
5l To loose in a competition. xo 
Downsizing creates a highly 
compet.itive Army environment . 
Related to the fear of failure. 
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5 2 Stressful interaction between XO 
culturally differe:1t gr::mps hampers 
effectiveness and mission 
accomp l ishment o f unit 
53 I CO is a tyrant (hypothetical, 
because actual relationship is ok! 
xo 
Ge~ting negative evaluations, if XO 
conduct is not appropriate 
Fear of faili:1g to execute tasks as XO 
des i red by CO 
5 6 CO is not capable of l eadir.g the XO 
unit and providing appropriate 
guidance. This .will lead to feelings 
l ike uncertainty, helpleSS:1ess, or 
dissatisfactior. 
CO is an idiot or moron (related to Xo 
56) 
58 Not being able to meet expectations XO 
59 Whether comments of biological or co 
medical nature in a discussion with 





60 I Probable improper behavior and 
inappropriate perEonnance in the 
past 
co I A 
61 Rumors about h is person CC 
62 Personal failure CO 
63 Not being trained sufficiently to CO 
perform correctly in a job 
I 6.', Failure in the execution of duties CO 
as a consequence of 63 
65 Getting a negative evaluation as a CO 
consequence of 64 
66 Getting dismissed as a consequence CO 
of 65 
67 Signing papers under time pressure CO 
or extremely :'ligh work load. Not 
enough time Eor effective checks 
68 Pressure from superiors and peers to co 
conform to cer t ain group norms which 
he does not accept 
69 Failure in executing his tasks CO 
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Looking bad i n front of the Firs t 
Sergeant 
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APPENDIX E: RESUME DAVID L. WILLARD, PH.D. 
To give the reader an overview of Mr. Wil l ard's education 
and professional positions, I provide this short list. It is 
not a complete resume, b ·..lt it serves the purpose of 
introduc ing Mr. Wi l lard. 
1971 Ph. D. 
1970 M. A. 
1968 1969 
Cl inical Psychology, University oEAlaba.rna 
Cl inical Psychology, U:1iversity of Alabama 
Cl inica l Psycho l ogy Internship 
Letterrna:1 Army Medical Center, San 
Francisco 
1966 8. A. Psychology, Mississippi State Universit_y 
1994 · 1982 




Pr ofessional Positions 
Clinical Psychologist, Recovery Center, 
Monterey, Ca 
Private Practice, Psychotherapy ar.d 
Testing 
Adjunct Associate Prcfessor, Chapman 
College, MO:1terey, CA 
Director, Clinical Psychology Internship 
Chief, Psychol ogy Service 
Si l as E. Hays Army Community Hospital 
Fort Ord, CA 
Academic Coordinator, 
Adjunct Associate Professor, Chapma:1 
College, Monterey, CA 
Chief, Psychology Service, Fitzsimons Army 
Medical Center, Denver, Colorado 
Staff Psychologist, Silas B. Hays Army 
Conununity Hospital, Fort Ord, CA 
Chief, Psychology Service , 24th Evacuation 
Hospital, Long Binh, Republic of Vietnam 
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Mr. Willard was or St ill is membe~ of t h e follm"ing 
oraa;)"; zations : 
Me:nber, Ar:lerican Psychological Association 
Dipl omate in Cl inica l Psychology : American Board of 
Professional Psychology 
Fellow and Diplomate: I!1ternat i onal Academy of Behaviora l 
Med:"cine. Counse l ing, and Psychotherapy 
Member, Co unc i l !:or the International :<.egiste r of Healt h 
Provi ders in Psycho logy 
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